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1. Special issue introduction 
 
This special issue of European Transport contains a selection of six papers that are all 
based on the findings of the DIFFERENT project. DIFFERENT was a two-year project, 
co-funded by the European Commission’s DGTREN under the Sixth Framework 
Programme of Research. 
DIFFERENT started from the premise that in the European Union, levels and 
structures of transport infrastructure charges vary strongly across transport modes and 
countries. In the presence of unsolved difficulties in funding transport investment and 
serious concerns about the envisaged application of marginal social cost pricing, any 
convergence is slow. Furthermore, existing charging regimes are often far from 
internalising external costs and rarely based on efficiency principles. In this situation, 
differentiation of existing charges appeared to be a sensible intermediate step that 
merited dedicated research based on four building blocks: economic theory and 
behavioural theory provide the foundations, while the main pillars are empirical 
research based on case studies and modelling work. 
The first of the six papers, by Jasper Knockaert, Christos Evangelinos, Piet Rietveld 
and Bernhard Wieland starts with an explanation of the economic theory, in particular 
the concepts of normative and positive theory, but then continues to explore the 
empirical evidence to establish how different factors affect infrastructure pricing as 
described by theory; these factors are: aims of the pricing scheme, user demand, cost 
structure, the cost of price differentiation, but also political factors. To this end 
information was collected from 27 case studies, and a cross-case analysis was carried 
out based on a number of hypotheses that were drawn from the theoretical framework. 
Testing for the hypotheses using the case study information allowed identifying how 
key aspects of the theory of price differentiation are dealt with in the setting of actual 
implementations and helped establishing an overview of the current state of 
differentiated infrastructure charging. One of the key conclusions of the paper is that 
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lobby activities are a major explanatory variable for the differentiated charging 
structure. 
The second foundation of the DIFFERENT project, behavioural theory, is the basis 
for the paper by Lars Rößger, Jens Schade and Terje Tretvik and applied here in the 
context of freight operators. While it is often argued that behavioural aspects are only 
important for passengers, and freight operators will base their decisions on purely 
rational aspects, the authors found here that a positive attitude is also for this group an 
important factor for prospective success and effectiveness of a pricing scheme. This 
finding was based on 18 telephone interviews with hauliers operating in an urban 
environment and questionnaires filled in by 17 involved in interurban transport. More 
generally, the results show that a global index of acceptability of differentiation 
elements is particularly strongly correlated with the likelihood of future behavioural 
changes in the medium term as well as in the long term. 
The case studies used for the empirical work in DIFFERENT covered all four 
transport modes: waterborne, air, rail and road; however, of the four remaining papers in 
this issue, two address road user charges and two rail charges. 
The first one of the papers related to road charging, by Davide Fiorello and Angelo 
Martino focuses on charges for motorways, with some alternative options also charging 
on national roads. The two test beds used are the Brenner Corridor, which has mainly 
through-traffic and no capacity problems, and the Padana region with two motorways 
with mainly local traffic and high levels of congestion. For the Brenner Corridor, an 
“environmental” differentiation of charges leads to an increase of travel time in all 
tested scenarios, because part of the traffic shifts onto the ordinary roads, with an 
overall worsening of congestion. The best results here were achieved when truck 
motorway tolls were reduced and, at the same time, goods vehicles were tolled on 
ordinary roads, since this caused a cross-shift of cars from the motorway to the ordinary 
roads and vice-versa for goods vehicles and, as a result, both segments benefited from 
less congestion and reduced travel costs. For the Padana region it was found that total 
costs for travellers exceeded the benefits and, furthermore, that pollution was increased 
in all scenarios. Hence, the key recommendation in this paper is to fully investigate the 
overall network effects before introducing any charge on part of the network. 
The second paper concerning road user charges, by Peter Bonsall and Mike Maher, is 
also based on modelling work, but compares the effects of motorway charges, urban 
road charges and schemes that combine both in metropolitan areas, where both road 
systems are closely interwoven. A wide range of scenarios was modelled for a network 
that was loosely based on the City of Edinburgh, covering strategies including full 
charging on all roads, on motorways only, on motorway access roads, on urban roads 
only, and at cordons. One key finding was that introducing charges on motorways has 
much lower benefits than charges on congested urban roads. Furthermore, independent 
of the type of road, charges linked to congestion turned out to be much more beneficial 
than per kilometre charges. The highest benefits overall could be achieved with “first 
best” charges, i.e. charges that reflect the social marginal cost of each vehicle on each 
link. However, when implementation costs are taken into account, the best performing 
scheme was a cordon charge combined with a per-km charge for use of motorways 
outside the cordon. 
Within the first of the two papers related to rail charges Bryan Matthews, Christos 
Evangelinos, Daniel Johnson and David Meunier, focus, more specifically, on rail 
freight. The paper starts by summarising some findings from the very limited existing 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 43 (2009): 1-3 
 3 
literature on the effects of differentiated charging schemes, before continuing to 
investigate how users react to different charging schemes in the real world through 25 
stakeholder interviews as well as observation of reactions in the British and French 
freight market and of the take-up of the Channel Tunnel. Furthermore, the effect of 
changes in rail access charge regimes on rail and road traffic in Britain have been 
modelled. In the real world, the relationship between charging structure, and even 
overall charging level, and demand for rail transport has been impossible to prove 
conclusively, in part due to problems accessing relevant data. However, the modelling 
indicated that different structures of access charges could incentivise rail traffic at least 
to some extent for longer transport distances. 
The final, and second paper related to rail, comes from David Meunier and Emile 
Quinet; while focussing on just one transport mode they, at the same time, complete the 
circle back to economic theory. They explore the optimal infrastructure charges where 
the infrastructure manager sells the use of the infrastructure to operators, who act in an 
imperfectly competitive market and provide services to a downstream market made up 
of an infinite number of end users; thereby they focus in particular on Short-Run 
Marginal Cost Pricing. Following on from explaining the general concepts that apply in 
this situation, the authors then simulate a range of scenarios. In general, they established 
that in cases of imperfect competition the optimal tariff is highly dependent on the 
specificities of the situation, including the level of the cost of public funds, the nature of 
competition and the demand functions. More poignantly, they found that in many cases 
marginal cost pricing leads to non-negligible welfare losses. However, the final 
conclusion from this paper, as already implied in others before, is that more research is 
needed to fully explain the relationship between infrastructure charges, user reaction 
and overall impacts. 
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Abstract 
 
In the European Union, the infrastructure charging regimes that can be observed are often far from 
internalising external costs and are rarely based on efficiency principles. In this situation differentiation of 
existing charges appears to be a sensible intermediate step. 
In this paper we study the empirical evidence of the different aspects that affect infrastructure pricing 
as described by theory. In order to do so information was collected from a number of case studies, and a 
set of indicators was defined, not only to allow for the analysis of price differentiation practise with 
respect to the degree of differentiation, but also to account for the level of ambition of the price setting 
actors. 
The cross-case analysis was based on a number of hypotheses that were drawn from the theoretical 
framework. Testing for the hypotheses using the case study information allowed us to establish an 
overview of the current state of differentiated infrastructure charging. 
 
Keywords: Price differentiation; Infrastructure; Special interest groups; Normative economics; Positive 
economics. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the European Union, levels and structures of transport infrastructure charges vary 
strongly across transport modes and countries. Some degree of convergence exists on 
the intention to apply the principle of marginal cost pricing in various transport sectors, 
but, in the presence of unsolved difficulties in funding transport investment and even 
serious concerns about marginal social cost pricing in several countries, any such 
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convergence is slow. At present, the charging regimes that can be observed are often far 
from internalising external costs and are rarely based on efficiency principles. 
In this situation differentiation of existing charges appears to be a sensible 
intermediate step. A possible way to increase the efficiency of pricing structures would 
be to take existing structures as a starting point and try to increase their efficiency by 
making them more differentiated. This may, however, lead to a number of questions 
such as: how differentiated should these price structures be in order to lead to efficiency 
gains, how will users react, what are the effects on equity and revenues, etc. The effects 
on revenues deserve particular emphasis here, because in many countries plans exist to 
replace the existing system of taxed based infrastructure financing with a system based 
on user charges. 
Economic theory has brought us an ample set of considerations with respect to 
differentiated prices. Pigou showed already in 1920 in his economic analysis of road 
pricing and congestion costs that a levy equal to the marginal external costs should be 
levied in order to correct for suboptimal behaviour of individual road users. Over the 
decades, scholars have elaborated on behavioural, technical, political, and many other 
impacts on the optimal form of differentiated infrastructure prices. 
In this paper we study the empirical evidence of the different factors that affect 
infrastructure pricing as described by theory. In order to do so information was collected 
from a number of case studies that were conducted in the DIFFERENT project. The 
case studies concern both real world implementations as well as desk based research of 
the introduction of differentiated infrastructure charges. A cross case analysis allows us 
to identify how key aspects of the theory of price differentiation are dealt with in the 
setting of actual implementations. 
The theoretical framework that we use as a basis for our study is represented in 
figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Analytical framework. 
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Figure 1 identifies five different factors that affect price differentiation. The left-hand 
side of the framework gives three (normative) arguments which may explain differences 
in price setting: objectives among infrastructure managers and operators may be 
different, with economic theory focussing on the role of economic efficiency and equity. 
Also the implications of the particular cost structure of the transport industry for pricing 
are being studied, as well as the demand of the infrastructure user. 
But there are also other issues that are relevant for user charge differentiation. Policy 
makers may well affect price setting in transport. This is where the positive branch of 
economic theory of price differentiation comes in (at the top of figure 1). The normative 
approach assumes that all politicians or regulators maximize welfare, but, at the same 
time, they may also pursue their own goals (e.g. re-election). Consequently, interest 
groups can have substantial influence on them. Considerations like these are of 
particular relevance as they may considerably affect the differentiation of user charges. 
Finally also practical issues are important (in the middle of figure 1). For instance, a 
highly differentiated first best pricing scheme may have large implementation costs, if 
technically feasible at all. A high degree of sophistication also implies significant 
decision costs for the infrastructure user. We refer to the GRACE project for more 
information on the appropriate degree of complexity in transport charges (see e.g. 
Bonsall, et al., 2006). Moreover, in an economy suggesting that less variety is 
sometimes better (Norwood, 2006), more choices (a consequence of a higher degree of 
differentiation) may also lead to more search costs.  
In order to conduct our cross case analysis we needed to collect information in a 
consistent form. To do so a fact sheet was completed for all case studies. These case 
studies were drawn from the DIFFERENT project. The DIFFERENT research project 
was carried out from 2006 through 2008 in the 6th Framework Programme of the EU 
Commission. The objective of the project was to improve the understanding of user 
reactions to differentiated infrastructure prices in order to determine efficient charging 
schemes for infrastructure use. The project investigated user reactions to differentiated 
pricing through empirical as well as inter-related theoretical work. The empirical work 
encompassed real world case studies, as well as stated and revealed preference research. 
The scope of the theoretical work included normative and positive economic theory, and 
behavioural theory. 
Furthermore, a set of indicators was defined in order to analyse price differentiation 
practise with respect to the degree of differentiation as well as to account for the level of 
ambition of the price setting actors. 
The cross-case analysis was based on a number of hypotheses that were drawn from 
the theoretical framework. Testing for the hypotheses using the case study information 
allowed us to establish an overview of the current state of differentiated infrastructure 
charging. 
 
 
2. Economic theory 
 
Economic theory provides a contribution to differentiated infrastructure pricing along 
two main lines. The first contribution concerns the formulation of the optimal 
framework (the normative approach) for transport charges differentiation. This 
framework can be determined by pursuing economic efficiency, a concept derived from 
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welfare economics, according to which transport charges (prices) should be equal to 
marginal social costs in order to obtain maximum social welfare. According to this 
theory, prices should be equal to marginal social costs (throughout the economy) in 
order to achieve this goal. 
The positive economic theory of price differentiation examines price differentiation 
from a different point of view: politicians are no longer assumed to be benevolent 
welfare maximisers, they are pursuing their own goals. So, instead of maximizing 
collective utility, they tend to maximize individual utility, in particular since they want 
to be re-elected. This makes decision makers dependent on interest groups. 
Departing from the axiom of welfare maximization means that the question of how 
transport prices are actually set under real world conditions is more relevant than the 
question of how transport pricing should be set. How this affects pricing-regulation has 
been demonstrated in the past in a long series of models (Stigler, Becker, Keeler, 
Posner, Grossman-Helpman). In this part of the analysis of our paper we go one step 
further and examine the way in which the interaction between Special Interest Groups 
(SIGs) and decision makers is reflected in the adopted structures of transport pricing. 
This change of perspective from normative to positive theory does not mean that the 
two approaches have no connection (in the sense of two different “schools” of economic 
theory or the like). First, many cases exist where both approaches make the same 
predictions, and second, every policy-maker needs to take normative considerations into 
account, if he wants to be re-elected (von Weizsäcker, 1982). In other words, the two 
approaches are complementary, or one may also say that one is a special case of the 
other, depending on perspective. 
 
2.1. Normative economics 
 
In this subsection we will introduce a selection of topics relating to price setting actors 
maximising welfare. The format is that of capita selecta. For a more extended 
introduction we refer to the literature or the project report. 
 
Efficiency: marginal social cost pricing 
 
The concept of economic efficiency is derived from the theory of welfare economics, 
and is related to the allocation of resources in an economy. Welfare economics takes a 
rather wide view of pricing, considering pricing as a method of resource allocation, 
maximising social welfare rather than simply the welfare of the supplier (Button, 1993). 
According to this view, prices should equal marginal social cost in order to maximise 
social welfare. By pricing at marginal cost, in effect, transport services are being 
provided up to the point where the benefit for the marginal unit is equal to the costs of 
providing that unit (Button, 1993). In some cases, private provision of the good or 
service may also result in maximising the social welfare. If not, regulatory policies may 
be formulated so that private companies will change their pricing policy , so that social, 
rather than private welfare, is maximised. 
A market equilibrium under this optimal pricing rule only can exist under a stringent 
set of conditions. Clearly, this equilibrium will not exist in reality. This makes first-best 
pricing very much a theoretical result, which is often used as a benchmark for other, 
more realistic, pricing approaches. 
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The transport market is characterised by several market imperfections which makes it 
very unlikely that the market, without regulation, will set transport prices equal to 
marginal social costs and, therefore, social welfare will not be optimised. Besides 
market failures, governments may also have other reasons to intervene and adjust prices. 
Equity is an important reason that deserves attention in the context of price 
differentiation. 
 
Constraints in transport pricing 
 
Social marginal cost pricing assumes a theoretical first-best world. Such first-best 
pricing is increasingly recognised as being of limited practical relevance, but it might 
serve as a useful theoretical benchmark. Besides the previously described reasons for 
market failures, various constraints and barriers may exist that prevent a regulator from 
charging (optimal) prices that it ideally would prefer. Verhoef (2002) mentions the 
following important constraints: 
 
- Technological and practical constraints: first-best pricing requires charges that 
vary continuously over time, place, route chosen, type of vehicle, driving style etc, 
which might be too sophisticated and not understood by drivers or impossible to 
implement under available charging technologies; 
- Acceptability constraints; there may be too much resistance and uncertainty (e.g. 
about objective and necessity of the measure) that may make it preferable to start 
with a few small-scale demonstration projects; 
- Institutional constraints; one example is where local or regional governments 
cannot affect some transport charges that are set by a higher level government; 
- Legal constraints; ideal prices might not be possible on the basis of legal 
arguments (e.g. when taxes should be predictable) 
- Financial constraints; for instance the prior definition of minimum or maximum 
tax revenue sums to be collected; 
- Market interaction constraints; transport taxes will have many consequences for 
other markets, among the most important is the labour market; 
- Political constraints: charges may become a political issue much more than an 
economic question. 
 
Under such conditions, the regulator has to resort to second-best pricing: setting the 
prices that are available optimally, under the existing constraints. 
 
Equity 
 
Finally, transportation often raises equity concerns that seem to conflict with marginal 
cost pricing. Marginal cost pricing may result in very differentiated charges with the 
consequence that no one transport user pays the same price; this may be perceived as 
unfair. Equity is important in the context of acceptability of pricing. Many stakeholders 
raise objections about pricing measures that they perceive as unfair. If a pricing measure 
is unfair either to themselves in relation to other people or to people who are considered 
to be less well off in society, significant acceptability problems could occur. Transport 
pricing is often perceived as a form of regressive taxation, allowing only those with 
enough money to access a resource (e.g. infrastructure) that was once considered free. 
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Implementation strategies that allow certain groups within a community to be exempted 
from pricing, or compensate some groups with a lump-sum transfer are therefore 
discussed. The problem of who should receive extra benefits (e.g. tax exemption) and 
the wider problem of making sure price measures are both equitable and perceived to be 
so, are important issues to be included in any successful implementation strategy. Then, 
price discrimination becomes relevant. In public transport, for instance, it is common 
that different prices are charged for the same service. Particular groups in society, e.g. 
the elderly, may benefit from the fare policy of governments . 
The public finance and tax literature makes a distinction between horizontal equity 
and vertical equity. Horizontal equity refers to the principle which states that those who 
are in identical or similar circumstances should pay identical or similar amounts in taxes 
(Stiglitz and Driffill, 2000). It requires that those with equal status - whether measured 
by ability or some other appropriate scale - should be treated the same. If, for instance, 
income were the only measure of a person, then two persons with equal incomes would 
be treated as equals. Vertical equity states that people who are better off should pay 
more taxes (Stiglitz and Driffill, 2000). This generally requires that those with less 
ability to pay are treated favourably relative to those with greater ability. 
 
User responses 
 
People's responses to transport pricing are not straightforward. Price increases may 
not necessarily lead to trip suppression, it may also induce travellers to change their 
modal use or change their departure time, depending on the type of measure. A wide 
variety of transport pricing measures exists, having different consequences for travel 
behaviour. Price measures are considered as one of the major tools for policy-makers to 
influence transport development. The design of measures will generally depend on the 
objectives. 
The response of infrastructure users will to a considerable extent depend on the exact 
design of the pricing scheme (e.g. a yearly tax on car ownership can be expected to 
affect kilometrage of a given vehicle relatively weakly, compared to a kilometre 
charge). Equally important, however, is the price sensitivity (often expressed as 
elasticities by economists) of transport users for the various relevant types of user 
reactions that together define transport behaviour. People have various possibilities to 
change transport behaviour, and can be expected to react differently to different pricing 
schemes. The possible outcomes (in terms of behavioural responses) of pricing can be 
the following: 
 
- Trip suppression (travel frequency choice); 
- Departure time choice (and scheduling of daily activities); 
- Different route choice; 
- Changes in modal split; 
- Changes in vehicle occupancy; 
- Spatial choices related to relocation; 
- Change in driving style (e.g. speed choice); 
- Vehicle ownership; 
- Technology choice; 
- Changes in destination choice; 
- Class choice (for public transport). 
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Elasticities can provide indicative and useful answers to the questions on the 
effectiveness of policy measures. However, policy makers must realise that no unique 
value of the elasticity of one particular measure does exist. Elasticities of travel demand 
will vary with circumstances and very much depend on the context. Relevant 
circumstances include geographical scale of the study, the short-term or long-term, 
existing price levels and alternatives, and the composition of the population. The types 
of change in travel times and costs might also be relevant (e.g. small or big change, 
increase or decrease, and gradual or drastic change). This makes it difficult to compare 
and interpret different elasticities. Comparison of elasticities only is useful when a clear 
description of the dependent and independent variables (which price changes and which 
demand is affected) exists. 
 
2.2. Positive economics 
 
This part of the analysis first gives a brief overview of the positive economic theory 
of regulation.1 Subsequently, the positive approach will be linked to transport pricing. 
Finally, the dimensions of price differentiation will be presented. 
To start with the existence of Special Interest Groups (SIGs), Noll (1989) states that 
the reason for the existence of SIGs is mainly due to the lack of power of single voters 
and the desire to control politicians. To solve the problem of lack of power, voters can 
unite in SIGs which represent their political preferences better than the simple voting 
process. Also the costs of influencing and controlling politicians’ activities are far too 
high for a single person, but not for a whole group pursuing the same interests where 
costs can be distributed over all members of the SIG. However, SIGs often face the 
problem of free riding. Olson (1965) notes in this respect that small and well organized 
interest groups are more efficient in lobbying because the free rider problem is much 
smaller. 
To motivate the use of the positive theory of regulation in this paper it is necessary to 
give a brief historical overview of the emergence of the positive economic literature. In 
the 60s more and more economists observed that decision makers failed to regulate 
industries effectively. In fact, regulation in many markets served the interests of the 
industry it was supposed to regulate. The initiating empirical study by Stigler and 
Friedland (Stigler and Friedland, 1962) that mainly resulted in the Stigler/Peltzmann 
model and other theories on regulatory capture gained acceptance among economists in 
the 70s. The main proposition of these models is that regulators gain from supplying 
regulation and industries gain from regulation through restriction of competition. The 
underlying assumption is that consumers are not well organized and informed but 
producers can form small but well organized interest groups. 
Thus, the widely known Stigler/Peltzmann Model assumes that decision makers 
maximize their political support (political support is assumed to be a function of 
industry profits and the respective price). In the equilibrium politicians will impose 
regulations on unregulated industries or partly deregulate completely regulated 
industries. Although at present much deeper positive economic models exist, the 
Stigler/Peltzmann economic contribution comprises a result, which has proven to be 
robust in most models of this type: The outcome of the political process is a 
compromise between total regulation and total deregulation. 
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The next major contribution in the positive economic theory was provided by Gary 
Becker (Becker, 1983, 1985). Becker extended the above mentioned models by 
incorporating the idea that more than one SIG (with partially conflicting interests) 
influences the political process. According to Becker, regulation thus occurs as a result 
of battling SIGs. Becker ignores the politician’s own preferences. However the outcome 
of his model comprises a politician’s decision, in which all SIGs preferences are (at 
least partly) incorporated. In the equilibrium the regulator implements a policy which is 
a weighted sum of the involved SIGs’ preferences. Several researchers (Tullock, 1971) 
dealt with this topic from a different point of view: SIGs know that policy makers have 
the power to distribute rents resulting from regulation and will therefore compete for 
these rents. Due to the existence of rent-seeking behaviour, only one SIG will win the 
regulatory game , an element which is strongly connected to the degree of political 
power of the participating SIGs. 
Curiously, at the time these theories were being developed, a process of deregulation 
all over the world set in. As a result of this deregulation movement taking place in the 
last three decades, many economists concluded that positive theory is of limited 
importance and has little explanatory power. This idea was picked up by Keeler, who 
argued that positive theory can allow for deregulation. Keeler (Keeler, 1984) combined 
elements of both positive economic models described above (by using the consumer 
surplus of more than one SIG) with normative economic elements (by using a social 
welfare function). Although from the modelling point of view Keeler’s idea needed to 
be improved, in many cases modern positive economic literature is based on the simple 
insight that the implemented policy is a mix of normative and positive policy elements. 
Modern theory of political economy focuses on elections, the provision of information 
and campaign contributions as the main fields in which SIGs concentrate their activities 
of interfering in the political process. 
Grossman and Helpman (2000) formalized Keeler’s main axiom so that the adopted 
policy package incorporates both normative and positive policy elements more fully. 
Their research concentrates on political interaction between policy-makers and interest 
groups. Using advanced game theoretical methods Grossman and Helpmann showed 
that SIGs will “educate” voters in the pre-election period, will provide credible 
information to policy-makers and will make contributions to politicians and parties in 
order to achieve their favourite policy set. On the other hand policy makers will select 
those SIGs which are most valuable to them, and will maximize their probability to get 
re-elected. This causes decision makers only to deviate from their personally most 
favoured optimal policy set, if they receive enough campaign contributions without 
worsening their re-election chances. 
All these presented models have in common that they attempt to describe the 
decision-making process under the influence of special interest groups. Although 
methodically different, the outcome of the models is a set of policies, selected by the 
decision-maker, containing the element of compromise. Since the transport sector is a 
traditionally highly regulated sector, this kind of analysis could be applied to transport 
markets. In all transport modes there are major or minor SIGs trying to interfere with 
the political process (e.g. drivers associations, environmental organisations, airline and 
airport associations etc). The first implication from the positive theory point of view is 
that in transport markets SIGs will try to interfere with the political process of decision-
making to achieve the best outcome for their members. Naturally SIGs and also 
regulators prefer regulation. However, a simple regulation of transport markets is 
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usually not possible. First, nowadays, it is difficult to impose apparent unnecessary 
regulations, because voters are much better informed than they used to be in the past. 
Second, in almost all cases in European transport there are at least two major SIGs with 
contrary interests intervening in the political game. Take for instance the construction of 
a new airport runway. Airport administration and (perhaps) airlines will certainly push 
the construction plans. In contrast, the inhabitants of neighbouring towns will oppose to 
these plans (due to noise pollution). Usually these inhabitants will be very successful in 
their opposition because of their ability to form an interest group quickly and efficiently. 
The outcome in many of the cases like the one just described is that the runway is 
constructed, but with substantial flight restrictions (e.g. night flights). This is exactly the 
element of compromise we mentioned above. 
These considerations have two major implications. First, in most of the cases a 
compromise will be the only way to achieve some degree of consensus among all 
participating actors. Second, powerful SIGs should find more subtle means than 
claiming the introduction of regulation in order to enhance the welfare of their 
members.  
One possibility to take the welfare of all (major) SIGs into account is the construction 
of infrastructure charging structures that reflect the interests of the participating SIGs. 
Price differentiation plays a major role here. On the one hand, additional differentiation 
can appease protests. On the other hand maximising social welfare and taking into 
account the interests of the involved (most powerful) SIG’s will also lead to additional 
differentiation. In the example above with the runway construction this would mean 
additional surcharges for night flights. 
It seems that up to now the “political economy aspect” of regulated tariffs has been 
addressed rarely in the literature. Laffont/Tirole (Laffont and Tirole, 2000) emphasised 
the danger of political manipulation of Ramsey pricing, if (positive) externalities are to 
be included in the Ramsey formula. The most important contribution up to now seems 
to be a formal model in which Laffont (2000) compared the Smith pricing rule with an 
optional tariff in terms of expected welfare in a scenario where two SIGs alternate in 
power with a certain probability. He arrives at the surprising result that the inclusion of 
political distortions by SIGs can lead to superiority of the Smith rule. 
In a subsequent section this analysis will be applied to the empirical evidence 
concerning the effects of lobbying for price differentiation. 
 
 
3. Case studies 
 
The previous section discussed the theoretical backgrounds of price differentiation in 
transport. It not only gives us a better understanding of the concept, it also allows us to 
identify important aspects for the assessment of the case studies. Various elements have 
been identified that may be relevant for the success or failure of a particular case study 
where price differentiation is implemented in practice. 
In this section we will provide a summary overview of the case studies carried out in 
the DIFFERENT project. We will also briefly address the methodology used for data 
collection and define indicators to be used in our cross case analysis carried out in the 
next section where we test the hypotheses. 
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In order to collect data from the case studies in a generic way, a factsheet form was 
designed. The fact sheet consisted of the main dimensions relevant to price 
differentiation. The aim is to provide common ground for the comparison of outcomes 
of the case studies, for example in terms of testing hypotheses on differentiated pricing. 
The complete factsheet design is documented in the project report. 
 
3.1. Generalities 
 
In this section we provide an overview of the case studies based on the information 
collected through the factsheets. Factsheet data were provided for 27 case studies (see 
table 1). In our discussion we consider five different types of differentiated 
infrastructure charging case studies: 
 
- Airlines (5) 
- Shipping (8) 
- Railways (4) 
- Road haulage (4) 
- Car drivers (6) 
 
The case studies are spread over in all EU-countries plus Switzerland and Norway. 
The wide geographic scope together with the various user types leads to a 
heterogeneous collection of case studies. 
The information collected is not fully homogenous. For three case studies the 
factsheet was completed only partially. We will nevertheless include the available 
information from these three cases in our analysis. On the other hand, for one case study 
two factsheets were completed, one for passenger and one for freight transport. We will 
consider them as separate cases in the subsequent analysis. 
Throughout our analysis the number of case studies considered may vary as a result of 
both the heterogeneous character of the information collected as well as the inherently 
heterogeneous character of the different case studies. This will be discussed in a 
subsequent section. 
Whereas in our discussion most attention will be paid to answers that fit in the 
predefined answering alternatives of the factsheet form, we will report on other 
dimensions where appropriate. 
 
3.2. Objectives of the price setting agents 
 
Cost coverage is the most cited objective for price differentiation, closely followed by 
efficiency and environment (figure 2). Legislative requirements and safety are 
considered as an objective in relatively few cases. If we consider different case study 
types, we observe that the overall ranking broadly holds for the individual types, be it 
with some noteworthy exceptions. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 43 (2009): 4-34 
 14 
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 12
 14
 16
 18
cost coverage
efficiency
environmental goals
congestion reduction
equity
profits
acceptability
competitiveness
other
safety
legislative requirements
sustainability
n
u
m
be
r o
f c
as
es
Objectives
airlines
shipping
railways
road haulage
car drivers
 
Figure 2: Main Objectives of Price Differentiation. 
 
Safety and competitiveness are considered only by port cases. Especially for safety 
this seems odd, given the important safety problems in road traffic. Port cases do 
generally not consider congestion, which probably fits the specific situation where 
congestion is a relatively small or even non-existent problem. 
One surprising observation in railway cases is that in only one case environmental 
objectives are represented in setting differentiated prices. Given the choice that 
operators generally have between old, unregulated and heavily polluting diesel powered 
rolling stock or clean electrical ones, there certainly would be a case for environmental 
incentives in the price schedule. 
The car drivers’ cases tend to focus on congestion, pay more than average attention to 
acceptability and any cost coverage objective is absent. This seems to fit the 
stereotypically setting of a congestion charge. 
The average number of objectives per case is about the same for road and rail cases, 
but is larger for shipping cases and smaller for airport cases. Obviously, the large 
variance in the number of objectives should have its impact on the corresponding 
differentiated pricing schemes. In order to have a measure for the number of objectives 
addressed in the case study, we define the degree of ambition, which is simply the 
number of objectives reported (see table 1). 
 
3.3. Dimensions of price differentiation 
 
We will first have a look at the behavioural dimensions along which price 
differentiation is considered in the case studies. In a next step we will introduce an 
indicator for price differentiation and discuss the application of this indicator to the case 
study data. 
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Figure 3: Types of Differentiation. 
 
The most often cited dimensions of price differentiation are: type of vehicle, type of 
user, size of vehicle and time of travel (figure 3). At the other side of the spectrum we 
find the dimensions: load factor (or occupancy rate in passenger transport) and type of 
fuel. 
Looking at oddities in the occurrence of differentiation dimensions, we observe that 
cargo type and activity level are only used for price differentiation in port cases. The 
differentiation along activity level obviously stems from the negotiable character of port 
prices. As for cargo type, it may both depend on costs related to handling or differences 
in demand elasticities (or willingness to pay). 
Payload related price differentiation (load factor for freight, occupancy rate for 
passengers) is limited to freight transport only. The motivations for such a 
differentiation are not very clear, given that most (internal and external) infrastructure 
use costs are function of the vehicle rather than its load. But it deserves to be noted that 
occupancy rate infrastructure use differentiation does exist in the form of carpool lanes, 
locally known as diamond lanes or high-occupancy vehicle lanes, and ubiquitous in 
many larger US urban areas. 
The relative absence of fuel type differentiation may be explained by prices already 
being differentiated in the reference case (road transport) or most vehicles using the 
same fuel (air transport). It should however be noted that existing differentiations in fuel 
taxes usually do not correlate to differences in external costs. This would justify further 
research on fuel price differentiation. 
Airline cases typically focus on time of travel (day versus night), probably with the 
intention to alleviate airport congestion or to abate noise pollution. 
Road haulage cases somewhat surprisingly do not differentiate as a function of time 
of travel. Differentiation along type of user is the most often reported dimension in car 
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driver cases. The underlying dynamic is that these urban congestion charge case studies 
typically feature a myriad of user classes which are exempt from the charge. Where 
differentiation along user class exists in non-road cases, this is motivated by demand 
based arguments (elasticities, willingness-to-pay). 
As with the number of objectives per case study, we also observe a larger than 
average number of differentiation dimensions for the seaport cases, whereas airlines and 
urban congestion charge schemes typically feature a smaller than average number of 
pricing dimensions, the latter probably explained by the inclusion of the Spitsmijden 
experimental scheme. 
A simple measure for degree of differentiation would be to count the number of 
dimensions along which price differentiation is proposed. However, such a measure 
would classify two schedules with a different number of price levels along the same 
number of dimensions as equally differentiated. Intuition suggests that this is typically 
not what we are aiming at. 
To account for the number of price levels along each dimension, we first look at a 
fictitious schedule that is differentiated along one dimension. The minimum number of 
price levels is one (provided that zero is also a level), in which case the schedule is not 
differentiated and the indicator should reach a minimum level. The maximum number 
of price levels is infinite (in the case of the price being a continuous function of the 
behavioural dimension), in which case the indicator should reach a maximum level. We 
normalise minimum level to zero and maximum level to unity. 
We still need to determine the functional form between both extreme points. Intuition 
tells us that the first additional price level (i.e. from one to two price levels) adds more 
to the degree of differentiation than let us say the 999th.We therefore want a functional 
form that is concave over the interval considered. Furthermore, we learn from literature 
on time optimal congestion charging (cfr. discussion in Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey, 
1993) that about half of the maximum welfare gain is obtainable with the simplest case 
of a differentiated charge (i.e. two levels). 
The simplest functional form that fulfils the requirements set out above (extreme 
points, convex, half the maximum value at two levels) is 1-1/n with n the number of 
price levels. 
To aggregate the values along the individual dimensions we simply add them up 
(hence our choice to normalise the minimum level to zero). This is a rather coarse 
approach. Not only do we assume that differentiation along the different dimensions is 
equally important, moreover we assume that the different dimensions are not correlated, 
which is highly unlikely e.g. for fuel and vehicle type. 
With respect to the first point above we can only argue that this is the best we can get 
for a generic approach given the heterogeneity of case studies. With respect to the 
second point, it seems safe to assume that price schedules are not randomly defined and 
that any price setting agent will refrain from schedules that introduce cognitive burden 
by pricing along heavily correlated dimensions.2 
The resulting indicator for degree of differentiation is presented in table 1. 
                                                 
2
 Provided the limitations that are identified with respect to corelation and other issues and that apply to 
both the indicator for degree of ambition and degree of differentiation, it would be an interesting 
excercise to test for different specifications of said indicators to assess the robustness of the conclusions 
drawn here. Unfortunately the dataset we use does not provide sufficient information to allow for 
alternative (and potentially more refined) specifications to be established. 
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Table 1: List of case studies. 
Name of Case Study Case Study 
Type 
Degree of 
Ambition 
Degree of 
Differentiation 
Port of Amsterdam shipping 6 6,6 
Port of Hamburg shipping 7 5,1 
Port of Gothenburg shipping 6 5,0 
Lerwick - Shetland Islands shipping 5 4,4 
Port of Valencia shipping 10 4,4 
Port of Duisburg - (Duisport) shipping 4 3,5 
France rail infra charge railways 8 3,0 
Trondheim road charge car drivers 3 3,0 
Scalloway, Shetland Islands shipping 5 3,0 
Effects of differentiated charges at 
Airpot Hamburg airlines 1 2,7 
German Railways railways 4 2,4 
Stockholm City car drivers 7 2,2 
London City Centre car drivers 5 2,2 
The German HGV Toll road haulage 4 2,2 
Edinburgh road pricing car drivers 6 2,0 
Brenner TEN-T (freight) road haulage 5 1,9 
Brenner TEN-T (passenger) road haulage 5 1,8 
Swiss Heavy Vehicle Fee (HVF) road haulage 3 1,7 
Sullom Voe, Shetland Islands shipping 5 1,6 
Ljubljana Airport Case Study airlines 3 1,2 
Rail infrastructure charges in Austria railways 2 1,2 
Spitsmijden car drivers 3 0,7 
London airports airlines 3  
Madrid Barajas Airport airlines 2  
Rail infrastructure charges in Britain railways 2  
Gran Canaria Airport airlines 2  
Rome road pricing car drivers 1  
 
With the exception of the Brenner cases all entries in table 1 for which a degree of 
differentiation is provided, concern real world implementations. For a number of cases 
we did not assess the degree of differentiation. This was either because sufficient 
information was lacking or because the setup of the case study did not allow for the 
calculation of an unambiguous value, especially where the case study focused on 
simulating an extended number of schemes. 
We observe that the port cases typically carry a lot of price differentiation (with the 
exception of Sullom Voe). At the other end of the spectrum is the Spitsmijden case 
which concerns a limited time scientific experiment: in such a setting one typically 
wants to focus on a concise number of influences hence the low level of differentiation. 
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Urban congestion schemes (i.e. “car driver” in the table) typically feature an 
intermediate level of differentiation. While this may seem counterintuitive given the 
need to avoid cognitive burden, these schemes typically carry a number of excepted user 
classes which adds to the degree of differentiation. 
There is no clear reason why shipping cases should carry more differentiation than 
e.g. road haulage cases. The figures do however suggest that there is much 
heterogeneity in price setting practise across the different transport modes. There seems 
to be no obvious difference in differentiation between freight and passenger transport 
cases (note that railway infrastructure pricing concerns both). 
 
 
4. Hypotheses 
 
In this section we use the theoretical framework presented above as a base to define 
hypotheses with respect to infrastructure price differentiation practise, and proceed to a 
cross-case testing of these hypotheses. 
In the setting of this paper we will limit the discussion to a selection of hypotheses 
that proved to be insightful. For a full overview of all hypotheses tested we refer to the 
project report (Knockaert et al., 2008). 
In the formulation of the hypotheses we focus on two research questions: 
 
- What explains the adoption of certain differentiated price structures? 
- What are the consequences of differentiated prices for travel behaviour, welfare 
and acceptance? 
 
In a first subsection we will present and test the hypotheses related to normative 
economics. In a subsequent subsection the focus will be on the hypotheses stemming 
from positive economics. 
 
4.1. Normative Economics 
 
For each of the research questions formulated we first present a general hypothesis. In 
a next step we present a number of specific hypotheses based on the corresponding 
general hypothesis. Each hypothesis is discussed with respect to the theoretical 
framework and subsequently tested for using the case study information. 
 
General hypothesis A The degree of price differentiation adopted by a certain actor 
depends on factors such as the aims of actors setting the prices (infrastructure managers, 
transport companies, governments), demand parameters and cost structure. 
 
The first general hypothesis addresses the determinants of the choice for differentiated 
price structures. We will discuss two specific hypotheses: one considering the role of 
aims of the price setting agents, and one considering the role of cost structures in price 
setting. Specific hypotheses on the role of the demand side in price setting were also 
formulated, but testing them proved not to be clarifying so we do not discuss them here. 
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Specific hypothesis A-1 The degree of differentiation of pricing schemes increases 
with the ambition of price setting actors. 
 
We observe a large variance in the number of objectives or degree of ambition across 
the case studies. In order to optimise a pricing scheme for a given number of objectives 
(assumed to be independent), one needs to tune a number of (independent) pricing 
dimensions that is (at least) the same. 
In figure 4 the relation between degree of ambition and degree of differentiation is 
plotted. The positive relation suggested by the hypothesis is confirmed by the trend 
reflected in the figure. 
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Figure 4: Degree of differentiation versus degree of ambition. 
 
While the hypothesis is motivated by basic mathematical evidence rather than specific 
economic theory, we use it as a starting point since the revealed relationship will prove 
to be very useful in controlling for heterogeneity in degree of ambition in our further 
analysis. 
 
Specific hypothesis A-2 The higher price setting actors value equity considerations, 
the more they will be inclined to apply price differentiation, where users that deserve 
support from an equity perspective will be confronted with lower charges than other 
users. 
 
Different user categories will be confronted with different charge levels simply 
because differentiation across user types is applied, or because pricing is differentiated 
across a variable that is correlated with user type. 
The hypothesis closely follows our definition of vertical equity. We conduct a 
qualitative comparison between the equity objective in the case study and the users 
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which are exempt from or being favoured by the scheme. We consider the following 
types of user support: favouring frequent users, users that live in a geographically 
confined area and handicapped users. 
Across all types of cases where equity is an objective, we find that frequent users tend 
to be favoured. It is unclear from an equity perspective why frequent users should 
deserve support (there may be some degree of correlation). 
Another type of user that is favoured under equity considerations, are users that live in 
a geographically confined area. In passenger transport cases, this mostly corresponds to 
the political influence of these users (but again there may or may not be correlation with 
equity). In the other cases, where freight transport companies pay the charge, we mostly 
observe protectionism tendencies in the favoured user types. 
A last type of user being favoured in all equity driven car driver cases are 
handicapped users. This is a category that, from a (vertical) equity perspective, should 
deserve support  
To summarise we conclude that the hypothesis is confirmed in private car driver 
cases. In other cases where companies pay the charge, equity motivation may be a 
disguise for protectionism tendencies. 
 
Specific hypothesis A-3 When the costs of price differentiated charging mechanisms 
are high for the price setting agents, they will choose simple (cheaper) charging 
mechanisms as second best strategies. 
 
The idea behind the hypothesis is that the costs of an upgraded charging mechanism 
are prohibitive compared to the expected (social) benefits by the larger degree of 
differentiation. The studied relationship is plotted in figure 5. 
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Figure 5: The charging mechanism as a barrier towards further differentiation. 
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Although one may expect the hypothesis to implicitly assume a constant degree of 
ambition, it may well be that price setting actors moderate their ambition when faced 
with the limitations of an existing charging mechanism. We should hence check for the 
degree of differentiation independently from ambition. We then observe that the cases 
where the mechanism is a barrier tend to the bottom of the differentiation spectrum. 
We therefore conclude that the case study data is in line with the hypothesis. 
 
General hypothesis B The degree of differentiation of transport prices has an effect 
on user responses in terms of travel behaviour (for example modal choice, trip 
generation, temporal choice) resulting in changes in transport flows, the efficiency of 
the pricing measures and the level of acceptance of these measures. 
 
The second general hypothesis addresses the consequences of differentiated pricing. 
Again will we discuss a selection of three specific hypotheses. Other hypotheses can be 
found in the project report (Knockaert et al., 2008). 
 
Specific hypothesis B-1 Effectiveness of a price measure increases with the level of 
differentiation, but above a certain level, the effectiveness stabilises or may even 
decrease. The negative counter effect is stronger for individuals (e.g. car drivers) paying 
the charge than for companies (e.g. rail freight operators). And it is stronger for frequent 
users than for infrequent users. 
 
The initial increase in effectiveness as a function of degree of differentiation is a 
direct result from convergence towards the first best optimal pricing schedule for which 
effectiveness reaches its maximum level by definition. 
 
 
Figure 6: The relationship between degree of differentiation and effectiveness. 
 
As we stated earlier, in order to realise a given number of (independent) objectives, 
one needs to differentiate prices along (at least) the same number of (independent) 
behavioural dimensions. This is mathematically determined. As such, the initial increase 
effectiveness 
degree of differentiation 
real world cases are expected to feature a 
degree of differentiation that corresponds to a 
high levels of effectiveness. 
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in effectiveness is dependent on the degree of ambition (i.e. the number of objectives to 
fulfil). For a smaller number of objectives, the initial increase will be stronger and reach 
the (first best determined) maximum value for effectiveness earlier than with a larger 
number of objectives. 
The intuition behind the expected decrease in effectiveness is based on the various 
decision making costs users incur due to differentiation. These decision making costs 
are likely to increase as an exponential function of the differentiation level and 
independently from the degree of ambition. 
We expect the negative counter effect to be mitigated to some extent by companies as 
they have more opportunities to invest in expertise with respect to dealing with a larger 
degree of differentiation. Frequent users at the other hand can build up experience with 
the scheme and are hence expected to have smaller marginal decision making costs than 
infrequent users. Although there probably is some correlation between both 
categorisations, companies are likely to be more frequent users than individuals. 
A way to test the hypothesis would be to compare degrees of ambition and 
differentiation to the impact of the charge. Only a limited number of cases have an 
impact that is not or only partially in accordance with the aims set. Failure to meet the 
objectives is in some of these cases attributed to lobbying, which is clearly not what we 
are looking for here. 
Considering the fact that most cases are real world pricing schemes, it seems safe to 
assume that they are designed to be (close to) optimal. As we have already seen in 
comparing the observed degree of ambition to the observed degree of differentiation, 
there seems to be a relation (figure 6). This relation indicates that a given degree of 
ambition corresponds to an optimal level of differentiation, which is basically what the 
hypothesis poses. 
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Figure 7: Case studies for which the impact of the charging scheme is reported to be in accordance with 
the aims set. 
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By redrawing the relationship between differentiation and ambition and limiting to the 
cases that have an impact in accordance to the aims set, the picture even becomes 
clearer (see figure 7). For smaller levels of ambition the optimal level of differentiation 
increases with ambition. For larger levels, the increase becomes smaller, which is an 
indication that the decision making costs play a role. And for a given level of ambition, 
the optimal level of differentiation is smaller for car drivers than for companies. 
We therefore consider the case study data to be in line with the hypothesis. 
 
Specific hypothesis A-2 When price differentiation takes place in a certain domain 
(for example time differentiated tolls), the strongest behavioural response takes place 
within the same domain (change in departure time). Effects in other domains tend to be 
smaller. 
 
The basic assumption behind the hypothesis is that consumers try to optimise their 
behaviour in such a way that maximum utility is obtained with minimum effort. In 
reaction to a differentiated infrastructure price schedule, the traveller will try to mitigate 
the pricing impact while minimising the discomfort of behavioural adaptations. 
The hypothesis then basically states that the easiest way to adapt behavioural activity 
along a given dimension is primarily to change behaviour along that same dimension 
and minimise efforts along other dimensions. 
The setting in which the hypothesis is formulated is rather artificial as compared to 
the reality of the case studies: most case studies carry differentiation along different 
dimensions and many case studies do not provide information on the relative 
importance of the different behavioural reactions (and neither on the ranking of the 
price differentiation dimensions). 
Moreover, the link between behavioural reactions and pricing dimensions is not 
always unique. Especially with respect to spatial differentiation, many pricing 
dimensions (place, infrastructure) are connected with many behavioural domains 
(routing, destination, location). 
In the case studies, the most often reported reaction to time differentiation is a change 
in trip timing. The example provided in the hypothesis is confirmed here. 
Differentiation of infrastructure prices along spatial dimensions (place, infrastructure) 
is mainly linked to route choice behavioural responses. Again, this is in line with the 
hypothesis. 
Price differentiation based on vehicle technology is somewhat surprisingly linked to 
route choice responses. That seems somewhat pointless. This is in part explained by 
cases where a combination of vehicle technology and spatial dimensions is used for 
price differentiation. There are however a number of cases where route change is 
reported to be an important user reaction whereas no spatial differentiation dimension is 
reported. It is our guess that the user reaction considered relates to route changes of trips 
to infrastructure outside the geographical area to which the differentiated pricing 
scheme is confined. This guess is in line with the observation that route change seems 
generally over-represented in the user responses reported by the case studies. 
Abstracting from the route choice issue discussed above, we observe that the second 
most reported user response to differentiation along vehicle technology dimensions 
(size, type, fuel) is choice of vehicle technology related domains. It should be noted 
here that the different dimensions considered (size, type, fuel) are heavily correlated. As 
such, the hypothesis seems to be confirmed again. 
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Given the earlier discussed heterogeneity between case studies as well as the caveats 
related to the real world setting of most cases, we consider the case study findings to be 
a confirmation of the hypothesis. 
 
Specific hypothesis B-3 In the case of equity oriented pricing policies, the level of 
acceptance of pricing schemes increases with the degree of differentiation. 
 
Although not stated explicitly, this hypothesis assumes a constant degree of ambition. 
In order to check the hypothesis against the case study information, we select the 
cases where equity is an objective, which report on acceptability and in which a value is 
available for the degree of differentiation and ambition. The resulting subset consists of 
ten case studies, which we plotted in figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Acceptability in cases where equity is an objective (rated on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning 
very unacceptable and 5 meaning very acceptable). 
 
Although not very sharp, there is an indication that the cases with a lower level of 
acceptability (two or three on a scale from one to five) correspond to lower levels of 
degree of differentiation. The higher level of acceptability (four) occurs with all levels 
of degree of differentiation. 
Although the information used is somewhat limited in scope, it does seem to fit in 
with the hypothesis. 
 
4.2. Positive economics 
 
In the theoretical section, we formulated the conjecture that in reality transport prices 
are to a large extent the result of political compromises. In the following we shall try to 
show in more detail how the various pricing schemes that have been developed in 
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normative price theory can easily be manipulated by politicians and interest groups. We 
will now substantiate the discussion by means of empirical findings from the 
DIFFERENT project. 
In our discussion of the topic we first elaborate on practical implications of the 
positive economics’ theoretic framework. These findings will result in two hypotheses 
which will subsequently be tested by using the case study dataset. 
 
Practical implications 
 
We shall first start with cost based pricing structures (marginal cost pricing and fully 
distributed cost pricing) and then move on to demand based pricing structures (Ramsey 
pricing, multipart tariffs). 
Starting with marginal cost pricing, it is clear that –when applied consistently- this 
pricing principle would result in very finely differentiated and very complex charges. It 
is this very postulate of maximum differentiation which opens the door for SIGs to 
intervene and manipulate the pricing structure. This assertion, however, is too coarse 
and needs to be refined. The finally implemented tariff structure will depend on the 
relative political power3 of the various SIGs. If a highly differentiated pricing scheme 
leads to substantial increases of expenses for the members of a certain (powerful) SIG, 
it will depend on its relative political power whether this pricing scheme will be 
implemented or not. A simple example of this case could be HGV tolls. A high degree 
of differentiation between private cars and heavy goods vehicles would most likely 
translate into higher bills for truckers. Private car drivers would favour a very 
differentiated pricing scheme for truckers and a less differentiated and lower price 
structure for themselves. (In Germany the current toll for private cars on motorways is 
even zero.) In that way they could shift the major part of infrastructure financing to 
hauliers. If, however, in this situation truckers are more effective in lobbying, or if the 
HGV manufacturing industry is important for policy-makers, the tariff structure which 
is finally implemented will be less differentiated than private car users would want it to 
be. 
Fully distributed cost tariffs, once implemented, are (as shown by Laffont 2000) less 
amenable to political manipulation than marginal cost prices. On this basis one would 
expect that the activity of SIGs will be directed more towards manipulating the cost 
calculation method. It can be expected, for instance, that SIGs will debate the costing 
methodology (accounting based vs. pure economical methods), the allowed rate of 
return as well as the degree of detail of the cost calculation. This too can result in a 
higher degree of price differentiation. 
A recent example are the developments of the German HGV toll: a more detailed cost 
calculation led to a marginally higher tolling level.4 
Sometimes pricing schemes based on Fully Distributed Costs are amplified by 
incentive compatible pricing elements. Again, the German HGV toll may serve as an 
example. The charging structure incorporates reductions and penalties for the use of 
environmentally friendly vehicles.5 This led to a much higher degree of differentiation 
                                                 
3
 Political power of an interest group can be defined first in terms of voting power (e.g. the number of 
members of the SIG), or in terms of financial power (e.g. the wealth of the single members of the SIG). 
4
 The new calculation method was developed by IWW/Infras. The calculation reports infrastructure costs 
of HGV at one cent higher than in the original calculation of 2002. 
5
 This calculation was made by means of a toxicity comparison method of the respective emission classes. 
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than the pure FDC methodology for the allocation of infrastructure cost would have 
implied. The winners of the new charging structure (effective from the beginning of 
January 2009) are the German hauliers, who in most of the cases use governmental 
subsidies to purchase environmental friendly vehicles and therefore pay a lower 
effective charge, which gives them a relative competitive advantage compared to 
foreign hauliers. 
In contrast to cost based pricing schemes, demand based charging structures take 
differences in the behavioural patterns of the infrastructure users as a point of departure. 
Let us begin with Ramsey pricing. Ramsey pricing takes price elasticities of user 
groups into account. The traditional principle of “value of service pricing” scheme of 
railroads may be interpreted in this way: by charging higher tariffs for high value goods, 
railroads exploit the lower elasticity of demand of the corresponding shippers. But 
Ramsey pricing is applied in other areas of transport too, although this may not be 
obvious at first glance. The reason for this apparent paradox lies in political influence. 
Political influence often results in the very opposite of the Ramsey principle that price 
should be higher for the inelastic demand. For example, in many European countries 
commuters can subtract a certain amount of money (based on the daily travelled 
distance) from their taxable income. Taking into account that commuters are in general 
less elastic in their travel behaviour than other travellers, this would seem to be more a 
case of inverse Ramsey pricing than of Ramsey pricing itself. Policy makers usually 
justify inverse Ramsey pricing with positive externalities (e.g. welfare effects of 
commuting mobility) as well as equity arguments. However commuters are also voters 
who are traditionally very well represented in the political process via automobile clubs 
and other organisations. Abolishing commuting subsidies would automatically decrease 
a politician’s re-election chances substantially. Germany, for instance, has just seen the 
re-introduction of commuting-subsidies after attempts to reduce them to a far lower 
level. 
In this case it is clear, that SIGs have taken advantage of their political power and 
achieved to impose differentiation in line with their interests. 
Examples like this seem to fit very well into the framework of positive economics. 
Since Ramsey pricing translates into different prices for different user groups it is very 
likely that the group paying the higher price will lobby in order to pay less. Keeping in 
mind that the policy-maker aims at re-election, politicians will try to avoid 
disadvantaging major SIGs. This means that, if disadvantaged user groups have high 
political power, policy makers will try to appease them in one way or another. The most 
likely way to do this is to create subgroups and impose additional price differentiation. 
From the perspective of positive economics, Ramsey pricing is therefore a policy which 
should be applied with caution, because it may invite interference of SIGs in the “wrong 
direction”. 
Another useful pricing scheme for transport could be peak-load pricing in situations 
where travel demand fluctuates predictably. For SIGs it is much more difficult to 
manipulate peak-load pricing, since peaks are clearly recognizable and therefore not 
manipulable. For this pricing scheme it is therefore to be expected, that disadvantaged 
SIGs will centre their activities at first on avoiding peak-load pricing altogether. This 
seems to be the case in air transport. In the very few situations were peak-load pricing 
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on airports was implemented (Schank, 2005), legacy carriers engaged in heavy and 
successful lobbying to remove it.6 
A further reaction of interest groups to peak-load pricing could be the attempt to 
influence the methodology of calculating marginal and capacity costs (see the case of 
FDC-pricing above). The peak-users would have an incentive to shift part of their 
capacity costs to the off-peak users. Commuters for instance would lobby in order to 
pay only the incremental infrastructure costs, or to exaggerate common costs with off-
peak users. 
Non-linear tariffs contain a fixed component (ideally reflecting the fixed costs) and at 
least one variable component (ideally reflecting marginal costs). Optional tariffs are a 
combination of at least two two-part tariffs, where the user can choose the one tariff 
fitting best to his/her preferences. Since users minimize their spending, they select a 
tariff according to their level of consumption. Therefore optional tariffs can also be seen 
as multipart tariffs. As stated in the theoretical section, Laffont’s results show that there 
are cases were political distortions make linear tariffs superior to optional tariffs. The 
reason for this result lies basically in the self-selection possibilities of SIGs to consume 
more or less than they would do in the welfare optimum and in that way to shift the 
financial burden to other users. In addition, a higher degree of differentiation of the 
variable components of the charge will multiply the possibilities of decision-makers to 
burden particularly weaker user groups.7 Another additional possibility for political 
influence related to non-linear tariffs, is the possibility to change the proportions 
between the fixed and the variable proportions of the charge. Take for instance airport 
pricing: the typical charge on European airports consists of a fixed charge (determined 
by MTOW) and a variable charge (determined by the number of passengers). Legacy 
carriers favour a regime that contains only variable charges for two reasons: First, 
paying only a price per passenger implies that risks resulting from demand fluctuations 
are (partly) transferred to airports. Second, paying only a variable charge is in line with 
the business model of legacy carriers to capture the passenger’s time sensitivity, which 
translates into a high service frequency and relative small aircraft size. In contrast, low-
cost-carriers (LCC’s) prefer to pay one price per take-off or landing, rather than a price 
per passenger, since they usually fly with high load factors. As a result, it is very likely 
that LCC’s and legacy carriers will try to influence the pricing policy of airports with 
respect to the variable and fixed component of non-linear tariffs. The result again will 
depend upon the balance of political power. 
Summarising this section so far leads to the formulation of the following conjecture: 
 
General Hypothesis 1 The setting of infrastructure-tariffs is subject to a strong 
political element. The positive theory aspect of setting infrastructure charges is therefore 
                                                 
6
 In just one case lobbying did not succeed to oppose peak-pricing efficiently. This case refers to La 
Guardia airport in year 1968, which experienced after the introduction of peak-pricing a massive exit of 
regional airlines to Teterboro airport. 
7
 Laffont’s result applies to outputs which are end-products. In talking about infrastructure user charges 
we are, however, dealing with intermediate products. It is well known that for end-products non-linear 
tariffs are pareto-superior to linear tariffs (apart from marginal cost pricing). With respect to intermediate 
products this is not necessarily the case (Ordover and Panzar, 1982) Frequently economists overlook this 
difficulty and use the so called “Willig theorem” for intermediate goods too, such as transport 
infrastructure services. Nevertheless it is still an open question whether Laffont’s result applies to 
intermediate goods in the strict sense too. 
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highly relevant. Lobbying activities will be a major explanatory variable for the tariff 
structure that will finally be implemented. 
 
General Hypothesis 2 Policy makers will react to lobbying influences and implement 
a “SIG equilibrium” (“a compromise”). Infrastructure charges which correspond to such 
an equilibrium may be labelled as “politically acceptable”. This means that in reality 
cases where charges conform the “textbook model” of a certain pricing-scheme (like 
marginal cost pricing or Ramsey pricing) will be rare. In most cases this rules out tariff-
structures which increase the welfare (as compared to the status quo ante) of only one 
SIG, even if total welfare effects would be positive. 
 
Specific Hypotheses 
 
With respect to the finally implemented charging structure, our analysis shows that 
different pricing rules lead to different SIG behaviour regarding different transport 
modes. In order to generate testable hypotheses concerning the effects of SIG behaviour 
on the finally implemented tariff structure, a framework of very detailed and 
differentiated hypotheses would be necessary. For practical reasons however and due to 
the limited amount of existing data (see the previous section), we limit ourselves to the 
formulation of two rough hypotheses, which reflect the main ideas of the theoretical 
analysis above. As stated before, price differentiation plays an important role for SIGs 
and policy makers in most pricing rules. In almost all pricing rules the number of SIGs 
as well as the distribution of their political power will be decisive for the final policy 
outcome: 
 
Specific Hypothesis 1 The higher the number of participating SIGs and the more 
balanced the distribution of their political power, the higher the degree of differentiation 
of the charge. If the number of SIGs becomes very high, however, the situation will 
approximate a regime of polypolistic competition where no SIG will be able to wield a 
decisive influence on the political process. Therefore, in this case the predictions of 
positive theory will be identical with the predictions of normative theory. 
 
Corollary The smaller the number of participating SIGs and the more unbalanced the 
distribution of their political power, the lower the degree of differentiation of the 
charge. 
 
In the following we will present the empirical results from the case studies in order to 
test these two hypotheses. The first major finding is that in almost none of the case 
studies a clear “textbook” pricing rule can be found. Most charging structures mix cost 
and demand elements in an opaque way, without recognizing the initial pricing rule. But 
this is only a first hint of the influence of SIGs. To deal with this issue more deeply a 
type of Delphi study was conducted within the DIFFERENT group with the various 
partners of the project acting as experts for their country. 
The first goal was to identify the political dimensions of the pricing scheme. From the 
answers obtained, it is clearly recognisable that the political dimension plays a decisive 
role. In 87 percent of all case studies the political factor is recognised as a crucial factor 
in pricing issues. The range of the political dimensions covers all transport modes and 
all countries concerned. There is only one case in which there is clearly no political 
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dimension at all, namely the Spitsmijden case. However, this case is based on 
experimental design and therefore cannot give evidence of any political dimensions at 
all. The large share of case studies indicating political dimensions supports General 
Hypothesis 1 above. 
Turning to the issue of political acceptability, the picture obtained by the case studies 
is very similar to the one with respect to the relevance of the political dimensions. The 
vast majority of all case studies (77 percent) showed evidence of the relevance of 
political acceptability. It was also clearly observable that politically accepted charges 
can be found in all transport modes. Even though lobby activity does not lead to 
politically accepted charges in every single case study, it can be safely stated that lobby 
activity in most cases achieves political compromises and therefore results in politically 
accepted charges. Additionally, both findings conform to Corollary 1. A majority of 
cases shows the relevance of the political dimension in infrastructure charging. At the 
same time a vast majority of cases detects politically accepted charges (little complaints 
and therefore little ex post lobby activities). One may assume therefore, that these 
charges represent a SIG equilibrium. 
Given that political influence is important in setting infrastructure tariffs, it is also 
important to take a closer look at the type of actors who benefit from the price structure. 
The results were as expected. Infrastructure companies seem to be unambiguously the 
“losers” of the political game of setting infrastructure charges. In most of the cases (12 
out of 22) users were recognized as the beneficiaries of the charging structure. This 
result was expected, since in almost all European countries infrastructure users have 
well organized interest groups. For instance car drivers are organised in automobile 
clubs which do not only provide technical assistance but also intervene with transport 
policy. Their political influence seems to be very high due to campaigns and printed 
media. Also, particular shippers (mostly oil-industry related, like in the case studies on 
ports) are favoured by the price structure. Some shippers managed to form small but 
very effective interest groups and therefore are in the position to keep the free rider 
problem under control. This means that shippers also have incentives to contribute to 
their lobby group in financial terms. With respect to the rest of the cases, results depend 
on the type of infrastructure analysed. Airport charges for instance are relevant for 
airlines and tour operators (as the major users). An interesting finding is that 
infrastructure companies do not seem to be able to establish their favoured tariff 
structure (see above). As privatisation progresses, infrastructure companies are expected 
to be the “winners” of the tariff-setting process (Betancor and Rendeiro, 2000) in more 
and more cases. Therefore, lobbying is expected to rise in the future. For the rest of the 
cases the picture was not clear enough since the researchers could not answer who 
benefits from the current tariff structure. Apparently, in these cases the political power 
was not clearly distributed and therefore no SIG could exclusively benefit from the 
tariff structure. This is an additional hint that the political balance of power is decisive 
for differentiation. In nine cases shifting of financial burden to other users was 
observed. 
Summarizing the empirical evidence so far, we conclude that lobby activities play a 
key role when designing tariff structures. In the vast majority of the cases concerned 
users of infrastructure facilities are favoured by the tariff structure. 
The next step is to link the degree of differentiation (as defined before) with lobbying 
activities and the political power of SIGs. Figure 9 depicts the first relation. The 
abscissa in this figure depicts the existence of lobbying activities (Yes/No) and the 
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ordinate depicts the degree of differentiation as defined above. The trend in this figure is 
clear: the degree of differentiation increases when lobby activities take place. However, 
the degree of differentiation has a relatively wide range. Hence, we can not safely 
conclude that the degree of differentiation increases with increasing lobbying activity 
per se. It is apparent that also other factors, such as voting power of the participating 
SIGs, play a key role. 
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Figure 9: Degree of differentiation and lobbying activities. Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
In order to account for at least one of these factors we included voting power in the 
analysis. To do this we plot the degree of differentiation against the three possible levels 
of political power (as indicated by the case study leaders). Figure 10 shows a 
differentiated picture: first, the low number of cases (two cases) with low political 
power of the respective SIG does not allow for drawing safe conclusions; second, if 
political power of the dominant SIG is high, the degree of differentiation tends to 
decrease. This can happen because only one SIG will prevail at the end and hence the 
finally implemented charge will reflect the welfare of the members of this particular 
SIG; third, if political power of SIGs is medium, it can be safely stated that more than 
one SIG is active. In this case, decision makers will take into account the welfare of the 
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most powerful ones. Thus, the degree of differentiation tends to be higher than in all 
other cases. 
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Figure 10: Degree of differentiation and political power. 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
At this point it has to be stated that the limited number of cases does not allow a test 
for each single pricing rule as described above. Additionally, the balance of political 
power is different in each single transport mode. In air transport for instance legacy 
carriers traditionally have much more political power than low cost carriers. Finally, in 
each transport mode there are different parameters defining the activities of interest 
groups. The degree of competition in the market, or the nature of regulation are two 
prominent examples of this. However, these first results give a safe impression on the 
outcome of the political process, when designing infrastructure charges. 
With respect to the impact of lobbying in terms of overall welfare effects, it is 
difficult at this stage to draw safe conclusions. If only one major SIG prevails (as figure 
10 shows), the degree of differentiation of the charge decreases, apparently below the 
optimal level. In contrary, if more than one SIG interacts in the political game, the 
degree of differentiation increases, apparently above the optimal level. In both cases 
welfare losses take place (see also specific hypothesis B-1 of the normative economics 
framework). These welfare losses are increased by transaction costs of organizing and 
running an SIG. Safe conclusions can however only be drawn if the optimal level of 
price differentiation is clearly defined. Defining this optimal level needs further 
research. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
In our analysis we covered a broad range of topics on infrastructure charge 
differentiation. Two strands of economic theory were explored: the positive and the 
normative economics approach. It was argued that both theoretical frameworks are not 
mutually exclusive: positive theory describes how policy makers maximise their 
personal utility but at the same time take into account normative elements such as 
general welfare. 
An analysis of the practise of differentiated infrastructure pricing was conducted on a 
set of case studies. The case studies covered an extended scope of infrastructure and 
user types and hence carried much heterogeneity. To allow for a cross case analysis, it 
was necessary to somehow control for this heterogeneity. Two generic indicators were 
introduced. The first one captured the degree of ambition and was used in the analysis 
as a variable to control for heterogeneity in the aims of price setting actors. A second 
indicator captured the degree of price differentiation and proved to be useful as a 
dependent variable in our analysis of the charging schemes. 
As for the impact of the aims of price setting actors, we revealed that a higher level of 
ambition relates to a higher degree of differentiation. While the described relationship is 
straightforward, it supports our use of the degree of ambition as a proxy for case study 
heterogeneity. 
Furthermore we showed that the actual charging mechanisms may pose a practical 
barrier towards more differentiation where a degree of differentiation is observed that is 
lower than expected for a given level of ambition. 
If we look at the relationship of the degree of differentiation and effectiveness, we 
observe that in practise the decision costs play a role in reducing the optimal level of 
differentiation for higher levels of ambition. This effect is stronger for car drivers than 
for companies paying the charge. 
The cross case study analysis made clear that user reactions are expected to occur in 
behavioural domains that directly correspond to the dimensions of the pricing 
differentiation. While again this may sound trivial, this has important practical 
implications with respect to potential effectiveness and efficiency of pricing schemes 
that focus on charge differentiation across dimensions that depart from the intended 
behavioural change. 
The analysis revealed that equity objectives can influence differentiated pricing 
schemes in many ways. The impact of the normative theoretical framework is 
confirmed by the observation that a higher value given to equity considerations (by 
price setting actors) results in lower charges for private car users that deserve support 
from an equity point of view. But in cases where companies are paying the 
infrastructure charge, protectionist tendencies seem to have a larger explanatory power 
for the distinction between the favoured users and the non-favoured ones. In this case, 
the positive theoretical framework describes how a powerful SIG can manipulate a 
scheme that is based on equity objectives. 
Furthermore, we observe that a higher degree of differentiation increases the 
acceptability in equity oriented cases. While again the relationship can be explained 
from a normative point of view, relating a higher level of political acceptability to 
lobbying of SIGs which result in a higher degree of differentiation can also be explained 
by the positive theory. 
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The positive economics framework implies that different pricing schemes result in 
different manipulation possibilities by SIGs. Qualitative analysis showed that 
variabilisation is a major issue in air transport, whereas inverse Ramsey pricing is likely 
to play a role in city tolling systems and a more differentiated two part tariff in the 
shipping sector. 
The case studies further indicate that lobby activities are a major explanatory variable 
for the differentiated charging structure. Moreover, political acceptability of a certain 
pricing scheme can only be achieved if the most powerful SIGs do not object. As a 
result, the actual tariff structure reflects the political power of the SIGs. Whereas the 
presence of a larger number of SIGs (with a smaller amount of political power each) 
necessitates for a brokered compromise that carries much differentiation, a single 
powerful SIG may overrule the other SIGs in the lobbying process and hence allow for 
a political compromise on a less differentiated scheme. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This study is financially supported by the Sixth Framework Programme of the EU  
Communities. 
 
 
References 
 
Arnott, R., de Palma, A., and Lindsey, R. (1993) “A Structural Model of Peak-Period Congestion: A 
Traffic Bottleneck with Elastic Demand”, The American Economic Review, 83: 161-179. 
Becker, G. (1985) “Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Deadweight Costs”, Journal of Public 
Economics, 28, 329 – 347. 
Becker, G. (1983) “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence”, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. XCVIII: 371 – 400. 
Betancor, O., and Rendeiro, R., (2000) “Airports”, in Privatization and Regulation of Transport 
Infrastructure: Guidelines for Policymakers and Regulators, Editors: Estache, A., and Des Rus, G., 
Washington, WBI Development Studies. 
Bonsall, P., Link, H., Toepel, K., Ricci, A., Enei, R., Martin, J.C., Román, C., Voltes, A., Meersman, H., 
Pauwels, T., Van de Voorde, E. and Vanelslander, T. (2006) “Information Requirements for Analysis 
of Optimal Complexity”, Deliverable 2 of GRACE (Generalisation of Research on Accounts and Cost 
Estimation), Funded by Sixth Framework Programme, ITS, University of Leeds, Leeds. 
Button, K. (1993) Transport Economics, Edward Elgar, Aldershot. 
Grossman, E. and Helpman, G. (2001) Special Interest Politics, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Keeler, T. (1984) “Theories of Regulation and the Deregulation Movement”, Public Choice, 44: 103-145. 
Knockaert, J., Wieland, B., Evangelinos, C. and Rietveld, P. (2008) “Economic Theory and Methodology 
on Differentiated Infrastructure Charging”, Deliverable 3.3 of DIFFERENT, Funded by Sixth 
Framework Programme, VU University, Amsterdam. 
Laffont, J.J. (2000) Incentives and Political Economy, Oxford University Press, New York. 
Laffont, J.J. and Tirole, J. (2000) Competition in Telecommunications, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Noll, R.G. (1989) “Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation”, Handbook of Industrial 
Organization, Vol. II. 
Norwood, F.B. (2006) “Less Choice is Better, Sometimes”, Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial 
Organization, 4 (3): 1-21. 
Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Harvard Univ. 
Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Ordover, J.A. and Panzar, J. (1982) “On the Nonlinear Pricing of Inputs”, International Economic 
Review, 23 (3): 659-675. 
Pigou, A.C. (1920) Wealth and Welfare, Macmillan, London. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 43 (2009): 4-34 
 34 
Schank, J.L. (2005) “Solving airside airport congestion: Why peak runway pricing is not working”, 
Journal of Air Transport Management, 11: 417-425 
Stigler, G.J., Friedland, C. (1962) “What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity”, Journal of 
Law and Economics, 5, 1-16. 
Stiglitz, J.E. and Driffill J. (2000) Economics, W.W. Norton & Company, New York. 
Tullock, G. (1971) “Public Decisions and Public Goods”, Journal of Political Economy, 79 (4): 913-918. 
Verhoef, E.T. (2002) "Marginal Cost Based Pricing in Transport: Key Implementation Issues from the 
Economic Perspective", unpublished paper, VU University, Amsterdam. 
von Weizsäcker, C.C. (1982) “Staatliche Regulierung – positive und normative Theorie”, Schweizerische 
Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik, 3: 325-343. 
 
 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 43 (2009): 35-48 
 35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Motivational factors influencing behavioural responses 
to charging measures in freight operator sector 
 
Lars Rößger 1, Jens Schade 1∗, Terje Tretvik 2 
 
1
 Technische Universität Dresden, Germany, 
2
 SINTEF Technology and Society, Trondheim, Norway 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The present paper aims to provide insights into freight operators’ attitudes with differentiated charges 
and their opinions about charges’ effectiveness and future behavioural responses. Thereby, we investigate 
whether motivational factors, particularly acceptability towards road charges, play an important role on 
future behavioural adaptations according to charging schemes. Interview surveys have been conducted 
and have focused on freight operators and road hauliers’ perception and attitudes towards differentiated 
transport charges and several aspects of differentiation. Results show that a global index of acceptability 
of differentiation elements is particularly strongly correlated to the likelihood of future behavioural 
changes in medium terms as well as in long terms. These findings indicate that positive attitudes towards 
differentiated prices are also in the freight sector relevant for prospective success and effectiveness of 
pricing measures. Differences in likelihood of behavioural responses between several time horizons imply 
that effects of differentiated pricing in the freight operator sector affect behaviour more in the long run 
than in short term. Further findings show that the attitudes of the surveyed freight companies towards 
various elements of differentiation differ. Results suggest that differentiation elements which relate to 
changes at vehicle side are rated as more acceptable than differentiation elements which refer to concrete 
behavioural changes. 
 
Keywords: Price Differentiation; Road pricing; Freight Operators; Acceptability; Behavioural Change; 
Psychological Reactance. 
 
 
 
1. Background 
 
In the transport sector differentiated pricing is increasingly used to influence 
behaviour in order to manage users’ demand for infrastructure capacity. However, there 
is a likely conflict between the theoretical desirability of highly differentiated pricing 
structures and the ability and the motivation of users to respond effectively to them. 
Bonsall, Shires, Matthews, Maule & Beale (2004) have summarised some of the 
relevant cognitive aspects for pricing differentiation in transport and have drawn on 
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other sectors for empirical evidence of people’s response to differentiated pricing 
schedules. If differentiation becomes too extensive for individuals to understand, people 
tend to base their behaviour on a simplified and possibly erroneous mental model of the 
price structure. Bonsall, Stone, Stewart and Dix (2006) found that a significant 
proportion of consumers ’disengage’ if they perceive cost structures to be too complex. 
This disengagement sometimes leads people to delay the decision, to avoid purchase, to 
opt for the simplest or least uncertain option (if there are alternatives), or just to pay up 
regardless. Qualitative evidence confirmed that a proportion of the population would 
respond to complex charges by disengaging. This disengagement will sometimes take 
the form of paying the charge irrespective of its size, and sometimes deciding to adopt 
an option which avoids exposure to the charge. This could have profound implications 
for the performance of pricing schemes and for the structure of models used to predict 
behavioural responses (Bonsall, Shires, Matthews, Maule and Beale, 2007). Rößger, 
Schade, Obst, Gehlert, Schlag, Bonsall and Lythgoe (2008) have shown that an 
increased differentiation of road pricing leads to an increased erroneous price 
estimation, slower response times in price estimations as well as to increased 
uncertainty and perceived difficulty in dealing with the schemes. In general, this study 
also suggests that people seem to prefer simple tariffs (e.g. flat rates) even if these 
tariffs are slightly more expensive than differentiated price schemes. 
But there are not just cognitive aspects which relate to the ability to understand 
differentiated prices that have to be considered as constraints of behavioural adaptations 
to differentiated prices (Hoffmann, Schade, Schlag and Bonsall, 2006). Motivational 
factors also play an important role. I.e., even if transport users are able to understand a 
highly differentiated pricing system and to predict prices in advance, it does not mean 
that they are willing or motivated to deal with these charges and to adjust their 
behaviour. When people feel that they are treated unfairly (e.g. by a new pricing 
regime) behavioural disengagement becomes more probable, and thus, intended 
behavioural changes are likely to fail (Gehlert, Francke & Schlag, 2007). The Theory of 
Psychological Reactance (Brehm, 1966) provides a valuable approach to explain this 
phenomenon. The reactance theory is based on the observation that people want to 
perceive that their relevant behavioural options could be potentially implemented 
(behavioural freedom). If the behavioural freedom is perceived as threatened or 
restricted (e.g. by road pricing), individuals will experience an adverse motivational 
state called reactance. An important prerequisite for the development of reactance is that 
people perceive the threatening of their behavioural freedom as unfair or unreasonable. 
If, however, the restrictions are logical or otherwise made plausible less or no reactance 
is predicted (Miron & Brehm, 2006). Since reactance is an intense adverse motivational 
state which has strong motivational properties, experience of psychological reactance 
eventually leads to attempts to restore one’s behavioural freedom. According to 
Brehms’ theory, the restoration of freedom can be done in two distinguished ways. The 
restoration of perceived behavioural freedom via direct actions is seen as the most 
effective way of reducing reactance but because of situational and social constraints 
direct actions are less likely. Instead of direct actions, the restoration of behavioural 
freedom via indirect reactions is more likely. Thereby, one possibility of indirect 
reactions is restoration by implication. In this term implication includes refusing to act, 
watching others restoring the freedom or motivating others to restore freedom. 
According to the noted theoretical approach and beside the cognitive aspects a central 
motivational factor that might influence user reaction toward differentiated pricing is 
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acceptability. If users do not accept the price system they may not make an effort to 
understand it (Rößger et al., 2008). In such cases they may not change their behaviour to 
the extent they could, or may even resist making any change. Acceptability is a 
hypothetical construct that refers to the (affirmative) attitude towards a specific 
attitudinal object. Within the heuristic model of acceptability by Schade and Schlag 
(2000, 2003) several factors have been identified which contribute to the acceptability 
of transport pricing measures. For the evaluation of such pricing systems, among others, 
relevant issues of acceptability seem to be perceived effectiveness and perceived 
fairness. Perceived effectiveness refers to the degree to which the aims of the measure 
can be reached. Whether the proposed measures are perceived as being effective or not 
determines the acceptability of the measure. Perceived justice or fairness also is an 
important prerequisite of acceptability. If fairness is tentatively operationalised as 
personal outcome expectations it is expected that the more people perceive advantages 
following the introduction of transport infrastructure use charges the more they will be 
willing to accept it (Schade & Schlag, 2003). 
The empirical background to the above theoretical discussion is mostly research in the 
passenger travel market, and car drivers in particular. Freight is usually relatively 
essential movement (similar to commuting to work), and hence elasticities for freight 
movement in general can be expected to be low. But for commercial reasons, companies 
have various alternative options available as responses to increased transport costs, like 
changing vehicle type or switching to an alternative mode. Further, inaccurate 
perceptions and personal biases are likely to be less of a problem to freight than to most 
private travellers; freight operators in many cases use special software to calculate 
prices, or they use specialized staff for this task. These arguments would imply that 
actual elasticities for a particular mode in freight might be higher than for freight in 
general, and higher than expected from the essential nature of freight. The evidence on 
elasticities supports these views to an extent; see for example Graham and Glaister 
(2004). 
Road freight is a market characterized by strong competition and well informed 
decision makers. Since profit maximization is a prime objective, operators are expected 
to act rationally to price differentiation measures. The present paper aims to examine if 
motivational factors like acceptability, perceived fairness and perceived effectiveness 
still have an effect on influencing future behavioural responses, and which factors are 
the most important ones. 
Two interview surveys with freight operators have been conducted to obtain 
information on operators' views and opinions, one referring to an urban setting, and the 
other referring to an interurban setting. Because of the different nature of urban and 
interurban freight transport, the two surveys were different in the description of choice 
scenarios and certain options for price differentiation. For instance, an alternative free of 
charge route would not be available for the urban sample. The urban sample consisted 
in principle of local operators with local and regional distribution as their main business. 
The interurban sample would have long distance transport as their main business, and 
with international operation equally common as national operation. This sample would 
in general have prior experience with charging like motorway tolls and the German 
Maut, whilst only the Norwegian urban sample would have extensive experience with 
urban charging. 
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2. Survey 1: Interviews on urban settings 
 
2.1. Method 
 
The survey has been conducted by direct telephone interviews with key area managers 
of the firms contacted, or directly with single haulers. Together with the official 
invitation to take part in the survey, a self-administered version of a questionnaire was 
submitted by e-mail both to assist phone meetings and give the option of self 
completion (Tretvik, 2007). 
Questionnaire. At the start section the questionnaire asks for information about the 
company (turnover, transport activities, type of hauled goods, fleets etc.). The second 
part of the questionnaire deals with some general questions about current practise 
regarding road tools, among others the way to calculate tolls. 
Within the third part reactions and opinions towards an example scenario adopted 
from the Stockholm congestion trial has been applied to the participants. Referring to 
the scheme, the questionnaire sought for information about the understandability of the 
pricing scheme, ability of precise prediction of price calculation (How accurately 
COULD YOU predict costs?), engagement / motivation in of price calculation (How 
accurately WOULD YOU predict costs?) and perceived effectiveness of the pricing 
schemes. 
Furthermore, freight operators were asked about the likelihood of several behavioural 
adaptations if differentiated charges were applied in the specified local urban areas. 
Respondents of the survey thereby were asked to rate the likelihood of reactions in short 
term, medium term and long term. The following behavioural reactions have been 
focussed on: 
 
- Changes in delivery time, 
- Use of intermodal services, 
- Changes in frequency of consignment/departures, 
- Optimisation of loads by restructuring services, 
- Alliances / agreements with other transport operators, 
- Change of road vehicle and 
- Renewing of the vehicle fleet (e.g. cleaner vehicles) 
 
The last part of the questionnaire focused on perceived effectiveness, perceived 
fairness and acceptability of the following elements of differentiation, if differentiated 
charges were introduced in the hauliers’ local area: 
 
- Vehicle class,  
- Emissions,  
- Time of day/night (peak/peak off hours),  
- Type of traffic (crossing/internal),  
- Types of road (motorway/express/local roads),  
- Period of year/day/week  
 
Participants. The sample contained a total of n = 18 (5 Italian operators, 5 operators 
from Norway, 3 operators from the UK and 5 Polish operators). 12 out of 18 
participants stated that their annual turnover is larger than 500 k uro, 2 out of 18 stated 
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that their turnover is between 100 k and 500 k uro. 2 operators refused the question 
about annual turnover. Referring to the type of urban freight transport, about 55% of 
respondents stated that local distribution is most common for their firms with respect to 
the tolled (scenario) area. About 38% (7) stated that the most common type is regional 
distribution for their firms. Only one respondent stated all types (Local, regional, long 
distance road freight transport) are common for his firm with respect to tolled area.  
 
2.2. Results  
 
Overall, differentiation based on emission standards or peak/off-peak hours were 
perceived to be the most effective in affecting road hauliers’ actions, whilst measures 
believed to be the least effective were differentiation based on vehicle class or type of 
road. Interestingly, one of the measures perceived to be the most effective (emission 
standards) was perceived to be the most acceptable, whilst the other (peak/off-peak 
hours) was the most unacceptable (Figure 1). Still, only the peak/off-peak measure 
showed a significant correlation (at the 5 % level) between perceived acceptability and 
effectiveness. There were in general strong positive correlations between responses to 
the questions about acceptability and fairness of measures. Correlations for each 
measure ranged between 0,6 (significant at the 5 % level) and 0,9 (significant at the 1 % 
level). 
 
 
Figure 1: Acceptability toward types of differentiation in an urban setting. 
 
Figure 2 shows clearly that long term responses were more likely than medium term 
responses and that medium term responses were more likely than short term responses. 
Overall, long term fleet renewal (according to EURO standards) was the most likely 
response. Even fleet renewal in the medium term ranked third overall. In the short term, 
the optimisation of loads and change of frequency of services were ranked highest. 
Other options that ranked high overall were changes in delivery times and change of 
frequency of services, both in the long run. Alliances, change of vehicles and use of 
intermodal services, all in the short run, were the most unlikely adaptations. 
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Larger companies were in general more likely to indicate behavioural changes for the 
majority of measures, compared to smaller size companies. It was in fact only changes 
in delivery times in the short, medium and long term that smaller companies indicated 
more frequently than larger companies. This might be because larger firms are in a 
better position to adapt to price differentiation measures in a variety of ways, or 
psychological factors may to a larger extent act as constraints for smaller companies 
than for larger ones. Sample sizes were too small for making a statistical investigation 
of this issue. 
 
Changes in
delivery times
Use of
intermodal
services
Change of
frequency of
services
Optimisation
of load by
restructuring
of services
Alliances with
other
operators
Change of
vehicles
Fleet renewal
in short term in medium term in long term
likely
very unlikely
very likely
 
Figure 2: Stated likelihood of behavioural responses if pricing schemes would be applied on urban areas. 
 
 
3. Survey 2: Interviews on interurban setting 
 
3.1. Method 
 
Questionnaire. The questionnaire for the second survey was almost identical with 
regard to the relevant items with the questionnaire used within study 1. Reference 
schemes were adapted to the characteristics of respondents. Participants were polled on 
the understandability of reference schemes, perceived effectiveness and engagement / 
motivation in prediction of tolls (Martino, 2008).  
As in study 1, freight operators were asked about the likelihood of several behavioural 
adaptations if differentiated charges were be applied on a certain corridor, and in 
addition to this, on the whole European network. Respondents were asked to estimate 
the likelihood of their reactions in short term, medium term and long term. In addition 
to the items used in study 1, the questionnaire included re-routing to other motorways 
and respectively re-routing to express / parallel roads as possible behavioural responses. 
Further, this questionnaire distinguished the use of accompanied intermodal services 
(Rolling Motorway / Ro-Ro) from the use of non-accompanied intermodal services. 
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As in study 1, the last part also sought for information about perceived effectiveness, 
fairness and acceptability on differentiation elements. In addition to the differentiation 
elements presented in study 1, an item referring to differentiation based on geographical 
aspects (mountainous or sensitive area) was added. 
Participants. The sample contained n = 17 participants. 30 questionnaires were sent 
out, a total of 17 were returned (9 by Polish operators, 8 by Italian operators). 9 out of 
12 respondents stated that their annual turnover is larger than 500 k Euro, 5 participants 
refused the question about yearly turnover. Half the respondents operate mainly on 
international level; about 50% of operators are mainly active on national level. 
 
3.2. Results 
 
Differentiation elements according to emission, and respectively, to vehicle class 
(e.g. axels, weight) were more acceptable than other differentiation types. The 
acceptability of differentiation according to period of the year / week and according to 
geographical sensitive areas received the lowest ratings by the freight operators (see 
Figure 3). There were slight differences between the ratings referring to the interurban 
corridor and ratings referring to the network setting but these differences were not 
statistically significant. 
 
Vehicle class
Emissions
Peak / Off-peak hours
Type of traffic
Type of road
Geographical
Period of the year /week Interurban corridor
Interurban network
Completely
unacceptable
quite
unacceptabe
quite
acceptable
Absolutely
acceptable
 
Figure 3: Acceptability towards differentiation types in interurban settings. 
 
Correlation analyses further emphasized that stated acceptability of specified types of 
differentiation were strongly related to perceived fairness. This held true for statements 
referring to the corridor case as well as for statements referring to the EU road network. 
The fairer differentiation elements were assessed, the more these aspects have been 
accepted. Tests of correlations between acceptability and perceived effectiveness 
showed weaker associations. Average correlation coefficients were computed via 
Z – transformation: the correlation between acceptability and perceived fairness was 
r = 0.80 if the setting referred to an application of charging schemes on the whole EU 
road network. If the setting referred to an application of charging schemes on a single 
corridor, the correlation coefficient between acceptability and perceived fairness r = .47 
was smaller but remained considerably. The average values for correlation coefficients 
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between perceived effectiveness of differentiation types and acceptability towards 
differentiation types were r = 0.24 for the EU road network and r = 0.28 for the 
application on an interurban corridor. 
Concerning the stated likelihood of future responses, there were no significant 
differences between the ratings with respect to a certain corridor and the ratings with 
respect to the European road network. As an example for the interurban setting, Figure 4 
provides an overview of respondents’ statements on behavioural adaptation strategies if 
charges would be applied on the EU network. Like results in study 1 already indicated – 
and not surprisingly, the most apparent effect on the likelihood of behavioural changes 
seemed to have the time horizon. Regarding a short time perspective, behavioural 
responses to charging schemes were rather unlikely whereas the likelihood increased 
with an increasing time horizon across all behavioural categories. However, these 
increases in the likelihood seemed to be different for certain behavioural categories. 
While “Alliances with other operators” was (relatively) rated as the most probable 
strategy referring to a short time perspective, in medium and in long terms “Fleet 
renewal” became the most probable behavioural adaptation strategy. Re-routing, 
changes in delivery times and optimisation of load by restructuring also became more 
probably over the time than the use of intermodal services or making alliances with 
other operators respectively. Obviously, behavioural strategies in adapting to charging 
schemes will change over time. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
in short term in medium term in long term
very likely
likely
very unlikely
1 Re-routing to other motorways
2 Re-routing to parallel / express roads
3 Changes in delivery times
4 Use of intermodal services (accompanied)
5 Use of intermodal services (non-accompanied)
6   Changes in frequency
7   Optimisation of load by restructuring
8   Alliances with other operators
9   Changes of vehicles
10  Fleet renewal 
 
Figure 4: Likelihood of future behavioural responses if charging scheme would be applied on the EU 
network. 
 
 
4. Further analyses 
 
Datasets of both surveys were merged together into a joint dataset. The purpose for 
this procedure was to get more generalisable valid results for freight operators and to get 
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a more reasonable sample size for interference statistical analyses. Furthermore a joint 
dataset provides the possibility to compare responses between the urban and interurban 
setting. Since the statements within study 2 considering behavioural strategies and 
attitudinal variables do not differ in respect to the reference areas (interurban corridor 
vs. EU road network), for the joint data analyses only statements referring to the EU 
network have been used. 
Comparisons between the urban and the interurban setting show differences in the 
acceptability of differentiation elements. So, differentiation according to the vehicle 
class (axels / weight) and differentiation according to emissions were rated significantly 
more acceptable if the respondents were exposed to an interurban setting than to an 
urban setting (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Differences in acceptability statements between urban and interurban setting. 
Differentiation element Setting Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
Signif. 
Urban 2,78 ,647 ,152 Vehicle class (axels / weight) 
Interurban 3,31 ,479 ,120 
.011 
Urban 3,22 ,428 ,101 Emissions (Euro standards) 
Interurban 3,56 ,512 ,128 
.043 
Urban 2,47 1,179 ,286 Peak / Off peak hours 
Interurban 2,69 ,873 ,218 
.555 
Urban 2,65 1,169 ,284 Type of traffic (crossing /internal) 
Interurban 2,31 ,946 ,237 
.375 
Urban 2,94 ,873 ,206 Type of road (motorways /express 
/local) Interurban 2,63 ,719 ,180 .256 
Urban 2,56 ,984 ,232 Period of the year /week /day 
Interurban 2,13 ,719 ,180 
.159 
 
Differences between the urban and the interurban setting also have been found with 
respect to the likelihood of certain future behavioural adaptation strategies. Considering 
the likelihood of short term responses, in the urban setting participants tended to rate 
“Changes in frequency” and “Optimisation of load by restructuring” more probable than 
participants in the interurban setting. On the contrary, respondents in the interurban 
setting rated it more probable to make alliances with other operators than respondents 
within the urban setting. This difference was significant at 5% significance level 
(Figure 5). 
Prediction of Stated Likelihood of Behavioural Changes. Future behavioural 
responses to reference pricing schemes have been obtained in order of short term, 
medium term and long term responses separately. As descriptive results from study 1 
and study 2 show, behavioural changes in the short term were rather unlikely, whereas 
the likelihood of behavioural changes increased with enlarged time horizon. Moreover, 
fleet renewal seemed to be the most probable response in the long term as well as in the 
medium term. For the short time perspective, not only fleet renewal but also changes in 
frequency of consignments / departures showed slightly higher values of stated 
likelihood compared to other responses. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 43 (2009): 35-48 
 44 
Changes in
delivery
times
Use of
intermodal
services
Changes of
frequency of
services
Optimisation
of load by
restructuring
Alliances
with others
Change of
vehicle
Fleet
renewal
Urban
Interurban
*
very unlikely
likely
very likely
Likelihood of short term responses
 
Figure 5: Differences in behavioural strategies as response to charging schemes between urban and 
interurban setting. 
 
Based on the complete data set (study 1 and 2), three indices by means of average 
values of all used items for short term, medium term and long term responses have been 
computed serving as comparable indicators of the behavioural responses’ likelihood. So, 
we produced three indices which provide approximations of the likelihood of future 
behavioural changes (LBC): LBC short term, LBC medium term, LBC long term. These 
indices were used in the following regression analyses as dependent variables. 
Potential factors have been tested simultaneously regarding their impacts on 
prediction of likelihood of behavioural change indicators by stepwise regression 
analyses. Unfortunately, items considering acceptability had not been similarly obtained 
within both studies. As described above, both surveys however obtained acceptability 
toward several differentiation aspects similarly. An approximation of a global value of 
acceptability towards differentiated toll charges has been computed by means of an 
average value of these items. So, this acceptability indicator has served rather as an 
approximation of a more general attitude toward differentiated charges than an attitude 
toward a specific charging scheme. 
In sum, theoretically relevant variables were included in a start regression model in an 
explorative way. After that, the number of predictors was stepwise reduced by criteria 
of non-significant changes in total explained variances. The start regression model 
included the following predictors: 
 
- Global acceptability towards differentiated toll charges  
- Understandability of reference scheme  
- Engagement / motivation to deal with reference scheme 
- Perceived effectiveness of reference scheme. 
 
A regression model to predict LBC short term provided unsatisfactory results 
(Table 2). This result has suggested that the likelihood of short term response was not 
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predictable by independent variables included in the regression equation. None of the 
predictors showed a beta-weight at significant level. Based on this result, it has to be 
noted that operators’ perceptions respectively opinions about a differentiated pricing 
scheme did not affect their (stated) likelihood of behavioural changes in the short term. 
Table 2: Regression coefficients Prediction of Likelihood of Short Term Responses (LBC short term). 
Start model Standardised 
coefficients 
T Significance 
(constant term)   6.578 .000 
Acceptance  .259 1.384 .178 
Understandability  .154 .704 .488 
Engagement  -.134 -.624 .538 
Effectiveness  .153 .804 .429 
 
Results of regression analysis of LBC medium term showed a significant multiple 
correlation coefficient between obtained values and values predicted by all independent 
variables together (start model, R = 0.618, p = 0.012, see Table 4). The explained 
variance of this model (adjusted R2) was 0.287: suggesting that about 29% of the 
variance in stated likelihood of behavioural changes was explainable by variances of the 
predictor variables. Moreover, the stepwise reduction of predictors did not change the 
value of explained variances significantly. In terms of tested variables this means that 
the likelihood was solely predictable by operators’ index of acceptability towards 
differentiated toll charges. The coefficient for perceived effectiveness achieved 
significance only at the 12.5% level, but was the second most important factor 
(Table 3). 
Table 3: Regression coefficients Prediction of Likelihood of Medium Term Responses (LBC medium 
term). 
Start model Standardised coefficients T Significance 
(constant term)  3.883 .001 
Acceptance .523 3.363 .002 
Understandability .239 1.317 .199 
Engagement -.230 -1.285 .210 
Effectiveness .251 1.586 .125 
Table 4: Summary of Regression Models: Prediction of Medium Term Responses. 
Model  R Adjusted R2 Changes in F Changes in 
significance of F 
Start model (a)  .618* .287   
2 (b)  .585** .269 1.650 .210 
3 (c)  .573** .280 .583 .451 
4 (d)  .536** .262 1.721 .200 
Notes: a) Predictors: Acceptance, Understandability, Engagement, Perceived Effectiveness 
b) Predictors: Acceptance, Understandability, Perceived Effectiveness; 
c) Predictors: Acceptance, Perceived Effectiveness; 
d) Predictor: Acceptance 
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Regression analysis of LBC long term also showed significant multiple correlation 
coefficient between obtained and predicted values of behavioural changes’ likelihood 
(Table 6). Compared with the results above, the fit of regression equation was even 
stronger: correlation coefficient R = 0.674 and adjusted explained variance by all 
predictors together (start model) in index LBC long term was R2 = 0.371. Stepwise 
reduction of predictors by above named criteria suggested that again mainly 
acceptability contributed essentially to the prediction of the behavioural change index. 
Changes in explained variances were not significant by reduction of predictors - except 
the variable acceptability. So, this finding was very similar to the result of regression 
analysis concerning medium term responses. Again, perceived effectiveness was the 
second best explanatory variable, but the coefficient achieved significance only at the 
10% level (Table 5). 
Table 5: Regression coefficients: Prediction of Likelihood of Long Term Responses (LBC long term). 
Start model  Standardised coefficients T Significance 
(constant term)  
 
2.047 .051 
Acceptance  .580 3.971 .001 
Understandability  .212 1.243 .225 
Engagement  -.256 -1.520 .141 
Effectiveness  .255 1.714 .098 
Table 6: Summary of Regression Models Prediction of Long Term Responses. 
Model R Adjusted R2 Changes in F Changes in 
significance of F 
Start model (a)  .674** .371   
2(b)  .650** .358 1.544 .225 
3(c)  .633** .357 1.048 .315 
4(d)  .597** .334 2.054 .163 
Notes: a) Predictors: Acceptance, Understandability, Engagement, Perceived Effectiveness 
b) Predictors: Acceptance, Understandability, Perceived Effectiveness; 
c) Predictors: Acceptance, Perceived Effectiveness; 
d) Predictor: Acceptance 
 
5. Discussion 
 
The present paper considers freight operators’ opinions and perceptions of road 
pricing charges as well as their views on selected elements of differentiation. Results 
show that a global index of acceptability of differentiation elements is particularly 
strongly correlated with the likelihood of future behavioural changes in medium terms 
as well as in long terms. These findings indicate that positive attitudes towards 
differentiated prices are also in the freight sector relevant for prospective success and 
effectiveness of pricing measures. Perceived effectiveness was the second most 
important motivational factor for all three time horizons, even if the estimated effect on 
the likelihood of behavioural change was only close to being significant, given the 
relatively small sample size. This gives some support to the hypothesis that a belief in 
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the effectiveness of price differentiation measures, in terms of providing more efficient 
transport operation, is important for behavioural changes to happen. 
Further, variables investigating aspects of direct handling with toll charges by 
operators (e.g. understandability, engagement to deal with schemes) do not considerably 
contribute to the prediction of stated likelihood of behavioural changes. That might 
suggest that the understandability of charging schemes respectively the engagement to 
deal with them is less important for freight operators than for individual car users or 
transport passengers. A further fact supports this assumption: a vast majority of 
respondents’ states that they have special staff calculating and evaluating road toll 
expenditures. So, cognitive burden by differentiated pricing schemes seems not to be a 
major issue for freight companies. It seems to be identified as a necessary separate task -
allocated in companies’ structures separately. Moreover, differences in likelihood of 
behavioural responses between several time horizons imply that effects of differentiated 
pricing in the freight operator sector affect behaviour more in the long run than in short 
term. This is comparable with the typical finding that long-term elasticities are usually 
higher than short-term elasticities (e.g. Nijkamp & Pepping, 1998). 
Additional findings show that the attitudes of the surveyed freight companies towards 
various elements of differentiation differ. E.g., differentiation according to emission or 
vehicle class seems to be more acceptable than any other differentiation element. 
Differentiation in terms of geographic (e.g. mountainous or sensitive areas) or time 
aspects (period of year / week / day) are rather less acceptable to road freight operators. 
It is interesting to note that differentiation elements which relate to changes at vehicle 
side are rated as more acceptable than differentiation elements which refer to concrete 
behavioural changes. One possible explanation might be that freight operators perceive 
more control to respond towards vehicle based price differentiation than to a price 
differentiation which relates to changes in the operation of HGV. Comparison of certain 
future responses hints also in this direction: so, fleet renewal is seen as the most likely 
response to reference schemes in medium terms as well in long terms.  
Due to the correlative design of the survey, further studies are needed to examine 
casual relationships between motivational factors and behavioural responses towards 
differentiated charging schemes. It might be possible that acceptability affects 
behavioural responses in sense of a higher willingness to deal with charges and thus 
behavioural adaptation will become more likely. On the other hand it might be also 
plausible that certain kinds of behavioural adaptation strategies are perceived as more 
realisable and therefore certain charging schemes corresponding to realisable adaptation 
strategies are more accepted. Finally, it is probable that both variables interact. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the impact that tolling schemes with a higher degree of differentiation of tariffs 
among demand categories can have on road demand. The question addressed in the paper is whether the 
differentiation of inter-urban road tolls can help to manage demand and meet targets like alleviating 
congestion, reducing emissions or making feasible project financing schemes, where toll revenues are 
used to cover construction and operating costs. The paper is mainly based on the results of the 
DIFFERENT research project, co-funded by the European Commission DG TREN, where a number of 
modelling tests have been carried out using two different transport network models. Based on modelling 
results we conclude that a trade-off between alternative targets of toll differentiation exists and that results 
vary according to the specific context of the application. In non-congested corridors charge differentiation 
can raise money, but there is little room for social benefits, whereas in congested areas travel speed on the 
road network can be improved by introducing charges on congested non-motorway links. Additionally, 
achievement of benefits from differentiated charges may require the co-ordinated introduction of charges 
on ordinary roads as well as on motorways. 
 
Keywords: Road charging; Modelling; Project financing; Transport externalities. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Motorways tolls are already applied in many European countries to contribute to 
finance the total operating cost, including investment and return on investment, for the 
various concessionaires. Countrywide toll schemes, with some levels of differentiation, 
have been recently introduced on German, Czech and Austrian motorways and on the 
road network of Switzerland. Rules for road charges in Europe are going to be changed 
on the basis of the EC strategy for the internalisation of external costs of all modes of 
transport, as specified in the Greening Transport Package issued on July 2008. It is then 
expected that higher degrees of tolls differentiation will be soon introduced in the 
European road network.  
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The paper discusses the impact that tolling schemes with a higher degree of 
differentiation of tariffs among demand categories can have on road demand. The 
question addressed in the paper is whether the differentiation of inter-urban road tolls 
can help to manage demand and meet targets like alleviating congestions, reducing 
emissions or making feasible project financing schemes, where tolls revenues are used 
to cover construction and operating costs. Alternative criteria that can be used to 
introduce differentiation are compared. The paper is mainly based on the results of the 
DIFFERENT research project, co-funded by the European Commission DG TREN. The 
project has investigated the role of differentiated prices for all modes of transport from a 
theoretical and empirical perspective. Within DIFFERENT, several tests have been 
carried out to assess the impact of various differentiation schemes on interurban road 
transport using two simulation models: of the Brenner corridor and of the Padana region 
in Italy. The paper reports the main outcomes of these simulations, which are relevant 
for the design of transport policies. 
The paper has the following structure. In section 2 the modelling tools used for the 
simulations are described. The modelling tests carried out in DIFFERENT are 
introduced in section 3, while section 4 presents the main results. Finally, section 5 
draws conclusions and makes some reflection on policy issues. 
 
 
2. Description of the modelling tools 
 
The modelling applications, developed for the Brenner corridor and the Padana 
region, were used as test-bed to simulate tolls differentiation. The reason for using these 
two models is threefold: first, an initial version of both was already accessible to the 
authors. Second, the two models are considered well representative of two quite 
different conditions: the Brenner model relates to a major international corridor mainly 
used by through traffic and which has no significant capacity problems, while the 
Padana region is a complex and often congested network dominated by local traffic. 
Third, the Padana region model includes some planned infrastructures that should be 
built according to project financing schemes, whose feasibility heavily depends on toll 
revenues. 
A common feature of the two models that is important to clarify is that they do not 
handle long term effects which may happen when differentiated road tariffs are applied. 
For instance, when more polluting vehicles are overcharged, the vehicle fleet could 
evolve quickly, with more charged vehicle types replaced by others. Also, when a 
differentiation scheme gives rise to higher average tolls reactions might happen on the 
logistics side, e.g. empty trips might be reduced, etc. These kind of impacts are not 
modelled. Another type of decision that the two transport models do not tackle is the 
application of differentiation schemes based on aspects like the day of the week or the 
period of the year. A differentiation of tolls in e.g. summer week-ends with respect to 
other periods of the year could actually lead some demand to change route, but also to 
shift the trip to another period or to change destination and these choices are beyond the 
scope of the model. 
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2.1. The Brenner Corridor Model 
 
The Brenner corridor is one of the main gates for trans-Alpine traffic for both 
passenger and freight. Thus, a significant amount of crossing demand (with a substantial 
proportion of long distance HGV traffic) contributes to the traffic on the tolled 
motorway connecting Verona to Innsbruck and beyond. At the same time, especially in 
the Italian part, the corridor is also used for (relatively) short-distance trips within the 
study area. A national road runs parallel to the motorway and can be considered as an 
alternative route (especially for local trips). A major railway is also available on the 
corridor and a new rail tunnel is planned within the TENs projects. 
The Brenner model builds on an existing integrated transport and land use model of 
the Italian section of the corridor (Alto Adige/South Tyrol)1. The model is implemented 
using the Meplan software package and simulates both modal split and route choice of 
both passenger and freight demand during the morning peak. Two alternative road paths 
are considered – although in a simplified manner - for long-distance traffic: one is the 
corridor through St. Gotthard tunnel, the other is the Tarvisio pass. The 
Origin/Destination matrix was estimated using existing databases and origin-destination 
matrices (the South Tyrol integrated land-use and transport model, the CAFT Alps 
Crossing database2, the ETIS database3, the SCENES model4). 
The zoning system includes 42 zones (33 being part of the study region and the rest as 
external zones) defined with the objective of simulating local traffic as well as crossing 
traffic on the corridor. Two parallel segmentations of demand are used in the model, one 
concerning vehicles and one concerning individuals or transported goods. Vehicles are 
categorised according to their EURO emissions standard (consistently with the 
COPERT5 classification) and, in the case of trucks, their size. 
Passenger demand is segmented according to trip purpose (business, commuting, 
tourism, and personal trips) and the average length of trips ( crossing traffic; short and 
long distance traffic). Some combinations of trip purpose and length are not considered 
because they are regarded as unlikely or irrelevant (e.g. crossing trips for personal 
purpose) and thus 8 demand segments are used (table 1). Each of the 8 segments has a 
separate elasticity value and is further crossed with the 4 emission classes giving a total 
of 32 (8 x 4) demand segments. 
                                                 
1
 The South Tyrol integrated land-use and transport model was originally built in 1993 as a supporting 
tool for the Transport Master Plan. The model was updated in 2001 for the assessment of the Regional 
Transport Plan. 
2
 The Alps Crossing database is one result of a monitoring project managed by the countries of the Alps 
region (France, Switzerland, Austria and, lately, Italy). Each five years, a traffic survey is carried out on 
main Alps passes in order to collect information on the amount of road and rail freight traffic and its 
features (freight type, containerisation, etc.). A report of the latest survey can be found at: 
http://www.uvek.admin.ch/dokumentation/00655/00895/01152/index.html?lang=it. 
3
 Within the European Transport policy Information System (ETIS) project, ETIS-BASE developed a 
database of passenger and transport data which is expected to become the reference database for 
European strategic modelling. More information on ETIS and ETIS BASE can be found at: 
http://www.iccr-international.org/etis/. 
4
 See Ying et al, 2005. 
5
 COPERT is the acronym of “COmputer Programme to calculate Emissions from Road Transport”. The 
program has been developed by the European Environment Agency. The emissions functions developed 
in COPERT are a widely used reference in European studies. For more details on COPERT see 
http://lat.eng.auth.gr/copert/. 
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Table 1: Demand/Groups Combinations – Passengers. 
 Average Trip Length 
Purpose Crossing Short Distance Long Distance 
Business  X X 
Commuting  X X 
Tourism X X X 
Personal trips  X  
Table 2: Demand/Groups Combinations – Freight. 
 Average Trip Length 
Commodity  Crossing Short-Long Distance 
High Unitised (HU) X X 
High Not Unitised (HNU) X X 
Low (LOW)  X 
 
Freight demand is segmented according to commodity groups (high value goods 
unitised; high value goods not unitised e.g. machinery, vehicles; low value goods) and 
average trip length. As for passengers, not all possible combinations are actually used in 
the model. The demand groups are further split into 12 categories of vehicles obtained 
by combining the four emission classes and the three weight categories. Eventually, 44 
demand segments are used for freight demand. 
The Brenner corridor model is multimodal and, even though the focus is on road 
transport tolls, alternative modes are included in the model in order to simulate modal 
shift as reaction to the tolling measures. Four transport modes are available for 
passengers: car (only driver); car (driver + passengers); coach; train. The two alternative 
car modes are considered because one possible response to pricing policies is car 
pooling6. 
For freight, train is the only alternative to road modes. The alternative is modelled 
only for those demand segments correspondent to a large truck (>16 tonnes). The 
assumption is that deliveries using lighter vehicles are too small in volume and too 
frequent in time to have rail as a realistic alternative.  
In addition to the attention paid to the realism of traffic flows and mode split on the 
corridor, the model was calibrated in order to reproducing sound elasticities (i.e. 
comparable to literature values) of demand with respect to cost.  
 
2.2 The Padana Region Motorway Model 
 
The Padana Region Motorway model has been the results of the update of an existing 
road transport model, implemented using the Meplan software package, elaborated in 
order to test the impacts of further toll differentiation on the complex motorway 
network existing in its study area (see figure 1), which comprehends Lombardia, Emilia 
Romagna and Veneto regions.  
The Padana Region is one of the main gates for both passenger and freight traffic and 
his motorway network is composed by the following motorways: A4 Milano–Venezia, 
                                                 
6
 For trip purpose “tourism” only the driver + passengers alternative is modelled. 
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A1 Milano - Bologna, A22, Brennero-Modena, A21 Piacenza–Brescia, A13 Padova–
Bologna, Cremona–Mantova axis (in project), Brescia–Bergamo–Milano axis (in 
project), Pedemontana axis (in project), Tirreno–Brennero axis (in project). Population 
and economic activities density is very high in the model region, so that the motorway 
network is intensively used for local trips also. 
The model simulates route choice for both passenger and freight demand. None of the 
other modes is considered as alternative to road transport. Since in the modelled 
scenarios, at least some demand segments experience higher tolls, mode shift can be 
expected at some extent. The Padana region model cannot capture this effect and 
therefore absolute values of demand and revenues estimated with the model can be 
overestimated. At the same time, the interest placed in the comparison of results 
between the alternative scenarios, it seems reasonable that the absence of competing 
modes does not hinder to draw conclusions from the simulations.  
The toll differentiation tests have been implemented at the year 2020, when all the 
new motorway projects are supposed to be available. Different matrices concerning 
various configurations of the vehicle fleet have been produced in order to simulate the 
effect of its evolution on the toll analysis. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Padana Region Motorway Model Network. 
 
For the purpose of this study, the model was updated introducing vehicle 
differentiation for both freight and passenger, in order to permit the introduction of 
differentiated toll. The adopted segmentation is consistent to the one used for the 
Brenner model and includes : four emission categories – or Euro standards - for cars and 
trucks (EURO-I or less, EURO-II, EURO-III, EURO-IV) and three size categories of 
freight vehicles (<3.5 tons; 3.5-16 tons; >16 tons). As a result, passenger demand is 
segmented according to the standard EURO of the vehicle, while for freight demand the 
combination of size and standard EURO is considered. In the end, 4 segments are used 
for passenger and 4x3 =12 segments for freight demand. 
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3. Differentiation scenarios 
 
The differentiation schemes were defined according to: 
- The variable used to differentiate tolls (e.g. vehicle size, emissions category); 
- The level of differentiation (i.e. the difference between each toll level); 
- The size of the tolls (i.e. for a given relative difference between each toll level, the 
absolute values can be larger or smaller). 
Four types of scenarios were simulated: 
- A set of scenarios where motorway tolls are differentiated according to vehicles 
emissions class (named E-scenarios); 
- A set of scenarios where motorway tolls discriminate trucks on the basis of their 
size (named S-scenarios); 
- A set of scenarios where also the ordinary road network is tolled (named R-
scenarios); 
- A final set of eight alternative scenarios where all the criteria (emissions class, 
truck size and road type) are used at the same time (see table 3)7. 
Table 3: Summary Description of the Mixed Scenarios in the Brenner Corridor model. 
Test EURO Category Vehicle Size Road Type 
1 Disincentives for most 
polluting vehicles (with a 
larger difference for cars 
than for trucks). 
Discounted tolls for light 
vehicles, higher tolls than 
the current ones for heavy 
vehicles. 
State road tolled for all freight vehicles 
(50% of current motorway charge). 
25% discount on the motorway for all 
trucks. 
2 25% discount for EURO 4 
cars. 
Same as test 1. The toll for trucks on the state road 
increases (100% of current motorway 
charge). 
3 EURO 2 cars are no longer 
charged a premium. 
Rise in the discount for 
light lorries. Current toll for 
heavy trucks 
Same as test 2. 
4 10% discount for EURO 2 
cars with respect to the 
current charge. 
Light lorries are not 
discounted anymore. 
25% discount on the motorway for all 
trucks. 
5 20% discount for EURO 2 
cars with respect to the 
current charge. 
Light lorries receive a 25% 
discount. 
Cars using ordinary roads are charged 
40% of current motorway toll. 
10% premium on trucks using the 
motorway. 
6 Premium for EURO 3 cars 
is lower than in test 5. 
10% discount for EURO 2 
cars with respect to the 
current charge. 
Same as test 5. Same as test 5. 
7 Same as test 6. Same as test 6. Cars and trucks using ordinary roads are 
charged 50% of current motorway toll. 
Cars toll on motorway discounted by 25% 
Truck toll on motorway discounted by 
10% 
8 Same as test 6. Same as test 6. Cars and trucks using ordinary roads are 
charged 50% of current motorway toll. 
Cars toll on motorway discounted by 25% 
Truck toll on motorway discounted by 
15% 
                                                 
7
 All these eight scenarios were simulated with the Brenner model, while only the first six scenarios 
reported in table 3 were tested (with some minor adaptation) also in the Padana Region model. 
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In all scenarios some demand segments enjoy a toll reduction whereas others face a 
toll increase. However, scenarios are not neutral, i.e. increments and decrements do not 
balance each other. Especially where tolls are extended to the road network (in addition 
to the motorway network), the average tariff is actually larger than in the reference 
scenario. It should be clear that scenarios were not designed with the aim of keeping the 
average toll level fixed, but to discriminate between demand segments when, for 
instance, higher tolls are levied to internalise external costs or to recover investment 
costs. 
 
 
4. Modelling results 
 
4.1. Results from the Brenner Corridor Model 
 
Figure 2 to 4 provide a summary of the outcomes8 of the simulations of the first three 
sets of scenarios. 
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Figure 2: Summary Results of the E-Scenarios in the Brenner Corridor Model: Differentiation According 
to Emissions Level. 
                                                 
8
 Outcomes reported include: total travel times on the network (time); total variable operating costs plus 
toll costs (cost); emissions of: Carbon Oxide (CO), Carbon Dioxide (CO2), Oxides of nitrogen (NOx), 
Particulate matters (PM), Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC); Total toll revenues (Revenues). 
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Figure 3: Summary Results of the S-Scenarios in the Brenner Corridor Model: Differentiation According 
to Vehicle Size. 
 
 
Figure 4: Summary Results of the R-Scenarios in the Brenner Corridor Model: Differentiation According 
to Road Type. 
 
Some relevant results can be summarised as follows. First, in all tested scenarios, an 
“environmental” differentiation of charges leads to an increase of travel time because 
part of the traffic shifts onto the ordinary roads, with an overall worsening of 
congestion. Second, just increasing tolls for heavy vehicles produces higher revenues 
for the motorway operator but traffic conditions are slightly worsened (tests S1 to S3), 
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while coupling discounted tolls for light vehicles with slightly higher tolls for the 
heaviest vehicles (test S4) can give rise to positive effects: travel times in the area are 
reduced as traffic on ordinary road is decreased, without any effect on the motorway 
operator revenues. Third, when freight vehicles are charged on the ordinary roads (tests 
R1 to R3), truck drivers are induced to leave the ordinary road for the motorway, with 
positive effects in terms of traffic congestion on the ordinary network and lower travel 
times also for trucks (because the motorway is less congested). Total revenues 
(motorways + ordinary road) increase as well. When both cars and trucks are charged 
on the ordinary road and the latter receive a discount on current motorway charge 
(scenarios R4 and R5), route shift is larger and so is the benefit for road congestion. 
Discounting tolls for trucks on the motorway when the ordinary road is also charged 
seems also not detrimental for the total toll revenues, however environmental impacts is 
adverse because of the higher speed of trucks on the network. 
Figure 5 provides summary results of the final set of scenarios, where all criteria are 
used at the same time, trying to keep the good results of the previous scenarios and 
minimise undesired effects. However, the evidence from this last set of tests shows that 
only limited emissions and travel time reductions can be achieved using toll 
differentiation schemes and travel costs are often increased. Since all these scenarios 
include ordinary road tolls, operators revenues are increased, sometimes greatly. 
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Figure 5: Summary Results of the Mixed Scenarios in the Brenner Corridor model. 
 
Given these results, one may ask whether there is a real payoff for the higher travel 
costs. In order to address these questions, scenarios were compared using a measure of 
net benefit which included user costs together with a valuation of travel time and of 
pollutant emissions (note that this is not a full cost-benefit analysis because it excludes 
implementation costs and does not discount costs and benefits over time). 
The values used in this exercise are reported in Table 5. The values of travel times for 
freight were derived from values in Euro/ton*hour estimated in the SCENES project 
(Ying et al, 2005). The values of travel times for passengers were estimated using 
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results of direct surveys carried out by TRT in Italy. The marginal costs of polluting 
emissions were estimations made for the ASTRA-Italia project (Centro Studi 
Federtrasporto, 2002) starting from literature values (INFRAS-IWW, 2000). 
Table 4: Values used for the Estimation of the Net Economic Benefit of Scenarios. 
 VOT* CO** CO2** NOx** PM** VOC** 
Cars 11.7 3.1 87.2 6 863.2 173 276.5 1 073.7 
Trucks 20.9      
Notes: *Euro per hour; **Euro per ton. 
 
Figure 6 shows the results for the mixed scenarios in terms of total benefits enjoyed 
by the society in comparison to the BAU scenario. Positive values imply a gain in social 
welfare (lower costs), while negative values represent a loss (higher costs). 
Most scenarios present a negative economic benefit because the higher travel costs 
outweigh any reduction of travel times and emissions. The two scenarios yielding 
positive results are those in which a saving-oriented toll differentiation scheme 
(whereby truck motorway tolls are reduced and, at the same time, goods vehicles are 
tolled on ordinary roads) is applied. This scheme causes a cross shift of cars from the 
motorway to the ordinary roads and vice-versa for goods vehicles and, as a result, both 
segments benefit from less congestion and reduced travel costs. 
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Figure 6: Net Economic Benefit of Final Scenarios in the Brenner Corridor model (1000Euros per year). 
 
4.2. Results from the Padana Region Motorway Model 
 
The most significant results of the tests simulated with the Padana Region model are 
shown in figures 7 to 9 and can be summarised as follow. In scenarios where motorway 
tolls are differentiated on the basis of vehicles emissions class, an increase of the time 
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spent on the network and of transport emissions is obtained. This result is in line with 
the outcomes of the tests on the Brenner model. 
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Figure 7: Summary Results of the E-Scenarios in the Padana Region Model: Differentiation According to 
Emissions Level. 
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Figure 8: Summary Results of the S-Scenarios in the Padana Region Model: Differentiation According to 
Vehicle Size. 
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In the second set of scenarios, the most noticeable results concern the effect of 
coupling discounted tolls for light vehicles with slightly higher tolls for the heaviest 
vehicles (Test S5); in contrast with what was observed for the Brenner model, travel 
times are almost unchanged, transport emissions increase and the effect on the revenues 
of the motorway operator is of a slight reduction. The reason for this difference is that 
part of heavy vehicles (those moving on shorter distances) shift from motorway to road 
in reaction to larger tolls. 
In the third set of scenarios, when the charge on car travellers on the motorway is 
increased without any tolls on the state road (tests R1 to R3), while trucks are charged 
on both the infrastructure types, results are in line with those obtained in the Brenner 
model. On the one hand car travellers shift to the state road because of the increased toll 
on the motorway, on the other hand truck drivers are induced to leave the state road for 
the motorway: these shifts lead to savings in time spent on the network for both car and 
trucks. Unfortunately the positive effect on time (which is much larger than in the 
Brenner model because the network starts from a congested configuration) does not 
produce positive effects on transport emissions, which increase for all the pollutants in 
any scenario considered. Total travel costs are almost unchanged for these three 
scenarios while revenues increase for the motorway operator as effect of the increased 
toll. When also cars are charged on the road network, while trucks receive a discount on 
current motorway charge (tests R4 and R5) are also similar to the results of the Brenner 
model. 
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Figure 9: Summary Results of the R-Scenarios in the Padana Region Model: Differentiation According to 
Road Type. 
 
When we come to the final set of scenarios, mixing all differentiation criteria, the are 
different from the ones obtained with the Brenner Corridor model from an important 
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point of view: since speed can be improved more significantly by shifting truck demand 
on motorways, thus alleviating a congested road network, positive results in terms of net 
economic benefits are obtained (figure 10). The reason of such a discrepancy can be 
found in the different characteristics of the study areas: the Brenner is not a very 
congested corridor while the Padana region complex road network is almost close to 
capacity. Therefore, the social costs of the increase in the level of emissions and 
sometimes larger transport costs are more than balanced by substantial gains in terms of 
time spent by travellers on the network. 
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Figure 10: Net Economic Benefit of Final Scenarios in the Padana Region model (Million Euros per 
year). 
 
4.3. Lessons from the comparisons of the results 
 
Testing different toll schemes on the Brenner corridor and in the Padana region leads 
to some interesting results. In particular, the following points seem to be relevant. 
It seems impossible to reduce significantly emissions using differentiation tolls. If 
more polluting vehicles are overcharged they just shift on road and more elaborated 
schemes are able to produce only limited savings of pollution in the Brenner corridor, 
while in the Padana region even such a small result is not visible. 
In the Brenner corridor, where congestion is limited and a large share of traffic 
consists of heavy trucks crossing the whole study area, the impact of differentiation 
schemes on the travel speed is low. In the Padana region, where a more complex and 
congested network exists and demand includes many more local trips, travel speed can 
be improved much more significantly. 
There may be a trade-off between objectives. For instance, the better scheme for 
improving travel time on the network can not be the best solution to reduce emissions or 
to maximise motorway operators revenues. For instance, in the Brenner context, 
scenarios oriented towards the minimisation of time spent on the network can come up 
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with benefits exceeding costs only if toll discounts are used, which might be undesirable 
from the motorway operator perspective. 
Since in the Brenner corridor travel times cannot be improved, the only significant 
benefit from the social point of view can spring from a proper use of the revenues of the 
motorway operator, e.g. for developing alternative modes or boosting the renewal of the 
fleet. 
 
 
5. Conclusions and reflections on policy 
 
In the DIFFERENT project, a number of modelling tests have been carried out using 
two network models to assess at what extent inter-urban tolls differentiation can help to 
manage road transport demand in relation to objectives like reducing congestion and 
adverse environmental effects of road transport or applying project financing schemes.. 
The main conclusions can be summarised as follows: 
 
- Differentiation of road tolls can induce perceptible changes in the behaviour of 
freight and passenger vehicle drivers. 
- Differentiation of interurban tolls according to vehicles’ emission category does 
not seem to seem to produce any significant environmental benefit in the short 
term. 
- Results vary according to the specific context of application. In non-congested 
corridors charge differentiation can raise money, but there is little room for social 
benefits whereas, in congested areas, the travel speed on the road network can be 
improved by introducing charges on congested non-motorway links. 
- A trade-off between alternative targets of toll differentiation exists: e.g. the most 
preferable scheme to raise funds in case of project financing may well be not the 
best scheme for improving the level of service of the network. 
 
Given these conclusions, we think it is appropriate to make the following reflections 
on policy:  
 
- It is important to consider network effects; appraising the impact of differentiated 
tolls without taking availability and conditions of alternative routes can be 
misleading.  
- Even if a differentiation scheme is applied with the “neutral” objective of 
internalising external costs, it should first be tested extensively in order to identify 
undesired effects (e.g. shift of more polluting trucks onto ordinary roads) 
- Achievement of benefits from differentiated charges may require the co-ordinated 
introduction of charges on ordinary roads as well as on motorways. This might be 
politically challenging and, if proven unfeasible, it is recommended to not rise 
motorway tolls for trucks in areas where the motorway network is used by short 
distance freight demand. 
- Differentiation schemes do not necessarily give rise to social benefits in terms of 
saved travel time or reduced emissions and therefore, to achieve such benefits, 
some constraint on the use of revenues may be required. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 43 (2009): 49-63 
 63 
References 
 
Centro Studi Federtrasporto (2002) “Fisco e pedaggi per ridurre i costi del trasporto: la metodologia”, 
Bollettino economico sul settore dei trasporti, 12, Roma. 
INFRAS-IWW (2000) External costs of transport, Zurich/Karlsruhe. 
IRER (2007), Verifica degli effetti di una gestione unitaria di reti stradali complesse, Milano. 
Maibach M. et. al. (2008) Handbook on estimation of external costs in the transport sector. 
Internalisation Measures and Policies for All external Cost of Transport (IMPACT) Version 1.1., 
Delft, CE, 2008. 
Martino, A., Chiffi, C., Fiorello, D., Boscherini, E., Suter, S., Hajdul, M., Bonsall, P., Wieland, B. and 
Evangelinos, C. (2008) “Report on Impacts of Charge Differentiation for HGV and Motorway Toll 
Differentiation to Combat Time Space Congestion”, Deliverable D8.3-D9.2 of the DIFFERENT 
project, DG TREN, European Commission. 
TRT (2008) “WP 5 Case Studies and Simulations - Italian tolled motorway”, ENACT (Design 
appropriate contractual relationships) project, DG TREN, European Commission. 
Ying, J., Deane, G., Zhu, Y., Jakimovska, V., Martino, A. and Fiorello, D. (2005) “Results from the 
SCENES model”, Annex VI of ASSESS Final Report, DG TREN, European Commission. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 43 (2009): 64-82 
 64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Co-introduction of charges on urban roads and 
motorways in metropolitan areas:  
a model-based investigation 
 
Peter Bonsall 1∗, Mike Maher 1 
 
1
 Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores the relationship between charges on motorways and on other types of road. It 
draws on a model-based study of different pricing scenarios which was conducted within an EU-funded 
investigation of differentiated infrastructure charges (the DIFFERENT project). The scenarios covered 
strategies ranging from full charging on all roads irrespective of category, on motorways only, on 
motorway access roads, on urban roads only, and at cordons. A number of different charge levels were 
tested. The test results suggested that positive impacts and revenues are maximised by applying charges 
to each link which reflect the contribution to externalities made by the marginal user of that link - 
irrespective of whether it is a motorway link or an urban link. However, when implementation costs are 
taken into account, the best performing scheme was a cordon charge combined with a per-km charge for 
use of motorways outside the cordon. Fixed per-km charges on motorways or on urban roads are much 
less effective than charges which are differentiated to reflect congestion on individual links. The 
introduction of charges only on motorways produces little benefit and causes unwanted diversion to urban 
roads, and although the introduction of a charge designed to protect the level of service enjoyed by 
strategic motorway traffic succeeds in achieving that goal, it yields little revenue and has little overall 
impact on delay or other externalities. The paper highlights the practical implications of these results and 
notes that, although it is likely to be easier to gain political support for introducing charges on motorways 
than on other types of road, the benefits from so doing are generally lower than can be obtained by 
introducing charges on congested urban roads. 
 
Keywords: Road pricing; Model; Motorway; Metropolitan; Differentiation. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background and scope 
 
Tolls are commonly applied on motorways. They are generally designed to yield a 
revenue stream to offset the costs of the original construction or ongoing maintenance 
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and, perhaps, to generate funds to support future expansion in capacity. Most tolled 
motorways serve long/medium distance traffic but many pass close to centres of 
population and there are an increasing number of tolled motorways in urban areas – 
Melbourne’s City Link and Toronto’s Highway 407 being prominent examples. Charges 
are less commonly levied on users of general purpose urban roads but schemes in 
London and Stockholm exemplify increased interest in this policy option and, as 
demonstrated in Singapore, the introduction of charges in the city centre, on urban 
expressways and on major arterials offers a powerful tool with which to manage 
demand throughout the network. The objectives of charges on urban roads generally 
differ from those of motorway tolls in that they include an explicit goal of reducing 
demand and thus alleviating congestion – although the generation of revenue may still 
be an important aspect. 
Motorways and urban roads have different functions and generally serve different 
types of traffic. However, when motorways pass through, or near, metropolitan areas 
these distinctions may become blurred and it becomes impossible to optimise the 
performance of one type of road without considering its interaction with the other. The 
introduction of charges on one category of road is, of course, likely to have impacts on 
the usage of other nearby roads. This may be a result of diversion (e.g. drivers choosing 
to use uncharged routes in preference to charged ones) or of changes in trip patterns 
(e.g. as when introduction of charges in one part of the network suppresses trips and 
thereby relieves congestion across the whole network). 
It is a well-known principle of transport economics that maximum efficiency is not 
achievable in a transport network in which some links cannot be tolled1. In such 
situations, the best result is achieved, not by introducing marginal social cost prices on 
those links which can be tolled, but by setting tolls which take account of the effect on 
un-priced capacity (Lévy-Lambert, 1968; Marchand, 1968). The welfare gains from this 
kind of pricing are lower than those achievable when all links can be charged but are 
better than those achieved simply by optimising only for those links which can be 
priced (e.g. Liu and McDonald, 1998). 
Since it is usually much easier, politically, administratively and technically, to 
introduce tolls on motorways than to introduce charges on urban roads, more 
consideration has been given to the effect that introduction of motorway tolls might 
have on urban roads than vice versa. Recognition of the possibility of diversion of 
traffic from motorways onto adjacent roads has long been recognised by policy analysts 
(e.g. MVA, 1993) and has generally been seen as a potential problem. Although some 
analysts have suggested that any unwanted diversion might be prevented by local traffic 
management measures, others have concluded that it would be safer simply to avoid 
introducing charges on motorways near urban areas. (Atkins (2006), acting as 
consultants for the Greater Bristol Transportation Study, decided to exclude urban 
motorway charges from their list of potentially useful charging structures on just such 
grounds.) This approach, pragmatically justified though it may be, clearly leaves 
important questions unanswered.  
This investigation seeks to examine the relationship, within metropolitan areas, 
between charges on motorways and on other types of road, to explore the case for a 
coordinated approach to setting tolls on motorways and other roads and to consider the 
constraints which might make this difficult to achieve. The paper presents the results of 
                                                 
1
 This is one example of the difference between first best and second best pricing. 
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some previous modelling exercises before presenting some new modelling work in 
which the performance of different charging schemes is examined. Conclusions are then 
drawn on the interaction between charges on motorways and on other roads in urban 
areas and recommendations are put forward on the basis of these results and in the light 
of practical constraints and considerations which impinge on the design of road pricing 
schemes. 
 
1.2. The results of previous modelling exercises 
 
A number of studies have used models to examine scenarios for the introduction of 
charges on motorways and other roads in urban/metropolitan areas. The following 
paragraphs summarise some relevant results. 
 
Motorway Charging in West Yorkshire 
 
Mauchan and Bonsall (1995) used a fixed matrix SATURN assignment model to 
assess the effect of different forms of motorway toll on traffic diversion to the non-
motorway network in West Yorkshire. The study area was about 45 kms by 45 kms, had 
a population of about 2.2 million concentrated in 5 urban agglomerations and, at that 
time, included about 90 kms of motorway much of which passed quite close to the 
urban areas. Four charging regimes were tested: (i) a simple per-km charge on all 
motorways; (ii) a flat rate charge, irrespective of distance travelled, for any traffic using 
the motorway system; (iii) a per-km charge on traffic using the “strategic” motorways; 
and (iv) a flat rate charge on traffic using the “strategic” motorways. The flat rate 
regimes were designed to dissuade traffic from using the motorways to travel short 
distances while the “strategic motorway” charge regimes were designed to exempt local 
traffic. 
Tolls were assumed to be imposed on all traffic throughout the day and night with no 
distinction between different types of vehicle or between peak and off-peak times. 
Sensitivity analyses were conducted to gauge the sensitivity of results to the level of 
charges (per km charges were tested in the range of Eurocents 3 to 12 per km, whilst flat 
rate charges were tested in the range of cents 15 to 30 per trip). 
The key findings of the study were: 
 
- that the introduction of charges on the motorways caused traffic flows to increase 
significantly on the main non-motorway roads, especially in the off-peak period; 
- that, with charges in place, peak period congestion increased on the minor non-
motorway roads (via a knock-on effect whereby motorway traffic moved onto the 
major non-motorway roads and in turn displaced traffic from these roads onto the 
more minor ones); 
- that the distance-based charge diverted more traffic than did flat rate charges 
yielding the same overall revenue (the per distance charges typically caused 
increases of up to 25% in the flow on the major non-motorway roads - five to ten 
times as much as was caused by the flat charges - because the motorway routes 
tend to be longer and were thus less attractive when charges were based on 
distance travelled); 
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- that tolls introduced on only the “strategic” motorways caused 25% less diversion 
to non-motorway roads than tolls levied for all motorways – even though the tolls 
were set to produce a similar overall revenue; 
- that traffic was diverted away from ‘feeder’ motorways even when they 
themselves were not tolled; and 
- that diversion of traffic away from motorways caused increases in overall travel 
time and overall mileage in the network. 
 
The authors concluded that the introduction of tolls on motorway in or near urban 
areas could have significant deleterious effect on the urban network, if tolls were not 
simultaneously introduced on those urban roads. Their broader conclusion was that 
differentiation by type of traffic (long-distance vs. short distance) and by type of 
motorway (strategic vs. general purpose) can be used to control the impacts on the 
surrounding network.  
 
The South and West Yorkshire Multi-Modal Study (SWYMMS)  
 
The South and West Yorkshire Multi-Modal Study (SWYMMS) (MVA (2002), 
although not focussing exclusively on road charging, considered a number of strategies 
for road charging and is relevant to the current paper because the study area includes 
motorways running close to major conurbations. The investigations, reviewed by 
Coombe (2004) in the context of the UK Department for Transport’s Road Pricing 
Feasibility Study (DfT, 2004a), included charges at cordons around the centres of the 
three major cities; charges at cordons around the main urban areas; charges for 
travelling within urban areas; a per km charge for using any part of the motorway 
network2; and various combinations of these. 
The performance of these schemes was predicted, for the year 2020, by a strategic 
scale multi-modal model which, although employing a spatially aggregate 
representation of the network, included a disaggregate representation of traveller type 
and trip purpose and allowed trip frequency, destination, mode and time of day to vary 
in response to changes in the generalised cost of travel. The model produced estimates 
of equilibrium flows, journey times and costs, and of revenues. An aggregate measure 
of total time and money benefits was also calculated. 
The results suggested that the simultaneous introduction of charges in urban areas and 
on the motorways would yield very significant revenues, very significant reductions in 
journey times, particularly during peak periods, and significant overall benefits to road 
users. The introduction of charges on all roads in urban roads – with no charge being 
imposed on motorways – produced somewhat lower, but still significant, revenues and 
benefits (the imposition of charges at cordons around the urban areas also yielded 
significant revenues and user benefits but charges at cordons around the city centres 
generated only modest revenues, caused increased journey times and led to net 
disbenefits to car drivers and goods vehicle traffic). The introduction of charges on the 
motorways – with no charges for use of urban roads - yielded reasonable revenues but 
resulted in some increases in car journey times (presumably because some traffic diverts 
from motorways onto more congested routes) and produced only modest overall 
benefits. Interestingly, the SWYMMS model predicted that the introduction of charges 
                                                 
2
 Defined for the purposes of the investigation to include the strategic A1 trunk road.  
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in urban areas would result in reduced flow on the motorway network (whether or not it 
too was charged) – indicating that, taking motorways as a whole, the general reduction 
in trips caused by urban charging would have more impact than any local diversion of 
trips onto motorways. 
These results indicate that, in areas where motorways pass close to urban areas and 
serve local as well as strategic traffic, the combination of urban congestion charges (at a 
high rate per km) with motorway charges (at a lower rate per km) appears to perform 
better than charges introduced only on the motorways or only on the urban roads. 
However, the SWYMMS study also noted that there were circumstances in which the 
introduction of charges on motorways might be justified even in the absence of charges 
on urban roads. For example, the authors of the study suggested that, where motorway 
capacity has been increased, the introduction of motorway charges could be used to 
dissuade additional traffic and so help to “lock in” the benefits of the capacity increase3. 
 
 
2. New modelling work 
 
2.1. The model 
 
The new modelling work sought to go beyond the studies outlined above by exploring 
a wider range of scenarios for the co-introduction of charges on motorways and other 
roads in metropolitan areas. It sought to improve on the work conducted by Mauchan 
and Bonsall (1995) by allowing for the effect that the introduction of charges might 
have on total trip numbers and to include a more realistic representation of the network 
than had been attempted in the SWYMMS work (MVA, 2002). 
The new work used a user-equilibrium traffic assignment model, with a single user 
class and an elastic trip matrix. The assignment model used BPR-type link performance 
functions and employed the Frank-Wolfe method to iterate through to an equilibrium 
solution. The demand function used to modify the trip matrix is of the power law type, 
with a constant elasticity e such that the demand function is: 
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where Q0 and C0 are the demand and travel cost for an OD pair in the “no charges” 
scheme; and Q and C are the equilibrium demand and travel cost in any other scheme 
(i.e. when tolls are applied). 
An iterative process is applied to adjust the demand, starting from the base demands 
of Q0 until convergence is obtained (that is, the demands applied are in balance with the 
travel costs, according to the demand function above). Good convergence (to within 
0.1% of each OD’s demand) was found to be obtained in around six or seven of these 
outer loops. 
                                                 
3
 The economic case for using charges to “lock in” the benefits of new capacity presupposes that the 
increase in capacity is insufficient to eliminate congestion from the network. It differs from the case, 
frequently made, that tolls should be imposed to raise revenue pay for a previous increase in capacity. 
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The network and trip matrix used for the modelling were chosen to be broadly 
representative of a medium sized metropolitan area and are loosely based on the city of 
Edinburgh. The full network diagram, shown in Figure 1, consists of 175 (mainly) two-
way links (= 344 one-way links) and represents a total road length of 490 km - of which 
143 km is of motorway or near-motorway standard, including a short section of urban 
motorway near the central area. The motorways, which include major approach routes 
to the city from the north, west and east, and a southern route passing to the south of the 
city centre, run parallel with other, non-motorway routes, in places.  
The study area covers an area approximately 30 km by 20 km and is made up of 25 
zones connected to the network via 52 centroid connectors. The total demand 
(representing the morning peak) consists of approximately 110,000 movements in the 
base case, spread over 550 OD pairs. The study area is divided, for the purposes of 
analysis, into two regions. Region A comprises that part of the network that is inside the 
dotted line in Figure 1, consisting of most of the urban area, extending out to the 
circumferential motorway, and containing 14 of the 25 zones, the trips from which 
comprise 62% of the morning peak trip origins and 77% of the trip destinations. Region 
B covers the remainder of the region (outside the dotted line) and contains the 
remaining 11 zones. 
 
Figure 1: Diagram showing the modelled network (with motorway links shown in bold). 
 
The network and trip matrix were originally developed for a study of road charging in 
Edinburgh (Sumalee et al, 2005) and were subsequently used in a study of the effect 
that differentiation of road charges might have on overall scheme performance 
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(Bonsall et al, 2007). More recently they, together with the model described above, 
were used by Maher (2008) to explore a methodology by which the performances of 
different road user charging schemes might be fairly compared and displayed. 
 
2.2. The tests 
 
Eight scenarios were specified which, between them, cover a number of different 
ways in which charges might be introduced on motorways and other roads in a 
metropolitan area. (Note that in what follows, for simplicity of terminology, all links of 
motorway or near-motorway standard are referred to here as “motorways”, and all other 
links are referred to simply as “urban” links): 
 
1. “First best”; optimal tolls applied on each link in the network without specific 
regard to whether it is an urban road or a motorway link (optimal tolls being those 
which reflect the contribution to delay and externalities by the marginal vehicle on 
each link). Under this scenario the (flow-weighted) average toll charged on urban 
roads is 39.9 cents per km while that on motorways is 16.2 cents per km.  
2. “Best urban”; the “optimal” tolls defined in scenario 1 are applied to urban roads 
only (leaving motorways un-tolled). Note that the tolls on each urban link are the 
same as in Scenario 1; they were not re-calculated to be optimal for a situation in 
which motorways are not tolled.  
3. “Constant urban”; a constant (39.9 cents) per km toll was charged on every urban 
link (leaving motorways un-tolled). The 39.9 cents value being the flow-weighted 
average of the rates charged on urban roads under scenario 1 (and therefore also 
under scenario 2). This scenario was designed to test how much of Scenario 2’s 
benefit would be lost by applying a simplified, but comparable, charging regime.  
4. “Best motorway”; the optimal tolls defined in scenario 1 are applied to motorway 
links only (leaving urban roads un-tolled). Note that the tolls on each motorway 
link are the same as in Scenario 1; they were not re-calculated to be optimal for a 
situation in which urban roads are not tolled.  
5. “Constant motorway”; a constant (16.2 cents) per km toll was charged on every 
motorway link (leaving urban roads un-tolled). The 16.2 cents value being the 
flow-weighted average of the rates charged on motorways under scenarios 1 (and 
therefore also under scenario 4). This scenario was designed to test how much of 
Scenario 4’s benefit would be lost by applying a simplified, but comparable, 
charging regime.  
6. “Cordon only”; a €15 charge to cross an inbound cordon. The cordon surrounds 
the main built-up area just inside the circumferential motorway (following the 
dotted line in Figure 1, and separating Regions A and B) but intersects some 
motorway spurs and the traffic on these spurs has to pay the cordon charge. The 
charge was chosen, after inspection of the performance of a number of different 
values, as one likely to achieve significant reduction in delay per trip without 
suppressing total trip numbers by more than 10%. 
7. “Cordon & motorway”; the cordon defined in scenario 6 plus a 10 cents per km 
charge for using motorways outside the cordon. The 10 cents charge was chosen, 
after inspection of the performance of a number of different values, as one likely 
to yield a revenue approaching that of the “first best scenario”. 
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8. “Access charge”; a €3 charge was levied on all trips accessing the motorway 
network. The same charge applied irrespective of the distance travelled (unless the 
driver left the motorway and then rejoined it – in which case he would pay a 
second access charge). The justification for such a structure was that it would 
dissuade local traffic from using the motorways and preserve it for strategic traffic 
– for whom the one-off charge would be quite modest. Charges of this kind are 
sometimes referred to in policy debates as a means of “protecting” strategic 
traffic. The charge level for this scenario was selected after testing a range of 
values – the €3 charge being the one which minimised congestion (and total 
externalities). 
 
2.3. Evaluation of results 
 
The effect of introducing charges was measured using a variety of statistics which, 
between them, attempt to reflect the impact on demand, congestion and other 
externalities, the revenue generated, and an indicator of overall benefit. The impacts on 
demand are measured in terms of vehicle trips, vehicle kilometres and vehicle hours 
travelled – with an indication of the demand in different parts of the network and of 
average trip length and duration. Congestion and other elasticities are expressed in 
money values (using a resource value of time of € 0.1413 per person minute4 for delay 
and € 0.03219 and 0.03278 per vehicle kilometre5 on principal roads, and other roads 
respectively). An average car occupancy of 1.2 is assumed. Total revenue is a useful 
measure but net revenues are more revealing because they reflect the fact that the 
scheme implementation and operating costs are likely to be different for different 
scenarios. The scenario costs have been estimated following the principles set out in the 
UK’s Road Pricing Feasibility Study (DfT, 2004b)6. It is assumed that scenarios  
                                                 
4
 Based on the assumption that our peak period matrix is 50% commuters, 10% workers and 40% other 
and using the UK department for Transport’s recommended resource values of time of £4.17, £22.11 
and £3.68 for these three purposes respectively (see DfT, 2007). 
5
 Based on estimates by Sansom et al (2001) for small and large cars in outer metropolitan areas in peak 
periods (and assuming that our fleet consists of equal proportions of small and large cars). The main 
component (about 77%) of this cost is attributable to accident costs with smaller amounts for local air 
pollution (about 15%), climate change (about 6%), noise (about 1%) and infrastructure wear and tear 
(less than 1%). 
6
 Costs for scenarios 1, 2 & 3 were taken from the upper estimate for DfT’s scenario 7b (wide area 
schemes with mandatory OBUs) reduced to reflect the fact that the population in this study area is about 
3.6% of that for which the DfT study produced its estimates. Two estimates were made for the costs for 
all other scenarios. The first was based on the estimate for DfT’s scenario 5a (motorway and trunk 
schemes with mandatory OBUs) deflated to reflect the fact that, whereas the DfT scheme required 117 
charging points, our scenarios 4, 5 and 8 require 15, our scenario 6 requires 17, and our scenario 7 
requires 32. The second estimate was based on the lower estimate for DfT’s scenario 7b (lower because 
the GNSS for motorways and cordons need not be so accurate as for general urban roads) reduced, as 
above to reflect the relevant population. Interestingly, using these figures, all scenarios were found to 
cost less using GNSS technology than DSRC technology.  
  All costs assume that the scheme we are considering is one of several similar schemes in the country and 
thus can share some fixed costs. The costs have been inflated to allow for optimism bias and, strictly 
speaking, relate to 24hr schemes (some reduction in costs might be expected for peak-hour-only 
schemes but, given that the cost profiles are dominated by fixed costs, the reduction might not be great). 
The DfT report quotes total costs over 20 years; these have been converted into daily costs simply by 
dividing by 20x250. 
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1, 2 & 3 require GNSS onboard units whereas all other scenarios, because the charges 
are imposed at a limited number of locations, can be implemented via DSRC units. 
The indicator of overall benefit is simply defined for each scenario as the reduction in 
delay and other externalities minus the costs of scheme operation (i.e. [base delay and 
other externalities] – [scenario delay and other externalities costs] - [scenario operation 
costs]). It thus treats revenue as a transfer payment and takes no account of loss of 
consumer surplus, loss of tax revenues, long term impacts on land use and the economy, 
etc. The implications of excluding these aspects are discussed in Section 3.1 below but, 
meanwhile, this naïve definition of benefit has the advantage of simplicity. 
A comprehensive evaluation of each scenario would need to use a more sophisticated 
indicator of economic benefit and would need to consider such aspects as well as the 
practical and political feasibility of the proposed charging regime. Although these 
aspects were not covered in the modelling work reported in this paper, they are 
addressed in Section 3 below. 
 
2.4. The results 
 
Results for the 8 scenarios specified in Section 2.3 are summarised in Table 1. 
It appears that the greatest reduction in vehicle trips occurs under the “first best” 
scenario, that applying charges only to urban links has slightly less impact than the first 
best scenario, and that applying them only to motorways has relatively little impact. 
Constant charges have virtually the same impact on trip numbers as link-specific 
charges. 
The picture for vehicle kilometres is similar, with the first best scenario again seeing 
the greatest reduction and the effect of urban-only charges being again greater than that 
of motorway-only charges. The cordon charge, with or without the accompanying 
motorway charge, has a greater effect on vehicle kilometres than do any of the other 
second best charges – even though they have less impact on overall trip numbers (this is 
presumably because many trips are unaffected by the cordon but those that are, are 
severely affected). 
The constant urban charge has more impact than the per-link urban charge 
(presumably because, with a constant charge, long journeys are penalised even though 
they are not congested). 
Unsurprisingly, introduction of tolls solely on motorways causes a diversion of trips 
to the urban roads and vice versa. The constant motorway charge diverts more traffic to 
urban roads than does the best motorway charges (again this is presumably because, 
with a constant charge, long journeys are penalised even though they are not congested). 
Interestingly, the cordon has no impact on the balance between urban and motorway 
traffic volumes. The motorway access charge leaves a significant proportion of vehicle 
kilometres on the motorway – its main impact being to divert short distance trips from 
the motorway onto the urban network. 
Turning now to the impact on delay, it appears that the greatest reduction is achieved 
under the “first best” scenario, followed in turn by the cordon & motorway charge, the 
cordon-only charge, the best motorway charge and the best urban charge. The constant 
charges on motorways and on urban roads do not perform at all well in terms of their 
impact on delay - with the constant urban charge performing worst of all (presumably 
because the charges are not related to congestion and cause very inefficient routing by 
people attempting to minimise the distance they travel). The motorway access charge 
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does not manage to reduce congestion very much (any reduction in congestion on the 
motorways is counterbalanced by increased congestion on the urban roads). 
The greatest reduction in externalities other than delay is achieved under the “first 
best” scenario and the least under the scenarios which have charges only on motorways. 
The cordon scheme, particularly if combined with a motorway charge, performs almost 
as well as the first best scenario. Charges on motorways only, or on urban roads only, 
do not perform at all well - particularly when constant charges per km are applied. 
Table 1: Results of Scenarios. 
Measure Base Scenario 
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Total vehicle trips (‘000 per day) 110 93 97 96 105 104 100 98 104 
Vehs crossing notional cordon† 
(‘000 per day) 38 32 35 35 34 33 21 21 32 
Total veh km (‘000 per day) 1798 1531 1657 1608 1677 1674 1594 1531 1720 
Percentage veh km on motorways 59 64 69 72 47 34 59 40 50 
Veh km (‘000 per day) 
on motorways 1059 895 1143 1153 780 567 940 612 852 
Veh km (‘000 per day) 
on urban roads 738 636 514 457 897 1107 654 919 868 
Percentage veh km in Region A 33 32 30 30 36 35 33 35 34 
Veh km (‘000 per day) in Region A 588 497 494 475 601 592 529 536 581 
Veh km (‘000 per day) in Region B  1210 1034 1163 1133 1076 1082 1065 995 1139 
Total veh hr (‘000 per day) 56 39 49 53 50 55 46 45 54 
Percentage veh hr on motorways 42 91 57 55 58 42 74 72 34 
Average trip length (km) 16 17 17 17 16 16 16 16 17 
Average trip duration (min) 31 25 31 33 29 32 28 28 31 
Total cost of delay (k€ per day )  356 216 310 355 293 338 273 257 331 
Total other externality cost 
(k€ per day )  58 50 54 52 55 55 52 50 56 
Reduction in externalities 
relative to base††  0 148 50 7 66 21 89 107 27 
Rank 
(in terms of externality reduction)  1 5 8 4 7 3 2 6 
Total revenue from tolls 
(k€ per day )  0 378 210 182 141 92 317 369 96 
Assumed cost of scheme 
(k€ per day ) 0 699 699 699 552 552 552 552 552 
Net benefit relative to base 
(k€ per day ) †††   -551 -649 -692 -486 -531 -463 -445 -525 
Rank 
(in terms of net benefit)  6 7 8 3 5 2 1 4 
Notes: † between regions A and B (the dotted line in Figure 1); †† [base externalities (incl delay) – 
scenario externalities (incl delay)]; ††† [base externalities (incl delay) – scenario externalities (incl delay)] 
- [assumed operating cost]. 
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The revenues from the first best scenario are greater than from any other scenario but 
those from a cordon scheme, particularly if combined with a motorway charge (i.e. 
schemes 6 and 7) are also very substantial. Revenues from charges on urban roads 
exceed those from charges on motorways or on access links and are higher from 
schemes in which charges vary from link to link (in line with first best charges) than 
from those for which average charges are applied for a class of links. 
When allowance is made for costs of scheme operation, no scheme produces 
sufficient benefit to cover its costs. This result is not as alarming as it may seem at first 
sight because the schemes represented here are limited to the peak period (the potential 
additional revenue from charges at other times of day would be many times greater than 
the increased costs of operation – particularly in the urban areas). When the cheaper 
implementation costs of scenarios 4-8 are allowed for, they all outperform the first-best 
all-links scheme. 
The conclusions which we draw from these results are that: 
 
- positive impacts and revenues are higher for schemes which include charges on 
motorways and on urban roads than for schemes which include charges only on 
one type of road; 
- positive impacts and revenues are highest when link charges reflect the 
externalities associated with the marginal user of that link - irrespective of 
whether it is a motorway link or an urban link;  
- fixed per-km charges on motorways or on urban roads have much less positive 
impact than charges which are differentiated to reflect conditions (most notably 
congestion) on individual links (fixed per km charges on urban roads (only) are 
particularly ineffective because they cause people to use congested – albeit short – 
routes); 
- the introduction of charges on motorways, but not on urban roads, produces little 
benefit and causes unwanted diversion to urban roads;  
- the introduction of a charge designed to protect the level of service available to 
strategic motorway traffic succeeds in achieving that goal, but yields little revenue 
and, because it diverts traffic onto the urban network, has a modest overall impact 
on delay and other externalities; 
- net benefits are reduced by implementation costs and, since these costs are highest 
for schemes which involve charges on all urban links (and thus require the most 
sophisticated GNSS equipment), the overall performance of such schemes is 
depressed relative to that of cheaper schemes – particularly those based on 
cordons and/or motorway charges; and  
- the best performing scheme when implementation costs are taken into account is a 
cordon charge enhanced by adding a per-km charge for use of motorways outside 
the cordon. 
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3. Discussion 
 
3.1. Limitations of our approach 
 
Model simplifications 
 
Any model is a simplification of reality and the simplifications open the door to 
potential criticism. The model described in Section 2.1 can be criticised in various 
respects but perhaps most crucially for its use of a single user class and a single time 
period because it is known that the welfare gains from tolls are underestimated if 
allowance is not made for heterogeneity of travellers (Verhoef and Small, 2004) or for 
the dynamics of departure time adjustments (Braid, 1996; De Palma and Lindsey, 
2000). 
If the model had included more than one class of driver with different values of time 
(VoT) it could have captured the benefit which high VoT drivers might derive from 
reduced congestion on links which, due to the imposition of high charges, low VoT 
drivers were seeking to avoid. A shift of high VoT drivers onto high cost links, and of 
low VoT drivers onto slower or longer routes, would clearly have implications for 
equity and the distribution of benefits. More importantly, given our focus on the relative 
performance of the different charging scenarios, its impact on the overall performance 
of the network might be different in different scenarios. The effect will depend crucially 
on factors such as the relative sizes of the different user classes and on whether their trip 
patterns differ systematically in terms of their use of motorways and of links with 
different degrees of congestion. On balance, one might expect that the inclusion of 
different user classes with different VoTs would increase the benefits to be gained from 
motorway tolling more than those to be gained from urban charging7, but this 
assumption needs to be tested. 
If the model had included a dynamic representation of departure time adjustments, it 
would have been possible to explore the effect of introducing different levels of charge 
at different times of day and thus to investigate a much wider range of scenarios for the 
co-introduction of changes on motorways and on urban roads. To the extent that urban 
areas tend to have more off-peak congestion than motorways, one might expect that 
extension of the analyses to include off-peak periods would add more to the justification 
for urban charges than to that for motorway tolls8. However, this assumption needs to 
be tested because a realistic, dynamic, representation of departure time adjustment 
would show that some of the traffic seeking to avoid a peak charge would shift to the 
preceding period and thus contribute to the build up of the peak – and the seriousness of 
this phenomenon would depend on how the trip departure profile of users of motorways 
differs from that of users of urban links. 
If the model had included a representation of mode choice (rather than simply using a 
constant elasticity to adjust the trip matrix in response to any change in the generalised 
costs of car travel), it would have allowed for the fact that there are generally more 
modal alternatives in urban areas. It would thus have allowed charges on urban links to 
                                                 
7
 Since all journeys start and end on “urban” links, no group could be priced-off the urban links and so, of 
the two types of link, it is clear that motorways are the only candidate to become the high-price-high-
speed links which high VoT drivers would be prepared to pay for.  
8
 Off-peak charges would help to offset the costs of operating the charging system.  
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have more impact on demand than those on motorways. The economic case for charges 
on urban links would therefore have been enhanced. 
 
Definition of benefit 
 
The indicator of benefit included in Table 1 makes no allowance for loss of consumer 
surplus caused by trip suppression, for loss of fuel tax revenue, or for any long term 
impacts on land use and the economy, and makes no assumptions about the uses to 
which the revenue might be put. 
Inclusion of an allowance for loss of consumer surplus would reduce the 
attractiveness of scenarios 1, 2, and 3 relative to 4, 5, and 8 (1, 2 and 3 having greater 
reductions in trip making than 4, 5 and 8) but would probably have no significant effect 
on the overall rankings. Inclusion of an allowance for loss of fuel tax revenue9 would 
reduce the attractiveness of scenarios 1 and 7 relative to scenario 8 (1 and 7 being the 
ones with greatest reductions in trip kilometres and scenario 8 being that with the least 
reduction) but, again, would not be expected to alter the rankings (e.g. the fuel tax 
accruing from scenario 7 might be about 19 k€ per day less that in scenario 8 and would 
leave scenario 7 well ahead of scenario 8 in terms of benefit). 
Table 1 reports any reduction in vehicle trip numbers but, in the absence of any 
disaggregation of the elasticity parameter we are not in a position to indicate what 
proportion of the “missing” trips can be assumed to have moved into other time periods, 
or on to other modes, or to have ceased to occur. City authorities are likely to be 
concerned that any trip suppression might harm the local economy. A full economic 
appraisal of a charging scheme would clearly need to know the extent of time shift, 
mode shift and trip suppression, because they have very different implications for the 
overall benefit (for example; diversion of trips to public transport may have 
implications for subsidies and producer surplus, while trip suppression will affect 
consumer surplus and the performance of the local economy). Work by Bonsall et al 
(2007) suggested that the loss of consumer surplus associated with suppressed trips 
could significantly erode the overall benefit of road user charging. 
It is difficult to speculate on the effect of including long term impacts on land use and 
the economy because the impacts would depend crucially on how the revenues were 
spent but, on balance one might imagine the long term benefit to be greatest for those 
schemes which show the greatest revenues and benefits in the short term. 
Our indicator of benefit includes an allowance for changes in environmental 
externalities but they are assumed to be simply proportional to the vehicle kilometres on 
specified types of road. In practice they will vary with traffic composition and speed. 
The indicator of net benefit seeks to allow for the costs of scheme operation but, 
although the costs are based on an authoritative report, they remain speculative and any 
error could affect the relative levels of net benefit calculated for each scenario. 
 
Net effect? 
 
The net effect of the simplifications in the model and the limitations of the benefit 
measure discussed above are difficult to estimate without more detailed analysis but, on 
                                                 
9
 Note that revenue from fuel tax, like that from charges, is a transfer and only affects net benefit if trips 
are suppressed or if it is assumed that returns from expenditure of the revenue are lower (or higher) than 
those that would be achieved by the individual motorist. 
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balance, it seems likely that the model used for this work has under-represented the true 
performance of the urban charging regimes relative to that of the motorway charging 
regimes. 
 
3.2. Practical considerations 
 
A number of studies have explored the performance of networks in which certain 
classes of link are left un-tolled or in which different objectives are being used to set the 
tolls on different classes of link (for example, if different authorities or toll-
concessionaires have control over different parts of a network). Although most of this 
work has been based on simple networks with a very small number of links, on 
generalised representations of networks or without any explicit network representation 
(e.g. Verhoef et al, 1996; De Palma and Lindsey, 2000; Verhoef, 2002; Proost and Sen, 
2006; Ubbels and Verhoef, 2008), it is possible to draw a conclusion which is relevant 
to metropolitan networks. Namely, that, while social welfare is likely to be maximised 
by having charges set by one government agency responsible for the entire network, 
competition between government agencies attempting to maximise the welfare of their 
separate constituencies is likely to yield less welfare than that might come from a 
monopolistic profit optimiser or from effective competition between profit optimisers. 
An example of competition between toll operators having a potentially adverse effect on 
overall societal goals can be seen in the Paris region where concessionaires offer return 
tickets and regular user discounts (marketed as “Liber-t Weekend” and “Activ-t”) which 
may increase overall demand not only on the concessionaire’s motorway, but also on 
the roads leading to and from that motorway (for a fuller description of the incentives 
offered by toll concessionaires in the Paris region, see Section 10.3.1 of Bielefeldt et al, 
2008). 
Theoretical modelling clearly suggests that one cannot expect to maximise welfare 
unless charges can be implemented on all links in a network. However, it is in practice 
easier, technically, politically and administratively, to impose tolls on motorways than 
on general purpose roads. It is technically easier because physical limitations on access 
and egress allow use of cheaper charging technologies and more effective enforcement. 
It is politically easier because the public are more accepting of charges on high quality, 
“special”, roads (particularly if they are new) the use of which is discretionary, than on 
general purpose roads which they cannot avoid using. It is administratively easier 
because motorway administrators, unlike local highway authorities, generally have no 
specific responsibility to riparian owners and can concentrate exclusively on transport 
objectives. 
It is quite common for the administration of motorways in a conurbation to be 
separated from that of other roads in the area. In such cases it is likely that the owners, 
managers and/or franchisees of the different networks will have different objectives. 
Typically, the motorway manager will want to maximise revenue (initially to cover the 
costs of the infrastructure and subsequently to generate profit) or maintain strategic 
connections, while the urban roads manager will want to manage congestion and/or 
promote the local economy. It should also be noted that charging schemes on different 
types of road might be best implemented using different technologies; for example, the 
technology required to implement a simple motorway toll is likely to be much cheaper 
than that required for a scheme covering urban roads. These different objectives and 
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requirements will often lead different scheme sponsors to favour charging regimes and 
technologies which might be incompatible with those favoured by other sponsors. 
It is perhaps interesting to note that the most prominent example of successful co-
introduction of charges on urban roads and nearby expressways is found in Singapore - 
a country famed for the strength of its central planning. Singapore’s original charging 
scheme was limited to the city centre but was extended to include the expressways and, 
when this caused some diversion onto arterial roads and charges were introduced on 
these roads too (though at lower levels). The current system, as described by Santos 
(2005), uses a common technology (stored-value smart cards from which charges are 
deducted at charge points) combined with a charge regime in which charges vary by 
location, type of vehicle and time of day. Charge levels are reviewed every three months 
with the goal of maintaining average speeds on expressways and arterials within a target 
range. The differentiation by location allows charges to be set to reflect the different 
roles of different roads and appears to give the authorities the ability to manage demand 
throughout the urban network (including the expressways) in pursuance of their overall 
objective - to optimise the use and performance of the overall network. 
Although it may be theoretically desirable to co-ordinate the introduction of charges 
on all classes of road, it is very common to find motorways and other roads under the 
control of different agencies and for these agencies to have different objectives. 
However, this need not mean that they cannot cooperate on technical and design issues. 
For example, in Trondheim, a single agency has been formed to administer tolls on 
roads owned by different authorities, a single unified toll structure has been devised and 
a single pass can be used to pay tolls on any of the roads (see chapter 2 of Bielefeldt et 
al, 2008). 
Although institutional barriers may exist (e.g. if different authorities, with different 
powers and objectives, are responsible for the different types of road), the scale of 
potential benefits may be sufficient spur to seek to overcome them. A coordinated 
approach which treats the overall network as a single entity will have greater chance of 
achieving agreed prioritisation of objectives, and only by adopting a coordinated 
approach is it likely to be possible to achieve complicated, multi-faceted, objectives 
such as regional development or social equity. 
An issue which was not captured in the theoretical work referred to above is the fact 
that competition among profit-oriented concessionaires may result in schemes which 
may cause some confusion among motorists. For example, competition among 
concessionaires in the Paris region (as described in Section 10.3.1 of Bielefeldt et al, 
2008) has resulted in adjacent schemes adopting different definitions of the peak period 
and different classifications of vehicles. Any scheme characterised by highly 
differentiated charges and/or a non-intuitive relationship between the charges on urban 
roads and motorways might not be easily understood by road users. This could be a 
significant problem if it prevented people from understanding the intended price signal 
(because their behaviour would not reflect the signal) or if it led them to put pressure on 
the political authorities to abandon the scheme. 
Failure to coordinate details such as start and finish times, vehicle classifications and 
exemptions might create perverse incentives and so generate unwanted responses (e.g. 
if, in order to maximise revenue, the motorway authority started the morning peak 
surcharge period earlier than that on urban roads, early morning traffic might switch to 
the urban roads - exacerbating the build up of the urban peak; or if, given the objective 
of reducing production of greenhouse gasses, motorway charges were based on engine 
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emissions, the most polluting vehicles would be the most likely to switch to the urban 
roads - with unwanted implications for urban air quality). 
 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
4.1. Policy implications 
 
The degree of interaction between urban roads and adjacent motorways will naturally 
depend on the location and frequency of motorway access and egress points, the density 
of the urban network and the degree of spare capacity on parallel links in each network. 
Obviously, the greater the degree of interaction the more important it is to consider the 
potential cross-impacts. 
Previous modelling work, reinforced by the new work described in this paper, has 
shown that charges imposed on one category of roads in a typical metropolitan network 
can have profound consequences for traffic on other categories of road in that network. 
Considerable problems are likely to occur if charges on urban roads are designed 
without regard to their potential impact on any adjacent motorways or if charges on 
motorways passing through metropolitan areas are designed without regard to their 
potential impact on the roads in those areas or on the local economy. 
Some diversion of traffic from one network to the other is an inevitable consequence 
of introducing charges. Although some diversion may be desirable in order to achieve a 
better match of demand to capacity or to prioritise particular types of traffic, excessive 
diversion can cause serious problems. Diversion of traffic from motorways to other 
roads can be particularly serious, because it leads to increased accident risk and 
environmental externalities. 
Where motorways and other roads come under different political or administrative 
jurisdictions, it is particularly important to ensure effective coordination and 
cooperation. Cooperation on technical and procedural issues, and over detailed 
definitional points such as start and finish times, vehicle classifications and exemptions, 
is desirable even if the two road authorities have different objectives. In the absence of 
such cooperation the resulting complexity will tend to increase costs for system 
operators and end users and may cause particular resentment among the latter. 
Although it has not been proven by detailed modelling, it appears unlikely that a 
scheme designed to maintain free-flow on the motorways or maximise revenue for the 
motorway manager would simultaneously minimise congestion and other externalities 
within the urban area. It follows that, in order to maximise overall benefits, a degree of 
prioritisation or compromise is required. 
It seems likely that net benefit to society and the economy might be maximised by 
combining a charge on the urban roads with charges designed to provide a high level of 
service for traffic using motorways and other strategic links. The urban charge might be 
levied on traffic crossing specified cordons or using roads within a specified area, while 
the strategic-link-protection charge might involve specific charges for using motorway 
access or egress links or dynamic charges just sufficient to preserve free flow 
conditions. 
Although benefits are likely to be obtained by introducing a charge regime which 
draws no distinction between motorways and other roads, that does not mean that all 
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roads should carry the same charge; different roads have different characteristics and 
roles and an optimal design may imply charges which tend to be higher on one type of 
road than on another – but this is an output of the design process not an input to it. 
Although it is likely to be easier to gain political support for introducing charges on 
motorways than on other types of road, the benefits from so doing are generally lower 
than can be obtained by introducing charges on congested urban roads. It seems clear 
that the un-coordinated introduction of charges on motorways and other types of road in 
metropolitan areas could seriously compromise the efficiency of the overall network 
and the effectiveness of such charges that are introduced. The most serious problems are 
likely to occur if charges are imposed on only one type of road (with the other type left 
free at point of use) but problems can also occur when both types are charged if the 
charges are not co-ordinated. 
 
4.2. The need for further work 
 
We identify a need for more detailed modelling – particularly to include a 
representation of different user classes with different values of time and elasticities, a 
representation of the complex consequences of any re-timing of trips from the peak into 
adjacent periods (including the impact on the build-up and decay of congestion), and a 
fuller representation of mode choice. It is recognised that the first two issues, in 
particular, are not amenable to a simple solution. 
We identify a need for more detailed evaluation and would advocate an approach 
involving sensitivity analysis to allow for uncertainties in costs and benefits. The 
treatment of some impacts – notably loss of fuel tax revenue and of consumer surplus - 
are controversial and so should be separately identified in any evaluation. Impacts on 
employment, retail activity, property rents, economic output or efficiency are difficult to 
predict but could be based on an assessment of the effect that the scheme is likely to 
have on the costs of doing business in the city or region and of changes in the perceived 
attractiveness of the area. This requires a calculation of changes in the transport costs 
(including any expected congestion relief) experienced by commuters, shoppers, and 
suppliers, of changes in local environmental conditions, and of changes in business 
sentiment – with the latter two being particularly difficult to quantify. 
The potential social impacts of a road charging scheme are a matter of particular 
concern to government and require thought to be given to the incidence of costs and 
benefits among the affected population. Our suggested use of a model incorporating 
different classes of user is consistent with this aim. 
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Abstract 
 
One of the key objectives of rail infrastructure charges has been stated as being to promote the efficient 
use of the infrastructure. Much effort has been put into the derivation of charging regimes by 
infrastructure managers and regulators throughout Europe, and a mix of differing regimes have been put 
in place. However, relatively little work has been undertaken to examine the impacts and incentivisation 
effects that these charging regimes produce. This paper gives consideration to relevant theory in this area, 
what one might expect - from first principles - and then reports on a number of interviews and case 
studies undertaken to explore these impacts and incentives. Finally, it discusses a number of 
methodological issues surrounding this area of research, and proposes further lines of enquiry that might 
reasonably be pursued. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Charging in the rail sector has, over recent years, made a number of moves towards 
greater efficiency and this has tended to lead to a greater degree of differentiation in the 
charges. A number of countries sought, as part of the reform of their national railway 
industries, to develop and implement systems of rail infrastructure charging that 
approximate to marginal cost pricing and, since adoption of Directive 2001/14 which 
requires rail infrastructure charges to be based on marginal cost, the majority of member 
states have now done the same. However, the ways in which Member States are basing 
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their systems on marginal cost principles differ from one country to the next and a 
diversity of approaches has developed. 
Previous research in this area has tended to focus on the design of infrastructure 
charging regimes which, in principle, promote efficient use of the infrastructure, 
efficient investment or which enable a particular degree of cost recovery. This has then 
led on to a substantial body of research into the measurement of costs, in particular of 
marginal cost (Wheat and Smith, 2008; Nash et al, 2008 etc)). 
There has been relatively little research in the area of how train operators react to the 
charges they face. There is, for example, no previous research to estimate infrastructure 
charge elasticities and no research into how train operators perceive and interpret 
different charging structures; i.e. whether they can interpret highly differentiated, 
complex regimes or whether there may be a necessity to keep things simple. A further 
apparent gap in the research on rail infrastructure charges relates to the issue of how 
operators pass on their costs to end-users – that is, passengers and freight forwarders - 
and how different infrastructure charging regimes impact on charges to end users. 
 There is, nevertheless, some evidence that train operator reactions to infrastructure 
charges are important. A key factor motivating the revisions to rail infrastructure 
charges in Britain in 2001 was the view that the initial system of infrastructure charges 
gave the wrong incentives to train operators and led to greater congestion on the 
network. User reactions were also a key factor in Germany, where the infrastructure 
charging system has undergone reforms largely motivated out of concerns about 
competitive incentives and user reactions amongst train operators. 
One can postulate that rail infrastructure charges might have two principal effects on 
train operators. Firstly, they might affect their behaviour, in terms of their use of the 
infrastructure and the way they operate their services. That is, a train operator’s decision 
as to whether to offer a rail service and how to offer that service – when, where and 
with what rolling stock, staffing levels etc – is likely to be affected by the charges that 
they will incur in doing so. If there is a differentiated charging system featuring 
relatively high infrastructure charges in peak times (as was proposed in Britain) or on 
highly utilized lines (as is the case in Germany and Austria), that may serve as a 
disincentive to an operator considering the introduction of a new or additional peak 
service. Correspondingly, relatively low charges at night, for example, or on less 
utilized lines are likely to serve as a stimulus to new or additional services. Secondly, 
rail infrastructure charges could be expected to affect the charges that train operators 
make to their customers, be they passengers or freight forwarders. In fact, there may be 
a feedback mechanism, whereby the charges that train operators are able to make to 
their customers has an impact on the rail infrastructure charges as well. For example, if 
a train operator is faced with a high infrastructure charge for operating a particular 
service but thinks that passengers place a high value on that service, they might decide 
to operate the service on the basis of being able to cover the cost of the infrastructure 
charges through charging high passenger fares. Indeed, the reason behind the high 
infrastructure charge for that service may actually be a factor of the value that train 
operators believe that their customers place on the relevant rail services. 
There are likely to be differences between reactions and impacts within the passenger 
as compared with the freight market. Freight is, in European rail systems, often a 
marginal activity, which is fitted around the passenger services. Freight may be more 
flexible, at least for some flows, in that the time windows it operates in are less 
constrained than for passengers. Furthermore, freight tends to be, and it would appear to 
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increasingly be, more international in its nature than passenger services. This then leads 
to the necessity for operators to interpret several, sometimes very different, systems of 
infrastructure charging as they pass through two or more countries. 
The diversity of infrastructure charging regimes that exist throughout Europe is, in 
one sense, a good opportunity to undertake comparative research in this area. That is, 
Europe provides a real world laboratory, in which the attributes and impacts of one 
system can be compared and analysed in relation to one or more others. However, it is 
not only infrastructure charging regimes that differ across different countries; 
differences in respect of subsidy to the industry, regulation of the industry, market entry 
and competition serve to cloud the issue somewhat. Hence, there is a rich set of 
situations to draw on for research purposes, but with this comes a set of varying 
contexts that need to be controlled for somehow. 
Our aim was to develop a better understanding of the ways, in principle and in 
actuality, in which users react to differentiated charges in the rail sector. At a relatively 
early stage in the work, it became clear that relatively little quantitative data would be 
available to us, and so our method naturally turned toward being based on a mix of 
reviews and case studies, drawn from those Member States that have been most active 
in the areas of rail charging. In this paper we begin by reviewing the few items of 
previous research on this topic, before then summarising the outcomes of a round of 
stakeholder interviews and the results of a set of four case studies. We then give 
consideration to methodological issues that might affect further research in this area, 
and close with our conclusions. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
There is relatively little literature relating to the impacts of charging in the rail sector 
in terms of rail infrastructure charges. We pick out here three notable studies relating, in 
one form or another, to rail infrastructure charges. 
Firstly, the Leeds Freight Transport (LEFT) model is used for multimodal freight 
demand modelling in the UK (Johnson, Whiteing and Fowkes, 2007). The model tests a 
range of individual policies for the UK. In order to form the ‘best case strategies’ for 
road and rail, the policies are bundled into two groups to form a Pro-rail strategy and a 
Pro-road strategy, which are tested against a Do-nothing strategy. The results are 
explained in terms of the impacts for 2016. 
The impacts of the policy of doubling rail track access charges (part of the pro-road 
strategy) for rail freight operators, on road and rail modes are illustrated in the table 
below. 
Table 1 shows that with the doubling of rail track access charges, rail tonnes fall by 
2.03% and even further by 4.71% in tonne kms in comparison to the Do-nothing 
scenario. The length of haul falls by 2.73% in comparison to the Do-nothing scenario. 
As expected, the impact on road is in the opposite direction with increases in tonnes and 
tonne-kms and the length of haul in comparison to the Do-minimum, but the increases 
are rather modest. Interestingly, introduction of marginal social cost pricing on roads, 
part of the pro-rail strategy, increases rail-tonne kms by 18% (reducing road by 11%). 
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Table 1: Impact of Doubling Rail Track Access Charges by Mode for 2016. 
Mode   
Tonnes (millions) 
Change from do nothing (%) 
196.9 
-2.03 
Tonne kms (billions) 
Change from do nothing (%) 
28 
-4.71 Rail 
Length of Haul 
Change from do nothing (%) 
141.9 
-2.73 
Tonnes (millions) 
Change from do nothing (%) 
1935.2 
0.14 
Tonne kms (billions) 
Change from do nothing (%) 
170.3 
0.7 Road 
Length of Haul 
Change from do nothing (%) 
87.8 
0.56 
Tonnes (millions) 
Change from do nothing (%) 
2132.1 
-0.07 
Tonne kms (billions) 
Change from do nothing (%) 
198.3 
-0.1 Total 
Length of Haul 
Change from do nothing (%) 
92.8 
-0.03 
Source: adapted from Johnson, Whiteing and Fowkes, 2007. 
 
It must be noted that several other multimodal models do exist for testing transport 
policies and scenarios, such as the MODEV model in France. But these models usually 
do not include a specific representation of infrastructure charges. The impact of 
infrastructure charges can be taken into account only indirectly, generally through the 
impact it is supposed to have on final rail prices. 
Secondly, Preston, Holvad and Raje (2002) contrast infrastructure costs and charges 
in Britain and Sweden during the late 1990s. Although rail infrastructure costs appear 
similar on a track km basis in both countries, they highlight that British charges per 
train km were almost eight times those of Sweden. Table 2 shows the similarities in cost 
figures (particularly in terms of cost per track mile) and Table 3 shows the differences 
in infrastructure charge values. The basis of the charging regimes in Britain and Sweden 
are different. With charges in Britain being set on the basis of full cost recovery and 
charges in Sweden being based on short-run marginal cost. 
Table 2: Comparison of Railtrack and Banverket’s Infrastructure Wear and Tear Costs – 1998. 
 
Infrastructure 
Wear and Tear 
Cost 
£m 
Cost per 
Route Mile 
(£) 
Cost per 
Track Mile 
(£) 
Cost per 
Train Mile 
(£) 
Cost per 
Traffic Unit 
(£) 
Railtrack 2290 217000 108000 7.95 0.051 
Banverket 874 129000 113000 6.71 0.033 
Source: Preston, Holvad and Raje, 2002. 
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Table 3: Swedish and British Rail Infrastructure Charges Compared (1999/2000 prices £ per train km). 
1990 0.882 1994/5 6.032 Sweden 
2000 0.646 
Great Britain 
1999/2000 5.039 
Sources: Nash, 1997, Prognos, A.G., 2000. 
Assumes increases in RPI 1990/91 to 1999/2000 are 27.8% (http://www.netaccountants.com/rpi.html). 
Assumes that €1=£0.646 Oct 1999 (http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/mb199912en.pdf). 
 
Preston et al (2002) noted that on track competition in the passenger rail market is 
currently limited, but postulated that were such competition to be permitted on a wider 
scale, the extent would be influenced by the level of track access charges. To explore 
this, they used a simulation model - PRAISE - to assess the impact of on-track 
competition in both Britain and Sweden. 
They found that, for a main line intercity route in Britain, competition would be 
largely of a cream skimming nature, with the new entrant concentrating its services 
during the peak periods of the day. Evaluation of this competition found that, although 
it was profitable for the new entrant, it would not improve welfare overall. Furthermore, 
head on and fares competition did not appear to be profitable where infrastructure 
charges are based on full cost recovery, with the possible exceptions of some route and 
product competition. By contrast, for Route S1 in Sweden, it was found that on-track 
competition would lead to large service increases and significant fare reductions, and 
that this would represent a welfare improvement on the current situation; however, it 
would force a parallel route, currently commercial, into requiring subsidy. They went on 
to observe that, in Sweden, a greater proportion of the passenger rail network can be 
operated commercially because infrastructure charges are much lower than in Great 
Britain. Hence, there is greater scope for commercial on-track competition in Sweden 
than in Britain. 
Table 4: Estimated Impact of an Increase in Track Access Charges on Rail Freight Traffic  
(tonnage in 2014). 
Impact of a track access charge 
increase (%) 
Commodity Growth by 2014 
(%) 
+20% +50% 
Maritime Containers 50 -6.4 -15.2 
ESI coal -9 -0.4 -1.1 
Other coal 0 -0.7 -1.6 
Metals 12 -1.9 -6.3 
Iron Ore -5 0 0 
Construction 46 -10.5 -17.7 
Automotive 100 -3.2 -8.5 
Petroleum and chemicals 4 -1.8 -5.9 
Waste 15 -0.1 -0.2 
Domestic intermodal 215 -5.4 -13.5 
Spent nuclear fuel 0 0 0 
Mail/premium logistics n/a -2.3 -5.8 
Channel Tunnel 261 -2.1 -5 
Total 20 -3.9 -7.9 
Source: ORR 2006, page 6 (i.e. table above) 
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Finally, the British Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) commissioned MDS Transmodal 
to assess the impact of an increase in track access charges on freight traffic (ORR, 
2006). This work formed part of their work to review British charges, and was designed 
to investigate the impacts of including a mark-up on infrastructure charges for freight so 
as to recover the costs of freight-only lines. MDS used the GB Freight model along with 
models for intermodal and coal traffic, and their results are summarised in Table 4. 
 
 
3. Stakeholder Interviews 
 
A next step in our methodology involved a round of 25 interviews with industry 
stakeholders, undertaken in early 2007. Rail infrastructure managers, regulators and 
train operators (both passenger and freight) from six countries – Austria, Britain, 
France, Germany, Italy and Sweden – were interviewed using a common semi-
structured interview framework. Full details of the interviews are reported in Matthews 
et al (2007); here we provide a summary of the key findings to emerge. 
One early finding was that, whilst infrastructure charges are a potential influence on 
train operator behaviour, other cost elements for train operators (staffing costs, train 
operating costs etc) and demand elements (demand reactivity to price levels, to quality 
of service, willingness to pay, etc) would also be expected to be important influences on 
the market. Furthermore, the rail market is also likely to be affected by a host of 
contextual factors, including the competitive and regulatory framework (monopoly or 
oligopoly, type of regulation) and levels of car ownership and economic growth. 
Secondly, whilst we were able to gather information about infrastructure charge 
categories and levels for the selected case study countries, we very often encountered a 
lack of even the basic information about precise infrastructure charge quantities (i.e. 
train-paths, or train-km) bought for each category. Many of the other elements are 
viewed by train operators as being commercially sensitive; even the price levels are 
often not precisely observable, due to yield management techniques introduced in 
preparation for competition in the rail market. 
Hence, it was concluded that a systematic analysis of the impact of infrastructure 
charge differentiation seems an extremely difficult prospect at this point. Disentangling 
the impact of charges from the impacts of all of the other significant influences on the 
rail market, amidst a diversity of charging regimes and contexts, with a limited supply 
of detailed data, would appear to be highly problematic. 
The rail market is comprised of many different sub-markets, and there are potentially 
different scales of impacts in different sub-markets. In actuality, it appears to be the case 
that, in many situations, operators have relatively limited scope to adapt their supply 
policy and their tariffs in response to infrastructure charges. For instance, where 
services are franchised, e.g. as is the case with regional passenger services in Germany 
or France, and with nearly all passenger services in Britain, services are quite closely 
defined by the terms of those franchises. Hence, there is limited scope for operator 
response to infrastructure charges during the life of the franchise. However, charges 
may serve to influence the terms of franchises, either through franchising authorities 
examining the implications of the charges for the services they wish to specify or 
through the terms of the franchise bids submitted by competing operators. This 
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mechanism for response, being contained within the planning process, is very difficult 
indeed to tap into. 
In some situations, there may be no reaction at all on the part of train operators, due to 
mechanisms of compensation being in place. For instance, again where services are 
franchised it is common (and reasonable) for the terms of that franchise to require 
operators to be compensated by the franchising authority for any changes in 
infrastructure charges during the course of the franchise. Again, it may be possible to 
tap into the impacts as they relate to the franchising authority, but this would again be 
expected to be problematic. 
Nevertheless, whilst reactions may be difficult to analyse and, in certain situations, 
relatively limited in scale, our interviews did uncover which sorts of parameters have 
been affected. Main reactions observed were in relation to: 
 
- Design and choice of rolling stock; 
- Suppression of unnecessary path reservations when reservation charges were 
introduced in France. 
 
There was some interesting discussion of the share of train operating costs comprised 
of infrastructure charge-payments, and we have come to the view that the scale and 
form of reaction to infrastructure charges is likely to depend crucially on these cost 
shares. The cost shares for the use of infrastructure vary markedly across the 
interviewees in different countries. In general, the share of infrastructure charge costs as 
a proportion of train operating costs was reported to range between 10% and 30%. 
However, in Sweden the cost share was estimated at approximately 5%, whilst in 
Germany some operators estimated it to be as high as 60%. 
Almost all participants indicated elasticities greater than one. There are reasons to 
doubt whether elasticity in all cases is greater than one, since the interviewed persons 
represent at the same time the interests of their industry, and therefore it is natural that 
interviewed persons in such cases tend to exaggerate. 
Interestingly, on a number of occasions, operators reported that current degrees of 
differentiation were actually insufficient to elicit a reaction. For example, participants in 
Austria and Germany expressed the view that charge differentiation for highly utilized 
lines seems, due to the higher operating costs of the lower charged tracks, to miss its 
goals. Apparently there would be more recognizable effects if there was a higher degree 
of differentiation. Furthermore, many operators reported that they would be ready to 
accept higher charges in exchange for better quality of service. 
In all of our sets of interviews, freight operators indicated a greater degree of 
sensitivity to infrastructure charges than did passenger operators. In general rail freight 
tends to be privately operated, is confronted with severe competition from the road, has 
experienced more open access competition and receives less government financial 
support, than do passenger services, and together these factors may explain this apparent 
greater degree of sensitivity. In Britain, for example, there has been significant growth 
in the rail freight market since infrastructure charges for freight operators were revised – 
incorporating a marked reduction in their level – in 2001. The extent to which this 
growth is as a result of this revision is, however, not clear as other changes in the 
market have occurred simultaneously; nevertheless, it potentially offers an interesting 
line of further enquiry. 
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An initial hypothesis was that one of the impacts of differentiated infrastructure 
charges would be on prices charged to end-users – passengers and freight forwarders. In 
some cases, e.g. where services are franchised and infrastructure charges change during 
the course of the franchise, it seems clear that any such impact on prices to end-users is 
minimal or non-existent. Beyond this, it would seem that there would be some impact, 
but that this impact would be heavily influenced by the degree of external competition – 
be that from other rail operators or from other transport modes - in the end-user market. 
In general, the greater the degree of external competition the smaller the likely impact 
of infrastructure charges on prices to end-users. Indeed, the level of external 
competition often appears to be more important in determining end-user prices than 
infrastructure charges. 
Finally, it became clear that the data situation with respect to user reactions to 
differentiation of track access charges in rail is very problematic. Certainly, the charges 
themselves are public (although in freight some are the subject of private contracts) but 
the necessary data to analyse the reactions of the train operators with respect to output 
quantity (e.g. train kilometres), prices, costs and adjustment of production processes 
(choice of path or of type of rolling stock etc.) are extremely unsatisfactory or none 
existent. 
 
 
4. Case studies 
 
Having found that freight operators indicated a greater degree of sensitivity to 
infrastructure charges than did passenger operators, we concentrated much of our 
subsequent attention on the freight market. As referred to above, rail freight tends to be 
privately operated, is confronted with severe competition from the road, has 
experienced more open access competition and receives less government financial 
support, than do passenger services, and together these factors may explain this apparent 
greater degree of sensitivity. 
We undertook four case studies focused on rail freight. Three case studies analysed 
changes in the rail freight market in order to make informed observations regarding 
potential linkages between changes in the infrastructure charging regimes and changes 
in rail freight traffic; one focused on Britain, one on France and the third on Eurotunnel. 
The fourth case study undertook aggregate modelling, applying the LEFT model to the 
British rail freight market, to test a number of charging scenarios for their impacts. 
Additional case studies, focused on passenger services, were also undertaken, details of 
which are reported in Matthews et al (2008). 
 
4.1. Observations of Reactions in the British Freight Market 
 
Up to the point of British rail privatisation which commenced in 1993, the demand for 
rail freight had been on a 40-year downward trend. However, having reached a low-
point in 1995, demand has grown over the subsequent 10 years for which we have data. 
There has been an increase in rail freight over the last ten years from 15 billion tkm 
moved in 1996 to 22 billion tkm in 2006. In terms of the total growth in freight across 
all four modes illustrated, there has been an increase of 189% from 1953 to 2005. 
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Privatisation established a series of privately-owned open access rail freight operators, 
required to pay Track Access Charges to the infrastructure manager for the use of the 
network. During this period there have been 2 sets of infrastructure charges in place for 
freight operators. The first framework of charges for freight train operators was put in 
place in 1995. This framework remained in place until 2001, when the first Periodic 
Review of Track Access Charges recommended substantial changes be made.  
The first charging framework, introduced in 1995, was a negotiated two-part tariff, 
based on the value to each user of using the infrastructure, subject to the constraints of 
covering avoidable costs and avoiding discrimination between operators competing in 
the same sector. A charge ‘floor’ and a charge ‘ceiling’ were established. The floor was 
based on the avoidable costs, whilst the ceiling was based on standalone costs, I.E. 
those costs that ‘… would be incurred by a notionally efficient competitor providing a 
dedicated network for the service(s) in question.’ (ORR, 1997, cited in Stitle, 2004). In 
fact, the two-part tariff comprised a large fixed component and a relatively small 
variable component. The average track access charge under that framework payable by 
freight operators was estimated as being approximately £6.23 per thousand gross tonne 
miles (kgtm), whilst Railtrack's freight-specific costs were of £5.53 (CFIT, 2001). 
 
 
Figure 1: Domestic Freight Transport Moved (Billion Tkm) by Mode 1953-2005. 
Source: Transport Statistics Great Britain 2007. 
 
By 2001, gross tonne mileage had increased by more than 35% and additional growth 
was anticipated. Indeed, the government had set out an ambitious strategy for increasing 
demand for rail freight, with a target of achieving 80% growth over the period 1998/99-
2010 and, with this in mind, a number of new operators were considering entering the 
market. Concurrently, rail freight was thought to be facing increased competitive 
pressures from road and other modes. For example, decisions to allow the operation of 
44 tonne lorries and to stabilise vehicle/fuel duty were considered to be giving road 
haulage a significant competitive advantage. Furthermore, the periodic review of access 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 43 (2009): 83-112 
 92 
charges for franchised passenger train services had the effect of changing the balance of 
incentives between rail passenger and freight services on the network. 
These changes in rail freight market conditions led the Regulator to conclude that it 
was appropriate to undertake a review of the freight charges. Crucially, a better 
understanding of cost causation had developed, meaning that there was a stronger body 
of evidence on which to base a new set of charges. 
Prior to the outcome of the Periodic Review of Track Access Charges in 2001, an 
independent government advisory body, the Commission for Integrated Transport 
(CFIT) established a Rail Freight Working Group to consider track access charges. 
CFIT believed that rail infrastructure charges for freight services were “a significant 
factor for the further expansion of the domestic freight market”. In particular, their view 
was that the high costs of track access were serving to hold back rail freight operators 
from diversifying into non-bulk traffic. They commissioned research to analyse how rail 
freight operators could set about achieving the Government’s target of growing the rail 
freight market by 80% by 2010, with particular attention given to the influence of the 
amount paid for track access. 
This work identified infrastructure charges as one of seven key issues associated with 
growing the rail freight market and estimated the level of track access charges which 
would need to apply, under various scenarios, to deliver the Government's 80% growth 
target. Under a central scenario, which assumed relatively small improvements in rail 
service efficiency, and continued decline in road haulage journey times (and efficiency), 
they estimated that an average track access charge of £3.50 per kgtm would deliver 
approximately 80% growth by 2010. This implied almost a halving of the then average 
track access charge. Under a "worst case" scenario, assuming no improvement in rail 
service efficiency or journey times over road haulage, they estimated that an average 
track access charge of £1.50 per kgtm would be required to deliver the same volume of 
growth by 2010. 
The outcome of the 2001 Periodic Review represented a fundamental shift away from 
a negotiation-based approach to a published set of charges, the stated aim of which was 
to reflect the variable costs to the infrastructure manager of freight operations. The 
intention was that this would reduce transaction costs, improve operators’ ability to plan 
their businesses and create a more level playing field for new and potential freight 
operators. 
A fundamental change involved the Regulator no longer requiring that freight 
operators be expected to pay either fixed freight costs or the infrastructure manager’s 
costs which are common between freight and passenger operations for use of the 
existing network. The charges comprised three components: 
 
- Usage charges – designed to reflect infrastructure wear and tear costs directly 
attributable to particular services; 
- Traction electricity charges – designed to relate directly to the amount of 
electricity consumed by any particular vehicle; and  
- Capacity charges – designed to broadly reflect the congestion costs associated 
with increases in capacity utilization. 
 
The effect of these changes was that, on average, the charges that freight operators 
paid to the infrastructure manager were halved. The resulting shortfall in revenue to the 
infrastructure manager from freight operations, which was estimated as being £500 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 43 (2009): 83-112 
 93 
million over a 5 year period, was to be funded by the government (via the Strategic Rail 
Authority). In addition, performance regime arrangements were put in place to provide 
both freight operators and the infrastructure manager with an incentive to reduce the 
delay which they impose on users of the network. 
Interestingly, the outcome of the Periodic Review was very close to the charges 
associated with the ‘central scenario’ examined in the work for CFIT. It is, therefore, 
revealing to examine the growth in the demand for rail freight and how that compares 
with that projected in the CFIT work. 
The trends in commodities moved by rail over 1998-99 to 2006-07 are illustrated in 
Table 5. It shows that, across all commodities, there has been a growth of 28%. Within 
this, it is notable that coal traffic has almost doubled and construction traffic has 
increased by a significant 29%. 
Table 5: National Railways Freight - Freight Moved by Commodity 1998-99 to 2006-07 (Billion Tonne-
Kilometres). 
 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 
Coal 4.5 4.8 4.8 6.2 5.7 5.8 6.7 8.3 8.8 
Metals 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.4 2.6 2.2 2.1 
Construction 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.8 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.7 
Oil and petroleum 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.5 
Other traffic 7.1 7.6 7.4 6.7 6.6 6.8 7.0 7.1 7.0 
All traffic 17.3 18.2 18.1 19.4 18.5 18.9 20.4 21.7 22.1 
Source: Transport Statistics Great Britain 2007. 
 
Table 6 illustrates the trends in rail freight lifted for coal, other traffic excluding coal, 
and of all traffic over the period 1998-99 to 2006-07. It shows a decline over the first 
part of the period, followed by an increase, resulting in an overall growth over the 
period of 6%. Linking this to the numbers presented in Table 5, this indicates that rail 
freight growth has been associated more with an increase in the distance freight is 
moved than the actual quantity of freight being moved. In terms of coal, despite the 
increase in tkm in 1998-99 to 2000-01, there has been a decline in tonnes lifted. Despite 
the 29% increase in coal tkm in 2001-02, tonnes lifted only rose by 12% in that same 
year. In the years that followed, changes in coal tkm were also characterised with 
changes in tonnes lifted in the same direction. However as coal tkm rose from 8.3 to 8.8 
billion from 2005-06 to 2006-07, tonnes lifted decreased slightly from 48.9 to 48.8 
million over that same period. In terms of all rail freight traffic lifted over the last 
decade, the lowest point was in 2002-03 where only 87 million tonnes were lifted. 
Table 6: National Railways Freight - Freight Lifted by Commodity 1998-99 to 2006-07 (Million Tonnes). 
 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 
Coal 45.3 35.9 35.3 39.5 34.0 35.2 44.0 48.9 48.8 
Other traffic 56.8 60.6 60.3 54.5 53.0 53.7 57.1 58.7 59.6 
All traffic 102.1 96.5 95.6 93.9 87.0 88.9 101.1 107.6 108.4 
Source: Transport Statistics Great Britain 2007 
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Thus, whilst charges were essentially halved in 2001, growth in rail freight demand is 
not proceeding in line with the 80% government target (as the CFIT projections 
estimated that it would). Having grown by an impressive 4.8 billion tonne-kilometres 
between 1998-99 and 2006-07, it would have to grow by a further 9 billion tonne-
kilometres over the next 3 years in order to achieve this target. This then begs the 
question of how the assumptions of the CFIT ‘Central scenario’ compare with what has 
actually occurred since 2001. Certainly a number of unforeseen events have taken place 
over the period, including the closure of a major steel works (reducing demand for both 
coal and steel traffic), the switching of postal services from rail to road and the essential 
break down of the Strategic Rail Authority’s freight strategy. However, it is tempting to 
conclude that perhaps the CFIT work over-stated the importance of the role of 
infrastructure charges in stimulating rail freight demand. 
Nevertheless, there has been considerable growth in rail freight over recent years and 
infrastructure charges are likely to be partly responsible for this. Indeed, commentators 
have tended to site six factors as explaining the growth since 1995, as follows: 
 
- Increased road congestion; 
- Increased costs for road freight arising out of the fuel duty escalator and, more 
recently, the Working Time directive; 
- An increase in coal imports; 
- Improved quality of service for rail freight; 
- Investment in rail freight facilities; 
- Infrastructure charge changes. 
 
In terms of the types of commodities transported, there has been strong growth in 
some sectors. This has been most notable in relation to coal, which rail is inherently 
better-suited to carrying. The movement of coal and coke currently dominates rail 
freight, and 87% of coal and coke were carried by rail in 2006 (MDS GB Freight report 
2006). However, it is thought that, for coal, transport accounts for only approximately 
5% of the price of delivered coal, so the market is thought to be relatively insensitive to 
changes in the costs of transport. Hence, the actual growth in coal tonnes lifted was 
probably not related to the regime of infrastructure charges, but more concerned with 
changes in the detail of the power-generation market. The charge reductions may have 
enabled length of haul for coal and other traffic to increase at relatively little expense. 
Length of haul for coal traffic, for example, increased by 15% between 2001-02 and 
2006-07. However, on inspection, this seems to simply be the continuation of a trend 
that commenced prior to 2001. The average length of haul was 120kms in 1980 and had 
risen to 206kms by 2004 (MDS GB Freight report 2006). 
There has also been quite strong growth in construction traffic. In contrast to coal, the 
construction market is thought to be very price sensitive, with transport accounting for 
as much as 50% of the price of delivered materials. Hence, it is likely that charge 
reductions would stimulate growth in construction traffic. However, construction traffic 
since 2001 has fallen, then risen and, most recently, fallen again to a point slightly 
lower than that in 2001. It must be concluded that if charges are having an impact on 
this market, some other factor is clearly having an offsetting impact. 
Rail freight growth actually started in 1995, and we do not observe a major change in 
the trend around the time of the reductions in infrastructure charges introduced in 2001. 
Prior to 2001, the structure of charges was such that there was a large fixed charge 
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which, once paid, provided an incentive to operate as much as possible. Post 2001 the 
structure no longer provided this incentive but it did allow for increased 
competitiveness, but the level was such that it enabled the rail freight market to remain 
buoyant. It is thought that, initially, charge-reductions were only passed on to clients in 
a limited way – so part of the reduction was enjoyed by the operators as windfall gains. 
Then, once contracts with clients were renegotiated, the reduction in charges were past 
on as reductions in charges to clients. Furthermore, differentiation by vehicle-type is 
thought to have focused the industry on track-friendly bogies. 
As the rail freight industry has become more competitive and cost-conscious, it is 
rational that operators will pay more attention to what they are being charged for access 
to the infrastructure. It is suggested that this will have alerted operators to possible 
arguments for reduction of charges. Such arguments may have an effect on the overall 
charge level, as the rail freight industry has a strong incentive to make robust 
representations to the charge-setting authorities. They might also relate to incentives for 
operators to reduce impact of rail freight on the network, e.g. by operating less-
damaging rolling stock, by requiring fewer slots to operate a particular service etc. 
 
4.2. Observations of Reactions in the French Freight Market 
 
Infrastructure charges in France were first implemented in 1997, at which time the 
French infrastructure manager, Réseau Ferré de France (RFF), had just been set up. The 
network was divided into track categories and the charging components were 
established as follows: 
 
- DA - a fixed access right;  
- DR - a path reservation fee;  
- DC - a charge for train circulation; and  
- Additional charges, such as for the use of electrical supply equipment and access 
to marshalling yards. 
 
RFF was not then able to make a precise bill to SNCF, the only rail operator on the 
French network up to 2005, so the charging regime comprised a global package based 
on traffic, up to 2002. Hence, no freight or passenger trains had any marginal 
infrastructure charge to pay until 2002. Therefore, whereas the evolution of the total 
charges paid may be observed from 1997, the evolutions of unit price levels have to be 
made on the basis of 2002 or later years. 
There have been several changes to charging structure and levels over the period. The 
level of charges was increased extensively in 1999, but this increase was chiefly focused 
on passenger traffic, with only a 2% increase in freight charges. Freight traffic 
decreased slightly (-1%) in 1999, then increased by 6% in 2000 before decreasing again 
in 2001 by some 9%. 
From 2002 on, the structure of charges is stable and gives marginal charge levels' 
signals to the operator(s). Yearly arrêtés from the Ministry of Transport set the charging 
regime for one year and, generally, charge levels are known at least one year in 
advance. Given this level of pre-announcement, we assume that demand can adapt more 
or less to these evolutions with no important delay, allowing us to compare directly 
yearly traffic and tariffs. Additional charges such as those applying for the use of 
marshalling yards are not covered by these arrêtés. 
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The arrêté setting the 2002 charging regime defined the track categories, as set out in 
Table 7. 
Table 7: RFF Track Categories. 
Track category Subclasses Length Designation 
High level of traffic 287 km A Urban and 
suburban lines Medium level of traffic 985 km B 
High level of traffic C 
High level of traffic and max. speed 220 
km/h 
7,209 km C* 
Medium level of traffic D 
Main interurban 
lines 
Medium level of traffic and max. speed 220 
km/h 
5,840 km D* 
Other lines  12,738 km E 
High level of traffic 718 km N1 
Medium level of traffic N2 
Mediterranean HSL, medium level of traffic 457 km N2* 
Low level of traffic N3 
Mediterranean HSL, low level of traffic 321 km N3* 
High-speed lines 
East-European line 300 N4 
Note: the length per track category actually changes slightly from year to year. 
 
Key aspects of the charging regime introduced in 2002 are as follows: 
- DA is zero for D and E track categories. It is 365.88 €/path-km used per month for 
A & B, and 3.05 € for C track category. 
- DR is composed of a reservation fee (DRS) and a 0.6 coefficient (coefficient K) 
for freight trains (this means that freight trains get a 40% rebate on path 
reservation fee in return for lower quality paths – quality of passenger trains being 
consistently favoured). The levels of this charging component are set out in 
Table 8. 
Table 8: DRS Tariffs for Conventional Track Categories in 2002 (€/Path-Km). 
 A B C D & E 
Off-peak hours 1.52 0.61 0 0 
Normal hours 4.88 1.22 0.8 0 
Peak hours 14.3 2.44 0.8 0 
 
DC is set lower for freight trains than for passenger trains (0.23 €/train-km vs. 0.79), 
whilst a fee for power transport (RCTE) is created. Like the use of electrical supply 
equipment (RCE) and the use of marshalling yards, etc., it is an optional service. Rail 
freight traffic remained stable. 
In 2003 DA was increased slightly for track categories A and B, but a coefficient M 
was created for differentiating this access fee, for A, B and N track categories, varying 
with the number of reserved paths and the duration of the agreement for those paths, as 
set out in Table 9. Total DA paid decreased (86 M euros i.e. 4.7% of total charges vs. 95 
M euros and 5.2% in 2002). 
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Table 9: M Coefficient for Access Fee DA. 
Coefficient M Number of booked paths in A, B, N 
Per category 1-10 11-100 101-1000 >1000 
Purchase agreement < 5 years 0.03 0.225 1.5 1.5 
Purchase agreement > 5 years 0.02 0.15 1 1 
 
Furthermore, coefficient K was divided into 2 categories: K=1 for train paths > 300 
km with an average speed > 70 km/h (meaning no rebate for these “rapid” trains, that 
correspond roughly to “high value” freight such as containerised traffic), and K=0.6 for 
all other freight trains. In addition, all DRS and DC tariffs increase by 2 %. 
Freight traffic decreased by 6.4%, but it is understood that this was mainly due to a 
long strike during the spring. SNCF freight branch’s losses reached 450 M€. A 3-year 
restructuring plan, the Plan Fret 2006, is implemented. It aims at focussing on heavy-
haul, profitable services, and defines a new strategy based on customer approach and a 
better quality of service. SNCF forecast that they would obtain financial balance in 
2006 and expected the traffic to decrease under 35 billion tkm. 
Then in 2004, DA’s structure was modified by an arrêté, in readiness for the 
imminent arrival of new rail operators. For each path, DA became the product of the 
length of each network section used and a fee per path km. This new structure applied 
from 2006 on. Also, DRS of less expensive categories increased slightly. Zero terms 
were suppressed except for E off-peak hour category, but their level was still low (D= 
0.01 to 0.05 €/path-km and E= 0,005 €/path-km). On the contrary, the increase was 
important for C category: + 60 % in normal hours (0.13 €/path-km), and multiplied by 
15 in peak hours – still, the level remains quite low (1.25 €/path-km). A and B remain 
quite stable. In addition, DC freight increases by 3 %. 
Freight traffic remained more or less stable (increased by 1 % in tonnes but decreased 
1% in tkm). The Plan Fret seemed to achieve its 2004 target results, but traffic doesn’t 
fall under 40 billion tkm. The marshalling yards/ freight courtyards system was revised. 
Quality of service and productivity indicators showed a little improvement despite the 
increase of energy costs and important reorganisations in the industry. Some shippers 
report that SNCF’s freight tariffs doubled, or even were multiplied fourfold without 
prior consultation. All these evolutions of SNCF’s services and prices have in 2005 an 
overwhelming impact compared to the marginal impact of infrastructure charge 
evolution. 
In 2005, conventional track categories (A to E) are not much affected by 2005 DRS 
rises, except for C which DRS gets almost quadrupled (x 3,7) for off-peak hours and 
tripled for normal hours (0.38 €/path-km for both tariffs). DC freight increases slightly 
but remains about 1/3 of DC passenger. 
Freight traffic decreased by 12%, but it is understood that this was largely due to Plan 
Fret’s rationalisation. After a long controversy, the European Commission approved the 
800 M€ State aid for SNCF freight branch reorganization. 
The modifications of DA structure’s that were introduced in 2006 means that it is not 
possible to define its change in level from previous years. Although DA’s share in total 
charges is very small (around 4%), this modification was necessary in order to allow the 
development of new entrants’ traffic in a non-discriminative way –the package term 
would obviously have favoured SNCF. DA for conventional track categories was 0.015 
€/ path-km, except for D and E, which were zero. In addition, DRS increased by 4 % in 
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B off-peak hours (0.65 €/path-km). C off-peak and normal hour tariffs were aligned on 
this tariff (+70 %). Furthermore, DC freight increased by 15 %. 
Freight traffic remained stable. However, Plan Fret’s objectives, even after downward 
revision, were not achieved, and the freight branch ended the year with 260 M€ losses. 
Shippers pointed out a downfall in quality –especially punctuality on the second half of 
the year. CNC, the main rail-road container operator owned by SNCF, was restructured 
and focused its activity on maritime containers, abandoning most other market 
segments. 
In 2007 DRS’ main increase was concentrated on A off-peak hours (19 %) and C 
peak hours (20 %). In addition, DC Freight increased by 33 % (0.4 €/train-km). The 
freight branch launched a second reorganization plan in the August, focussing on single 
wagon traffic. This traffic is to be handled through 3 main “hubs” –Villeneuve-saint-
Georges (Paris), Sibelin (Lyons), Woippy (Metz)- and 31 regional yards, 262 courtyards 
(mainly located in Centre and Poitou-Charentes regions) being closed to single wagon 
traffic. Since this new organization was to be implemented within only 3-months 
following the announcement, shippers were forced to use emergency alternatives and 
local governments were alarmed. Strangely enough, the announcement was made while 
the Government organised the great debates of “Grenelle de l’Environnement”, that 
planned for non-road transport modes a +25% market share increase. Besides this, the 
strikes following the special working regimes reform in France, that highly concerned 
SNCF’s workers, brought on an estimated 80 M€ loss to freight branch. Recently, since 
high deficits continued and quality objectives were only partially met, SNCF issued 
another restructuring plan, including 1 billion Euros investment and a reorganization of 
its freight activities. 
Thus, there have been a number of modifications to infrastructure charges in France 
over the past decade, as well as some industrial upheaval arising out of reorganisation 
and new competition. Identifying clear and distinct impacts of these factors on the 
demand for rail freight would always be difficult, but the lack of data from the two main 
sources, SNCF and RFF, has been a major problem. Had it been possible to get the 
figures of quantities bought by rail operators for each type of tariff, we could have 
realistically sought to extract some kind of statistical link between tariffs and quantities 
bought. However, as it is, all that is possible is to draw some broad indications. 
In drawing any conclusions, we should recall that low-value freight traffic cannot bear 
high prices and is not very sensitive to transit time; therefore it is more likely to use low 
quality paths and thus less expensive track categories, especially D and E. Still, two of 
the three main marshalling yards -Villeneuve-Saint-Georges (Paris) and Sibelin (Lyons) 
- are located on category A sections, so that a notable part of freight traffic cannot avoid 
running on the most expensive track category. Except for a few postal TGVs, freight 
trains cannot run on high-speed (N) lines, even though this issue is under study for 
future high speed lines. Freight trains are also more likely to use off-peak paths during 
the night. 
As a whole, the increase of infrastructure charges for freight is important (see Table 
10) but less apparent than for passenger traffic. RFF’s global revenue for freight showed 
a 5 % increase from 1997 to 2004 with a 29% decrease in traffic (in tkm). The most 
important evolutions are those of track category C, coefficient K applied to reservation 
fee DRS, and circulation fee DC. The access fee DA decreased and remained stable at a 
low level since its new 2006 variable structure for all conventional (non-N) categories. 
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DRS increased mainly for track category C: A increased by 11% from 2002 to 2009, 
B increased by 28 % and C was multiplied by 15. D an E tracks began to pay a 
reservation fee in 2004. E tracks remained stable up to 2009 and D increased by 3%. 
DRS increased mainly in 2005, for C tracks only. 
Peak hour tariff remained around 1.9 times the normal hours tariff from 2002 to 2009. 
But off-peak hour’s coefficient increased from 0.27 to 0.42 during the same period, 
concerning more specifically freight trains. Indeed, the level of time differentiation has 
decreased during this period. 
60,00
70,00
80,00
90,00
100,00
110,00
120,00
130,00
140,00
150,00
160,00
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Tr
af
fic
/c
ha
rg
es
 
(b
as
e 
10
0 
in
 
19
97
)
Traffic (t)
Traffic (t-km)
Traffic (train-km)
Freight charges (€/train-km)
 
Figure 2: Freight Infrastructure Charges and Traffic Indicators from 1997 to 2006 (Base: 100). 
Figure 3: Freight Traffic (Mt-km) from 1997 to 2006. 
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freight. DC for freight doubled between 2002 and 2009. While freight infrastructure 
charges went up as described, freight traffic went on a downward trend from the end of 
the 1990’s (see Figure 2, Figure 3 and Table 10). These evolutions may seem, at first 
sight, to be closely related. 
Table 10: Charges per Freight Train-Km from 1997 to 2005. 
 
Total Freight 
Charges (M€) 
Freight Traffic 
(M train-km) 
Charges per train-
km (€) 
1997 155 155,6 1,00 
1998 159 154,1 1,03 
1999 163 154,8 1,05 
2000 165 154,7 1,07 
2001 167 144,3 1,16 
2002 170 143,9 1,18 
2003 156 130,4 1,20 
2004 163 121,6 1,34 
2005 159 105,7 1,50 
 
Nevertheless, the linkage between charges and traffic remains unclear and probably 
low; it would be certainly misleading to see tariff evolution as the main reason for 
freight traffic decreases; expert views and interviews of operators tend to think that the 
impact of tariffs is rather low. First, the main effect of tariff evolution, that occurred 
when reservation fees were effectively implemented, was the suppression of 
“facultative” paths that were unused, thus this effect does not appear in traffic figures. 
Second, even though it increased globally, the charge level still represents a low share in 
operators’ costs, especially for SNCF (around 8%), whereas the evolution of traffic 
showed important shocks that seem to be much more related to the changes in SNCF’s 
freight strategy. Indeed, reorganization plans, railway strikes, the liberalization of fret 
services and economic globalisation have extensively confused the price signal and 
impacted the traffic at a much higher degree than could do the relatively small signal of 
infrastructure charge. 
However, set now at higher levels, and in a more stable environment, infrastructure 
charges may play a stronger role in the future. At least, the steady increases, observed 
also in 2009 tariffs, may have an impact on operator’s purchase strategy –choice of day 
period, train speed, routes. Unfortunately, we couldn’t have any access to wagon 
loading rates, or to the relative use of off-peak periods, or to the distribution of train 
speed. 
RFF considers that freight operators have enough willingness to pay for long-haul, 
high-speed traffic, which is generally the most profitable. Nevertheless, French 
operators are doubtful about RFF’s ability to improve the quality of its freight path 
offer. Discussions have been led on 2010-2015 infrastructure charges tariffs; this 
resulted in new increases, so as to obtain a better cost coverage ratio for RFF in 
exchange for improved infrastructure quality for freight trains. The problem is that a 
good deal of freight traffic could simply not pay for the tariff increase and would then 
disappear. Therefore, a public contribution will, for several years, compensate the 
operators for the tariff increase. This contribution will, however, decrease progressively 
and then disappear, since it is expected that operators’ productivity gains, obtained both 
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by their own efforts and by the improvement of RFF’s freight paths, will make it 
possible to progressively increase the tariff effectively paid by the operators. 
As a conclusion, it has not been possible to show a precise impact of the increase and 
differentiation in RFF’s freight tariffs. The lack of data from the two main sources, 
SNCF and RFF, was a major problem. Very important events on the operators’ side and 
on the demand’s side had a major effect, and data available was not precise enough to 
get effects sorted out. Nevertheless, it is highly plausible that RFF tariffs’ evolution 
accompanied the other changes in the same direction, possibly accentuating the 
decreasing trends in traffic levels. 
 
4.3. Freight through Eurotunnel 
 
Eurotunnel provides an interesting case, as rail freight through the tunnel has 
performed somewhat disappointingly over a number of years and the charges faced by 
freight operators have consistently been cited as a potential cause of this poor 
performance. After 14 years of service, the channel tunnel is far from operating at the 
level of capacity requested by the reports giving support to the tunnel alternative for a 
cross-channel fixed link. Having originally had a design capacity of approximately 10 
million tonnes, freight traffic grew during the first 3 years of operation to three million 
tonnes in 1997. However, it then stagnated until 2000, before declining to just over one 
million tonnes in 2007. 
Table 11 and Table 12draw similar pictures for tunnel freight forecasts: a total traffic 
of about 30 million tonnes around 1993 and a total market share of about 35% for the 
tunnel, corresponding to about 10 Mt, with better market shares for rail wagons than for 
Le Shuttle. 
Table 11: Historical Forecast for Freight: Total Cross-Channel vs. Channel Tunnel (Million Tonnes). 
Freight forecasts 1969 1971 1980 1985 1990 2000 
MoT (1963) Via tunnel 2,6 2,9 4,0 4,5 - - 
Total demand - 5,7 13,1 - 25,3 - C & L (1973) 
Via tunnel - - 5,4 - 11,3 - 
Total demand - 5,7 12,9 - 20,2 - CTAG (1975) 
Via tunnel - - 5,3 - 7,8 - 
Total demand - - 15,9 - 27,3 37,2 DoT (1982) 
Via tunnel - - - - 8,6 11,1 
Source: Chevroulet et al, 2007; Anguera, 2006. 
Table 12: CTG-FM Unitised Freight Forecasts –Total Demand & Market Share (Million Tonnes). 
 
Cross-Channel 
1993 
Tunnel freight 
1993 
Market share 
1993 
Tunnel freight 
2003 
Roll-on/roll-off freight 24,2 6,0 25 7,5 
Containers and rail wagon 7,9 4,0 52 6,8 
Total 32,1 10,0 31 14,3 
Source: Chevroulet et al, 2007 ; Anguera, 2006. 
 
However, actual traffic was much different, as shown in Table 13 and Table 14. The 
total freight tonnage was underestimated by most of the forecasts, and the traffic of 
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through rail services remains very low compared to forecast and to freight shuttle. 
Freight shuttle service, in absolute terms, increased quite steadily ahead of what was 
forecast through to 2007. Nevertheless, forecasts for freight Shuttle’s market share 
appeared to be not far from what occurred. 
Table 13: Actual Channel Tunnel FreightTonnages (Million Tonnes). 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Le Shuttle Freight 0,8 5,1 6,7 3,3 9,2 10,9 14,7 15,6 15,6 16,7 
Through rail services - 1,3 2,4 2,9 3,1 2,9 2,9 2,4 1,5 1,7 
Total tunnel freight  0,8 6,4 9,1 6,2 12,3 13,8 17,7 18,8 17,1 18,4 
Source: Chevroulet et al., 2007; Anguera, 2006. 
Table 14: Actual Channel Tunnel Freight Tonnage (Million Tonnes). 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Le Shuttle Freight 16,6 17 16,9 18,4 
Through rail services 1,9 1,6 1,6 1,2 
Total tunnel freight  18,5 18,6 18,5 19,6 
Table 15: Cross-Channel Unitised Freight 1994-2003 (Million Tonnes). 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Channel tunnel 0,8 6,4 9,1 6,2 12,3 13,8 17,7 18,8 17,1 18,4 
Port of Dover 15,1 14,0 13,9 20,8 19,8 21,7 21,0 23,0 24,1 23,2 
Total cross-channel 15,9 20,4 23,0 27,1 32,1 35,5 38,7 41,1 41,2 41,6 
Source: Chevroulet et al., 2007; Anguera, 2006. 
 
Eurotunnel's only forecast that proved to be more or less correct is the freight Shuttle's 
market share. This traffic obeys mainly to road logics, for which existing methods, data 
and tools were more appropriate for doing forecasts. A hypothesis we can make is that 
by the time forecasts were made, the methods and tools used were built using these road 
logics, inducing no anticipation of strong competitive reaction (a shipping line is very 
mobile, unlike roads; prices are not often a competitive tool in the road sector) and 
modelling the competitive situation as a network composed of minor (high cost) “road 
links” for the ferries, compared to a new (low cost) motorway for the Tunnel. Another 
hypothesis is that Eurotunnel had more incentive and tools to reach its forecasts of roll-
on roll-off than of through trains. This last point leads us to the issue of infrastructure 
charges. 
The situation of infrastructure charges for using Eurotunnel is a complex one, having 
involved 3 major components. Prior to the opening of the tunnel, a fifty-year agreement 
was formed between Eurotunnel and the two then state railways, British Rail and SNCF, 
that each be allocated half of the tunnel’s capacity in return for the payment of 
infrastructure charges. In addition, the two railways agreed to pay a Minimum Usage 
Charge each year for using the tunnel, irrespective of how many trains actually used it. 
Thirdly, the two railways agreed to pay a fixed annual contribution to Eurotunnel’s 
operating costs, amounting to approximately £6.5 m each. 
The infrastructure charges were initially levied on a per tonne basis, based on a guide 
price of £10 per tonne and an overall volume of 10m tonnes. To that was added fixed 
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charges for Eurotunnel and for essential facilities at either end of the tunnel, each of 
which should have added another £1 per tonne. In reality though, those fixed charges 
were divided by the number of trains, and, since there were not many trains, this ended 
up resulting in very high charges. The per tonne charges were differentiated between 
bulk and non-bulk traffic, though – apparently somewhat counter-intuitively – the 
charge for non-bulk was three times that for bulk traffic. 
On rail privatisation in Britain, freight operations through the tunnel were sold to 
EWS, but it was agreed that government retain the responsibility for paying the 
infrastructure charges, the Minimum Usage Charge and the operating cost contribution 
through until November 2006. As of 2006, the agreement was that the Minimum Usage 
Charge would cease and the payment of infrastructure charges and the operating cost 
contribution would transfer to EWS. Subsequently, EWS have agreed with the 
government that the operating cost contribution continue to be paid by the government, 
leaving EWS to pay the remaining infrastructure charges. On the French side, SNCF 
has, throughout the past 14 years, been responsible for all 3 charging components. 
Following the cessation of the Minimum Usage charge and continued decline in rail 
freight traffic through the tunnel, discussion between the key stakeholders led to another 
set of revised charges being announced in autumn 2007. This set of charges, set out 
below, was issued as part of Eurotunnel’s strategy for ‘relaunching’ Open Access cross-
Channel rail freight. The charges are focused around a central average charge of 4.5k 
Euro (£3k) per train, irrespective of train-load. This central charge represents a 
significant reduction compared to the 2007 average charge of 8k Euro (£5,3k). 
Furthermore, the charges are differentiated according to speed and time of day. The 
central charge is based on a train passing through the tunnel at a speed of 120kph during 
a period of medium traffic density; lower charges are applicable for higher speeds 
and/or periods of lower traffic density, and vice-versa. Most intermodal/non-bulk traffic 
tends to travel at 120kph, whilst bulk traffic has tended to travel at slower speeds. At the 
same time, additional measures have been introduced to provide operators guarantees of 
equitable and efficient open access to the essential facilities at either end of the tunnel. 
These new charges, and the relaunch strategy, appear to be having clear impacts on 
rail freight traffic. Firstly, EWS report that they have increased the speed of their bulk 
traffic so as to take advantage of the lower charge for this. This has been somewhat 
fortuitous, as the change occurred at a time when they happened to have the rolling 
stock available to enable this. Secondly, EWS have announced the commencement of 
two regular Channel Tunnel services. Thirdly, though on a more negative note, Freight 
Europe UK have announced withdrawal of services apparently in response to the new 
charges. Freight Europe UK have been providing a less than train-load service between 
continental Europe and the UK which was, whilst charges were on a per-tonne basis, 
viable. However, with the switch to per-train charges, their payments have increased as 
they have begun having to pay for empty or part-empty trains. It may be that this is a 
temporary problem, as they rationalise their service and arrive at a new level of service, 
although it may also be the case that such a rationalised level of service may no longer 
be sufficiently attractive to customers and that they find their service having to be 
rationalised further. 
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Table 16: Eurotunnel Infrastructure Charges, 2007-08. 
Train @ 120 km/h Reservation fee per 
train single (£) 
Access fee per train 
single (£) 
Equivalent price per 
train single 
(based on 52 train 
single/year) (£) 
Off-peak period 270 2430 2700 
Intermediate period 300 2700 3000 
Peak period 330 2970 3300 
 
Train @ 100 km/h Reservation fee per 
train single (£) 
Access fee per train 
single (£) 
Equivalent price per 
train single (based 
on 52 train 
single/year) (£) 
Off-peak period 300 2700 3000 
 
Maintenance 
periods 
Reservation fee per 
train single (£) 
Access fee per 
train single (£) 
Equivalent price per 
train single (based 
on 52 train 
single/year) (£) 
All trains @ 100 km/h 300 2700 3000 
Source: Eurotunnel’s Network Statement - 2008 Working Timetable. 
 
The main problem of the forecasts, as compared with the actual traffic, seems to rely 
on the nature of the market Eurotunnel could try to grasp. The reaction of ferries proved 
to be quite effective at cutting Eurotunnel from a good part of its expected market, 
among other means by concentrating and reinforcing offers for origin-destination trips 
remote from the Channel. The decline in competitiveness relative to road transport, as a 
result of the impact of the fixed costs of frontier infrastructure (including security 
constraints) proved to be further constraints on channel Tunnel rail freight growth. 
Hence, the original charges were devised with no reference to the market, and the 
monopoly and state aid aspects of the market rendered them irrelevant as signals to the 
market. Since the removal of state aid, opening up of the market and establishment of 
the new charging regime, traffic appears, on the whole, to be responding positively, 
though it is too soon to say whether this is a sustained turn-around. 
 
4.4. Modelling Reactions in the British Rail Freight Market 
 
The effect of changes in rail access charge regimes on rail and road traffic in Britain 
have been modelled using the Leeds Freight Transport Model (LEFT) (Johnson et al, 
2007)). The LEFT model is essentially an aggregate mode split model for road and rail 
freight traffic in Britain, capable of forecasting changes in traffic for different 
commodities and modes following changes in transport costs. LEFT was initially 
constructed in 2002 and has been further developed over subsequent years, the current 
version being LEFT3. The model has no geography and uses Binary Logit models 
calibrated to existing data to perform mode split. Market size is determined using 
elasticities of tkm with respect to Generalised Cost and applying them with the mode 
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split element stripped out. Disaggregation within LEFT3 is by the following 
dimensions: 
 
1. The base data is split over 7 commodity groups consistent with the categories 
provided in the Department for Transport’s Continuing Survey of Road Goods 
Transport (CSRGT) data, reported in Transport Statistics Great Britain (TSGB) 
(DfT, annual): 
a. Food, Drink and Agricultural Products; 
b. Coal, Coke and related items; 
c. Petroleum and Petroleum Products; 
d. Metals and Ores; 
e. Aggregates and Construction; 
f. Chemicals and Fertilisers; 
g. Other, including manufactures, miscellaneous, containerised, and 
international. 
 
2. The base data by commodity is split over 9 distance bands, again consistent with 
those used by the CSRGT data. These are, 1-25 km, 25-50 km, 50-100 km, 100-
150 km, 150-200 km, 200-300 km, 300-400 km, 400-500 km and Over 500 km. 
We have taken the midpoint of the 500+ distance band to be 550 km. 
 
3. The base total market is split for each commodity and distance band according to 
whether traffic is favourable for rail operations, referred to as train-friendly (TF), 
or train-unfriendly (TU). For Bulks, TF traffic is that traffic we deem suitable for 
trainload movement from origin to destination. For Non-bulks (Food etc, and 
Miscellaneous), TF traffic is that to which we have assigned the need for 
collection and delivery (at most) at one end. 
 
There are therefore 2*7*9 = 126 cells in LEFT3. Traffic can switch mode or distance 
band, disappear altogether or new traffic can be generated. Just two modes were 
modelled - road and rail. The data used was collected from a variety of sources. For 
road, the primary source has been the Continuing Survey of Road Goods Transport, as 
reported in TSGB. For rail we have used unpublished data from the Strategic Rail 
Authority (SRA) with gaps being filled by our own best estimates. Base data relates to 
the period 1998-2000. All monetary amounts are in 2000 prices. A base for 2010 was 
obtained by projecting current trends forward. 
We were interested in looking at the responsiveness of rail traffic to different access 
regimes and pricing structures. Our aim was to see if, and to what extent, rail can 
replace some road traffic given the appropriate incentives. We determined the following 
six scenarios/policy tests to examine: 
 
- Removing current track access charges- the idea here is to create the best possible 
scenario for rail freight and see how much growth there could be in these 
conditions, with the aim of mode shift from road to rail on environmental 
grounds. 
- Halving current track access charges; again here the aim is to stimulate mode 
shift, whilst still recovering some track access revenues. 
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- Doubling current track access charges; here we see how rail traffic responds to a 
doubling of access charges across the board, with the aim of raising revenue from 
rail access charges. 
- Quadrupling current track access charges; as above but a larger increase. 
- Introduce a structure of fixed and variable track access charges; punishing short 
distance rail traffic. This is approximated using distance bands, with doubled 
access charges for the shortest distance band, tapering down to current charges at 
the longest distance. The justification for this scenario is to remove some short 
distance rail traffic, for which rail may be not as well suited and for which there 
are fewer environmental benefits of mode shift 
- A fixed and variable access charge stimulating long distance traffic. This is 
approximated by using differential charges over distance bands, with double 
access charges for the shortest distance, tapering down to ½ current charges at the 
longest distance. The justification here would be to stimulate a switch to rail from 
road only from that traffic for which rail is most suitable, namely long distance 
traffic, which will have a good environmental benefit and which is approximately 
revenue neutral. 
 
Table 17 and Table 18 report the results for the 6 different scenarios compared to the 
2010 Do Nothing. It can be seen that, in Scenario 1 (Zero Access Charges) Rail tonnes 
increase by 8.17 million (5.69%) and tkm increase by 2.13 billion (9.24%). Nearly half 
of the overall increased rail traffic is accounted for by an increase of 0.99 billion tkm in 
Ores & Metals. There is also a significant increase of 0.57 billion tkm in Others. The 
largest increases in rail’s share of tkm are found in Chemicals (by 31.75%), Ores & 
Metals (by 21.6%) and Others (12.08%). The smallest absolute increases are in rail’s 
Food, Drink & Agriculture and Petroleum tkm traffic. The smallest increases are in 
rail’s share of tkm of Food, Drink & Agriculture, Petroleum and Coal & Coke. 
In Scenario 2 (Halved Access Charges) Rail tonnes increase by 3.95 million (2.75%) 
and tkm by 1.02billion (4.43%). The magnitude of the effect of this scenario is 
approximately a half that of scenario 1, which is as expected. The increase of 0.48 
billion tkm in Ores & Metals accounts for nearly half of the overall increased rail traffic. 
There is also a significant increase in Others and Construction traffic. The largest 
increases in rail’s share of tkm are found in Chemicals (by 15.36%), Ores & Metals (by 
10.60%) and Others (5.85%). The smallest absolute increases are in rails’ Food, Drink 
& Agriculture , Petroleum, Coal & Coke and Chemicals tkm traffic. The smallest 
increases are in rail’s tkm share of Food, Drink & Agriculture, Petroleum and Coal & 
Coke. 
In Scenario 3 (Doubled Access Charges), Rail tonnes decrease by 7.16 million 
(4.99%) and tkm by 1.75billion (7.59%) overall. The drop of 0.83 billion tkm in Ores & 
Metals accounts for nearly half of the overall lost rail traffic. There is also a significant 
drop of 0.50 billion tkm in Others. The largest percentage reductions in rail shares of 
tkm are in Chemicals (by 27.54%), Ores & Metals (by 18.17%) and Others (by 
10.59%). The smallest absolute falls are in rails’ Food, Drink & Agriculture, Petroleum 
and Coal & Coke tkm. The smallest effects on rail’s share of tkm are in Food, Drink & 
Agriculture, Petroleum and Coal & Coke. 
In Scenario 4 (Quadrupled Access Charges), Rail tonnes decrease by 17.97 million 
(12.51%) and tkm by 4.29 (18.62%) overall. The drop of 1.88 billion tkm in Ores & 
Metals accounts for over one third of the overall lost rail traffic. There is also a 
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significant drop of 1.33 billion tkm in Others and 0.38 billion tkm in Construction. The 
largest reductions in rail’s share of tkm are in Chemicals (67.27%), Ores & Metals 
(41.12%) and Others (28.3%). The smallest absolute falls in rails’ Food, Drink & 
Agriculture and Petroleum tkm traffic. The smallest effects on rail’s share of tkm are in 
Food, Drink & Agriculture, Petroleum and Coal & Coke. 
In Scenario 5 (Higher Short Distance Access Charges) rail tonnes decrease by 4.28 
million (2.98%), and tkm by 0.82 billion (3.54%). Compared to scenario 3, tonnes fall 
by proportionally more than tkm highlighting that the reduction in rail traffic is more 
concentrated in the shorter distances than in scenario 3. In absolute terms, the drop of 
0.43 billion tkm in Ores & Metals accounts for more than half of the overall lost rail 
traffic. There is also a significant drop of 0.18 billion tkm in Others. The largest 
decreases in rail shares of tkm are in Chemicals (by 12.85%), Ores & Metals (by 
9.41%) and Others (by 3.88%). The smallest absolute decreases in Food, Drink & 
Agriculture, Petroleum, Coal & Coke and Chemicals tkm traffic. The smallest decreases 
in rail’s share of tkm are in Food, Drink & Agriculture, Coal & coke and Petroleum. 
In Scenario 6 (Higher Short Distance and Lower Long Distance Access Charges), rail 
tonnes decrease by 2.65 million (1.85%) and tkm decrease by 0.27 billion (1.16%), 
highlighting that much of the reduction in traffic is over the short distances. 
Interestingly there is little increase in Food, Drink & Agriculture tkm (0.06%) but 
decreases in all other commodities – very little of rail’s traffic in this commodity is in 
the shorter distances. The largest absolute falls are found in Ores & Metals and 
Construction. The largest decreases in rail share of tkm are in Chemicals (by 5.15%), 
Ores & Metals (by 4.02%) and Construction (by 1.04%). The smallest reductions in 
rail’s market share of tkm are found in Coal & Coke, Others and Petroleum. 
Overall, changes in rail freight traffic are driven primarily by the shifts in Ores & 
Metals traffic, (as this accounts for 19.8% of Rail’s overall tkm traffic), and also Others 
(accounting for 20.4%). Although Coal & Coke accounts for 22.3% of rail’s tkm traffic, 
there is little movement in tkm as its market share stays relatively static due to the level 
of captivity and the favourability of rail over longer distances. There are relatively 
significant changes in Construction, which accounts for 17.1% of rail’s tkm traffic. 
Whilst there are large shifts in the market shares of Chemicals, these represent very 
small absolute changes in tkm. 
In summary, by using LEFT, we were able to explore the potential impacts of 
variations in infrastructure charging in isolation from any other changes that might 
impact on the rail freight market. We found that by removing access charges, rail tonne 
kms increase by 9%, reducing road traffic by almost 2 billion tkm, just 1%. This 
highlights an underlying lack of competitiveness of rail in key freight markets such as 
Food Drink and Agriculture and Construction, because of high captivity to road 
transport, given the short distances involved and the lack of suitable rail infrastructure. 
We examined the sensitivity of the rail market to levels of access charges and found that 
rail is slightly less sensitive to access charge increases than it is to equivalent decreases. 
If we introduce different structures of access charging over distance bands, 
approximating a fixed and variable charging regime, we show how we can incentivise 
rail traffic over the longer distances where rail is more competitive and environmentally 
more beneficial. 
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Table 17: Tonnes Lifted by Commodity for Different Scenarios in 2010. 
Tonnes lifted [millions] Scenario Mode 
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Road 525.86 23.30 85.49 75.89 676.09 69.18 708.69 2164.50 Do nothing 
Rail 11.32 42.12 10.84 33.82 27.72 1.64 16.17 143.63 
Road 525.83 23.20 85.38 73.19 675.88 68.77 708.34 2160.60 
% change from 
do nothing -0.01 -0.42 -0.12 -3.57 -0.03 -0.60 -0.05 -0.18 
Rail 11.48 42.22 10.95 38.31 28.76 2.12 17.96 151.80 
Scenario 1 
Zero 
access 
charges 
% change from 
do nothing 1.41 0.24 0.99 13.29 3.74 29.57 11.06 5.69 
Road 525.84 23.25 85.44 74.56 675.98 68.99 708.52 2162.58 
% change from 
do nothing 0.00 -0.22 -0.06 -1.76 -0.02 -0.29 -0.02 -0.09 
Rail 11.39 42.17 10.89 36.04 28.17 1.87 17.05 147.58 
Scenario 2 
Halved 
Access 
Charges 
% change from 
do nothing 0.65 0.12 0.44 6.56 1.63 14.21 5.39 2.75 
Road 525.89 23.43 85.56 78.32 676.33 69.53 709.00 2168.05 
% change from 
do nothing 0.01 0.55 0.08 3.19 0.04 0.50 0.04 0.16 
Rail 11.18 41.99 10.77 29.70 27.02 1.23 14.57 136.46 
Scenario 3 
Doubled 
Access 
Charges 
% change from 
do nothing -1.19 -0.30 -0.61 -12.19 -2.52 -24.93 -9.94 -4.99 
Road 525.97 23.69 85.65 81.75 676.96 70.01 709.53 2173.57 
% change from 
do nothing 0.02 1.69 0.19 7.72 0.13 1.20 0.12 0.42 
Rail 10.89 41.73 10.70 23.88 25.99 0.66 11.82 125.66 
Scenario 4 
Quadruple
d Access 
Charges 
% change from 
do nothing -3.82 -0.93 -1.32 -29.39 -6.22 -59.94 -26.91 -12.51 
Road 525.88 23.37 85.54 77.46 676.24 69.37 708.84 2166.70 
% change from 
do nothing 0.00 0.32 0.06 2.07 0.02 0.27 0.02 0.10 
Rail 11.23 42.05 10.79 31.16 27.26 1.42 15.44 139.35 
Scenario 5 
Higher 
Short 
Distance 
Access 
Charges % change from 
do nothing -0.79 -0.18 -0.41 -7.85 -1.66 -13.46 -4.54 -2.98 
Road 525.88 23.35 85.52 76.98 676.20 69.29 708.75 2165.96 
% change from 
do nothing 0.00 0.20 0.04 1.43 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.07 
Rail 11.26 42.07 10.81 32.00 27.40 1.52 15.91 140.97 
Scenario 6 
Higher 
Short/ 
Lower 
Long 
Distance 
Charges 
% change from 
do nothing -0.51 -0.11 -0.30 -5.38 -1.14 -7.41 -1.61 -1.85 
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Table 18: Tonne-Kilometres by Commodity for Different Scenarios in 2010. 
Tonne kms [Billions] Scenario Mode 
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Road 63.33 2.31 8.29 8.53 35.91 8.84 73.09 200.30 Do nothing 
Rail 2.17 5.13 2.13 4.57 3.94 0.40 4.69 23.04 
Road 63.29 2.30 8.26 7.59 35.68 8.71 72.55 198.39 
% change from 
do nothing -0.06 -0.62 -0.27 -11.05 -0.62 -1.43 -0.74 -0.95 
Rail 2.21 5.24 2.17 5.56 4.19 0.53 5.26 25.17 
Scenario 1 
Zero 
access 
charges 
% change from 
do nothing 1.96 2.10 2.03 21.60 6.46 31.75 12.08 9.24 
Road 63.32 2.31 8.28 8.07 35.81 8.78 72.83 199.38 
% change from 
do nothing -0.03 -0.32 -0.12 -5.43 -0.26 -0.69 -0.36 -0.46 
Rail 2.19 5.18 2.15 5.06 4.05 0.46 4.97 24.06 
Scenario 2 
Halved 
Access 
Charges 
% change from 
do nothing 0.82 1.02 0.95 10.60 2.75 15.36 5.85 4.43 
Road 63.36 2.33 8.30 9.33 36.02 8.95 73.56 201.85 
% change from 
do nothing 0.04 0.61 0.18 9.42 0.32 1.24 0.65 0.78 
Rail 2.15 5.04 2.10 3.74 3.78 0.29 4.20 21.29 
Scenario 3 
Doubled 
Access 
Charges 
% change from 
do nothing -1.20 -1.85 -1.61 -18.17 -3.92 -27.54 -10.59 -7.59 
Road 63.40 2.36 8.32 10.34 36.19 9.11 74.35 204.07 
% change from 
do nothing 0.11 2.09 0.38 21.26 0.78 3.02 1.73 1.88 
Rail 2.10 4.87 2.04 2.69 3.55 0.13 3.36 18.75 
Scenario 4 
Quadrupled 
Access 
Charges 
% change from 
do nothing -3.41 -5.12 -4.13 -41.12 -9.76 -67.27 -28.30 -18.62 
Road 63.34 2.32 8.30 8.94 35.97 8.89 73.26 201.03 
% change from 
do nothing 0.02 0.40 0.11 4.84 0.19 0.58 0.23 0.36 
Rail 2.16 5.09 2.11 4.14 3.85 0.35 4.51 22.22 
Scenario 5 
Higher 
Short 
Distance 
Access 
Charges % change from 
do nothing -0.50 -0.72 -0.89 -9.41 -2.17 -12.85 -3.88 -3.54 
Road 63.33 2.32 8.29 8.70 35.94 8.86 73.09 200.54 
% change from 
do nothing 0.00 0.29 0.07 2.01 0.09 0.23 0.00 0.12 
Rail 2.17 5.12 2.12 4.39 3.90 0.38 4.69 22.77 
Scenario 6 
Higher 
Short/ 
Lower Long 
Distance 
Charges % change from 
do nothing 0.06 -0.12 -0.50 -4.02 -1.04 -5.15 -0.15 -1.16 
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5. Conclusions 
 
Infrastructure charges were introduced in Britain in 1995 and, when reviewed in 2001, 
were effectively halved for freight operators. Over the period, growth in freight traffic 
has been quite remarkable, in the order of 50% over 12 years. Within this, growth has 
been particularly notable in coal traffic, which rail is inherently better-suited to carrying, 
and in construction traffic which appears particularly price-sensitive. However, rail 
freight growth actually started in 1995, and we do not observe a major change in the 
trend around the time of the reductions in infrastructure charges introduced in 2001. 
Nevertheless, the structure of charges pper to be incentivising operators to reduce 
impact of rail freight on the network, e.g. by operating less-damaging rolling stock and 
by requiring fewer slots to operate a particular service. Further changes are soon to be 
implemented, involving greater differentiation and increased charging levels for freight-
only lines. It will be interesting to monitor any observable impacts of these forthcoming 
changes. 
Infrastructure charges in France were first implemented in 1997 and there have been 
several changes to charging structure and levels over the period. A differentiation 
between “rapid” (high value) freight traffic and other freight was introduced. The 
circulation charge for freight doubled between 2002 and 2009. While freight 
infrastructure charges went up as described, freight traffic went on a downward trend 
from the end of the 1990’s. These evolutions may seem, at first sight, to be closely 
related but the linkage between charges and traffic remains unclear and probably low. 
First, a notable effect occurred when reservation fees were implemented and led to the 
suppression of “facultative” paths that were unused. Second, even though it increased 
globally, the charge level still represents a low share in operators’ costs, especially for 
SNCF (around 8%), whereas the evolution of traffic showed important shocks that seem 
to be much more related to the changes in SNCF’s freight strategy. Indeed, 
reorganization plans, railway strikes, the liberalization of freight services and economic 
globalisation have extensively confused the price signal and impacted the traffic at a 
much higher degree than the relatively small signal of infrastructure charge could. 
However, set now at higher levels, and in a more stable environment, infrastructure 
charges may play a stronger role in the future. 
Eurotunnel provides an interesting case, as rail freight through the tunnel has 
performed somewhat disappointingly over a number of years and the charges faced by 
freight operators have consistently been cited as a potential cause of this poor 
performance. Having originally had a design capacity of c10 million tonnes, freight 
traffic grew during the first 3 years of operation to three million tonnes in 1997. 
However, it then stagnated until 2000, before declining to just over one million tonnes 
in 2007. The original charges were devised in the midst of rail re-structuring in both 
Britain and France, with no actual reference to the market. Furthermore, the monopoly 
and state aid aspects of the market rendered them irrelevant as signals to the market. 
Following the cessation of the Minimum Usage charge in 2006 and continued decline in 
rail freight traffic through the tunnel, discussion between the key stakeholders led to 
another set of revised charges being announced in autumn 2007. 
Since the removal of state aid, opening up of the market and establishment of the new 
charging regime, traffic appears, on the whole, to be responding positively, though it is 
too soon to say whether this is a sustained turn-around. 
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The effect of changes in rail access charge regimes on rail and road traffic in Britain 
have been modelled using the LEeds Freight Transport Model (LEFT) (Johnson, 
Whiteing and Fowkes (2007)). Six scenarios/policy tests examined the effects of: 
 
- Removing current track access charges; 
- Halving current track access charges; 
- Doubling current track access charges; 
- Quadrupling current track access charges; 
- Introduce a structure of fixed and variable track access charges; punishing short 
distance rail traffic; 
- A fixed and variable access charge stimulating long distance traffic. 
 
By using LEFT, we have been able to explore the potential impacts of variations in 
infrastructure charging in isolation from any other changes that might impact on the rail 
freight market. We have found that by removing access charges, rail tonne-kilometres 
increase by 9%, reducing road traffic by almost 2 billion tkm, just 1%. This highlights 
an underlying lack of competitiveness of rail in key freight markets such as Food Drink 
and Agriculture and Construction, because of high captivity to road transport, given the 
short distances involved and the lack of suitable rail infrastructure. We have examined 
the sensitivity of the rail market to levels of access charges and found that rail is slightly 
less sensitive to access charge increases than it is to equivalent decreases. If we 
introduce different structures of access charging over distance bands, approximating a 
fixed and variable charging regime, we have shown how we can incentivise rail traffic 
over the longer distances where rail is more competitive and environmentally more 
beneficial. 
Data availability issues have placed constraints on the level of analytical detail that 
we have been able to achieve. For further systematic analysis in this area, one might, 
ordinarily, seek to employ some form of econometric or statistical modelling exercise. 
However, for this, one would require detailed cost and demand statistics at the train 
operator level, and this would appear not to be available to us. Nevertheless, the case 
study research has helped to identify key trends and issues, whilst we have also been 
able to pursue some interesting modelling ideas. It is clear that modelling can help in 
identifying the cases where the final impact of infrastructure charges is rather low, and 
therefore in giving indications about the degree of desirability of infrastructure charge 
differentiation, given some minimal data requirements on the market segments 
concerned. 
Besides data requirements, the research field of imperfect competition in rail markets 
seems to be quite important if we want to explore these important issues further and 
have a better understanding of what the final indirect impacts of infrastructure charging 
are, once interactions between competitors and demand converge to an equilibrium. 
Simulation models, such as those developed by Meunier and Quinet (see “Effect of 
imperfect competition on infrastructure charges” in this issue) appear to provide a 
promising line of further research in this area. 
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Abstract 
 
The text explores the optimal infrastructure charges of an unbundled activity where the infrastructure 
manager sells the use of the infrastructure to operators providing services to a downstream market made 
up of atomistic customers. This situation has been widely analysed under the assumption that the 
upstream market is competitive, but more rarely in the case of imperfect competition. Typical examples 
are the railways activity in Europe and air transport. Various market structures are considered, illustrated 
by situations encountered in the transport field: a single mode operated by a single operator, two operators 
competing within the same mode, and two modes competing in a Bertrand way. In each case, situations 
are analysed using analytic formulae with a simplified demand function and a simplified cost function, 
and performing simulations with sensible parameter values drawn from current average situations. The 
main result is that the analysed imperfections make a dramatic departure from the conventional Marginal 
Cost pricing doctrine. Conclusions are drawn regarding infrastructure charging policy. 
 
Keywords: Imperfect competition; Transport infrastructure; Rail; High speed train; Marginal cost; 
pricing; Differentiation; Pricing behaviour; Market power; Lerner index. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The liberalisation of public services has created a great interest in Infrastructure 
Charges (IC), especially in Europe with the reforms leading to the unbundling of 
infrastructure management and operations. In this framework, the general doctrine 
commonly addressed (Proost and alii (2004), Quinet (2005)) is the Short Run Marginal 
Cost Pricing (SRMC), where the IC is equal to the Short Term Infrastructure Marginal 
Cost. 
Inside this framework, a growing interest arose about differentiation of Infrastructure 
Charges. Among the many situations explored by the research program “Different”, a 
                                                 
* Corresponding author: David Meunier (quinet@enpc.fr - http://www.enpc.fr/ceras/quinet) 
The authors are indebted to the participants of the DIFFERENT research program and to an anonymous 
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particular one deserves interest and is the subject of this text: the imperfect competition 
in transport markets. 
Strangely enough, while a lot of attention has been paid to the situations of perfect 
competition, little consideration has been given to situations of imperfect competition. 
What happens in that case? How should optimal infrastructure charges deviate from 
SRMC? How should they vary according to the degree of competition? What are the 
consequences of alternative IC levels on welfare, on the revenues of the operators and 
on the consumers’ surplus? This contribution explores these questions, using as an 
example the case of the railways, in which an infrastructure manager (IM) sells the use 
of the infrastructure to operators. These operators act in an imperfectly competitive 
market and provide services to atomistic customers. The IM sets the IC that all rail 
operators have to pay. 
The effects and consequences of alternative Infrastructure Charges (IC) can be 
assessed either through theoretical considerations based on economic analysis or 
through tests of real situations. In the framework of imperfect competition, the first 
approach gets rapidly limited due to the complexity of mathematical derivations. As a 
consequence, only a few very general and well-known results can be derived through 
such a method. 
The second approach, the numerical test of real situations, allows to use the power of 
computer calculation and to test more varied and complicated situations. But it needs 
some numerical assumptions so as to simulate the behaviours of the actors of the game.  
The text is organized as follows: section 2 presents the basics of optimal IC in a 
framework of imperfect competition. Section 3 develops the modelling principles. 
Section 4 presents the data used. Section 5 presents the simulations and their results, and 
section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Optimal IC under imperfect competition 
 
Transport markets and especially rail markets are characterized by imperfect 
competition1: for long distance passenger traffic, there is in general just one rail operator 
(RO), the competition is intermodal, with air transport, and it often happens on each 
relation that there is just one or a few air competitors. For medium and short distance 
passenger traffic, there are in general just one or very few competing rail operators, and 
the main competition comes from road transport; road transport is regarded as being 
operated under pure competition conditions between road hauliers, having no strategic 
behaviour, and in the case where one RO is competing only with road transport, 
everything looks as if the RO were a monopoly. On-track competition is more frequent 
in freight transport, but here again, the competitors are just a few on each single 
relation. 
In such a situation, the classical doctrine of marginal social cost pricing does not 
apply. The rigorous formulae giving the charge should be derived from a general 
equilibrium model (GEM) taking into account the real features of the economy. 
                                                 
1
 The following results are drawn from Quinet 2007 (“Effect of market structure on optimal pricing and cost 
recovery”) and Meunier 2007 (“Sharing investment costs and negotiating railway infrastructure charges”), both 
communications to the Second International Conference on Funding Transportation Infrastructure Leuven, Belgium, 
September 20-21, 2007 
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Unfortunately the formulae are not easy to handle (see for instance Mayeres I., Proost S. 
(2001)). 
Another less rigorous but more tractable procedure can be used, in the framework of 
partial analysis, and some strictly localised departures from the first best situation are 
allowed. This procedure is the one used in the well-known Ramsey formula, where a 
budget constraint of the operator is modelled, or where the distortion of taxes is 
captured through a cost of public funds. And the result is that in this case, at the social 
optimum, the Lerner index (percentage of increase of price - here, the IC - compared to 
the short run marginal cost) is inversely proportional to the price-elasticity of the 
demand2. But this result holds only in case of perfect competition in the downstream 
market. Our aim is to follow this way in order to explore the consequences on the 
optimal charge level in cases of imperfect competition between transport operators, 
where cost of public fund and, possibly, externalities, are introduced. The procedure is 
similar to the modelling framework exposed in Suter and alii (2004) on the Molino 
model; still, it is much less sophisticated and does not take into account the phases of 
investment funding. Using a simpler process, it allows putting more attention to the 
transport market and to its imperfections. Let us present the analytical results in two 
particular cases (the derivations of the formulae are given in Appendix 3). 
The first case will be a profit maximizer monopoly. Let us derive the algebraic 
formula for the optimal IC, using the following symbols and assumptions: 
 
- The demand function of the down-stream market is a linear one: 
- Q= f(p) = α p + β, α<0 and  β>0 
- where Q is the traffic and p is the price paid by the users to the rail operator (RO) 
- The operating cost of the RO is assumed to be constant and equal to: c’ per unit of 
traffic 
- The operating cost of the infrastructure manager (IM) is assumed to be constant 
per unit of traffic and equal to: b 
- The IM sells the paths to the RO at a price: t per unit of traffic 
- Then the cost per unit of traffic for the RO is constant and equal to: c=c’+ t 
- The RO generates an external cost of e per unit of traffic 
- The Cost of Public Funds (or shadow variables of possible budget constraints) are 
(λ-1) for the IM and (λ’-1) for the RO 
 
It is easy to show that the RO, aiming at maximising its profit: Q(p-c’-t)=Q(p-c), 
chooses the price p such as: 
 
α
βα
αβ
2
)2/()2/( −=−= ccp
 
 
i.e.: 
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2
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2
 In presence of externalities, this opinion is wrong as shown in Quinet, Touzery et Triebel (1982) and in Oum and 
Tretheway (1988), and as it will be recalled later 
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The Welfare is: 
 
W(p)=SU(p)+λPRim(p)+λ’PRro(p)-eQ(p) 
 
where PRim and PRro are the profits of the IM and the RO, SU being the final users’ 
surplus. 
The optimal IC is the value of t which maximises W(p). 
Noting that ∂SU/∂p=-Q, and replacing the other terms by their expressions, it turns 
out that: 
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where Qb is the traffic obtained when the IC is equal to the marginal infrastructure cost. 
Let us present also the case of a duopoly, representing competition between air and 
rail. The demand functions are: 
 
rmrr qppQ ++= γα  for rail traffic 
mmrm qppQ ++= βγ  for air traffic 
000 ><< γβα
 
 
The profit of the RO is: 
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with the similar relation for the competitor m. The welfare is: 
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We assume for simplicity that both operators are purely private: λ’=λ’’=1 
and that rail externalities are negligible when compared to air externalities: er ≈ 0. 
 
Maximisation then leads to: 
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These developments confirm that the optimal IC under imperfect competition is quite 
different from the classical SRMC pricing principle. But, even in the simple cases 
analysed using linear demand functions, the algebraic formulae are complex and not 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 43 (2009): 113-136 
 117 
easy to interpret. This point is an argument for using numerical simulations in order to 
explore the properties of the IC in situations of imperfect competition. 
 
 
3. The modelling framework of the simulations 
 
Simulations could be made on a large scale, for instance at the country level. The 
overall model would use as entries the cost and demand functions for each route of each 
operator, the ICs to be tested on each route, as well as the structure of the competition 
(if any) between the operators; the outputs would be the prices and the traffics for each 
mode and various other outputs such as the profits of the firms or the welfare. 
In practice, the implementation of this model is hampered by the lack of data: we have 
no good knowledge of the cost functions of the operators at the level of each route; the 
type of competition between the operators is not known precisely. The lack of data 
prevents us from achieving econometric calculations and induces us to use more simple 
and crude methods, restricting the ambitions of the modelling framework. 
The method implemented here can be entitled “sensible simulation”, and presents the 
following features: 
 
- It involves a simple network: one or a few origin-destinations, one or two modes 
serving these relations  
- The agents are: the final consumers, the transport operators (one or two rail 
operators, zero or one operator using another mode) and the infrastructure 
manager. The rail operator(s) pay an IC to the infrastructure manager. The IC has 
no fixed part tariff nor quantity rebates, it just uses a fixed unit price 
- The demand functions are either linear or logit 
- Cost functions are linear 
- The parameters of the cost and demand functions are not calibrated on a specific 
real situation, they are set up in order to reproduce typical situations that are 
determined in relation to the common knowledge of the specialists of the field. 
- Other parameters may be introduced such as cost of public funds or externalities 
- Operators are supposed to adopt a continuum of possible behaviours between two 
extreme ones: the marginal cost pricing corresponding to the behaviour of an 
operator aiming at maximizing the welfare and, at the other end of the spectrum, 
the profit maximizing behaviour. The operator's utility function is assumed to be 
some kind of linear average between these extreme utility functions. 
Alternatively, this type of utility function can be interpreted as the result of more 
or less tight price regulation from the transport regulator. 
- A variety of competition situations are represented, including: 
- For rail: monopoly, duopoly 
- For the competing mode: perfect competition, monopoly 
- For the type of duopoly competition: Bertrand competition 
- In case of oligopoly, the services provided by the operators are deemed to be 
imperfect substitutes. 
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It turns out (see Appendix 1) that these various competition situations can be 
represented using a single formula for each operator, that generalizes the Ramsey-
Boiteux formula: 
 
(p-c)/p=-s/ε 
 
where p is the price of the operator, c is its marginal operating cost, ε is the own price-
elasticity of the operator and s is a parameter representative of the behaviour of the 
operator or of the strength of the price regulation as seen above. Values of s are varying 
from 0 (case of perfect competition or own-market welfare maximisation behaviour, or 
extremely tight price regulation) to 1 (case of profit maximizing monopoly, Bertrand 
competition with profit maximizing operators, or no price regulation). Parameter s may 
be interpreted as a measure of the market power effectively exerted by the operator. 
The simulation process is the following one: 
 
- A set of sensible and reasonable estimates of some parameters is fixed, aiming at 
representing current typical situations: prices and traffic levels, costs of the 
operators and of the infrastructure manager, price-elasticities (a single elasticity in 
the case of a monopoly, 4 elasticities in the case of a duopoly). 
- From this data set, the parameters of the demand function and the parameter s are 
deduced,  
- After this calibration phase, the optimization phase aims at finding the IC that 
maximises the welfare, taking into consideration possible costs of public funds 
and external costs. 
 
Appendix 2 details the corresponding calculations. They have been achieved through 
Mathematica and Excel softwares. 
 
 
4. The data 
 
The most difficult data to obtain are data on costs, since much of them are covered by 
secrecy. Prices are also difficult to gather due to the increasing use of yield 
management, that leads to high discrimination of the demand and to differentiation and 
multiplication of prices. The data base is shown in the following table: 
Table 1: Main Data Set. 
 Link A B C D E F 
Market structure  Monopoly Monopoly Monopoly Duopoly Duopoly Duopoly 
Operator's prices p1 43 43 52 48 59 50 
  p2    62 102 85 
Operator's costs c1 16 13 16 19 24 16 
  c2    55 80 65 
Elasticities E11 -0,9 -1 -0,9 -1,5 -1,2 -1,5 
  E22    -1,7 -1,5 -1,5 
  E12    0,8 2,3 2,5 
  E21    1,5 1,5 1,5 
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 Link A B C D E F 
Traffics Q1 0,31 0,26 0,33 0,31 0,24 0,17 
  Q2    0,39 0,45 0,51 
Infrastructure 
charges used as 
references 
RIC 12,60 12,60 5,80 16,15 20,56 10,28 
Infrastructure 
Cost b 2,06 2,06 2,13 3,44 5,52 5,21 
Environmental 
Costs e1 1 2,25 1,75 3,5 4,5 4 
  e2 4,4 9,9 7,7 15,4 19,8 17,6 
 
Situations A to C are “monopoly-like” situations of competition between high speed 
train and motorways for diverse travel distances, so as to represent more or less tough 
competition conditions and market shares for rail. Situations D to F are situations where 
high speed train is competing with air transport, again for diverse travel distances so as 
to represent a range of competition situations and a variety of relative competitive 
advantages for rail. 
 
 
5. The simulations 
 
The modelled cases are, according to the available data, the following ones: 
 
- A rail operator monopoly on a single origin-destination (O-D) link 
- A rail operator competing with an operator from another mode, both in situation 
of monopoly within their mode on a single O-D link 
- A rail duopoly on a single O-D link, with two hypotheses for the infrastructure 
charges: either a single infrastructure charge, or a differentiated infrastructure 
charge (the two competitors do not have the same IC then). 
 
Simulations provide several results. Some of them are confirmation of already well-
known results. Other ones pertain to the sensitivity of the results to calibration 
parameters such as the shape of the demand function or costs and prices. A last series 
gives indications about how interesting it would be to introduce some differentiation. 
In the following sub-sections, we selected some simulations so as to illustrate the 
specific points that came out from each simulation theme. The following tables will 
show only one or a few simulation situations taken from situations A to F, since the 
other ones would not give much more additional information, and so as to keep tables 
relatively simple and easy to read. We did not precise for each table the whole set of 
parameter values that were used, since they were too numerous, but the key parameters 
that change from table to table are highlighted. 
 
5.1. Consequences of Marginal Cost pricing in some cases of imperfect competition 
 
First, as clearly shown by the theoretical formulae given above, as long as there is no 
tax distortion, i.e. the CPF (Cost of Public Funds) parameter is 1, the optimal IC are 
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low, and may be lower than the marginal infrastructure costs, in case of monopoly at 
least. Optimal ICs are even in some cases negative3, which means that the rail service 
should be subsidized. This result is classical: in order to avoid the monopolistic 
distortion of prices vis-à-vis costs and to induce the monopoly to fix its price at the level 
of the marginal cost, it is necessary to decrease the prices of its inputs, and the single 
input on which the IM can act is the IC. This point is exemplified for instance in the 
case of monopoly, as shown by table 2: 
Table 2: Comparison of optimal IC and marginal infrastructure cost in the case of a monopoly. 
Link Costs of Public Funds Optimal Infrastructure 
Charge 
Marginal 
Infrastructure Cost 
 IM RO 0IC b 
C 1 1 -34,2 2,1 
 1,3 1 -5,7 2,1 
 1,5 1 4,3 2,1 
A 1 1 -18,9 2,1 
 1,3 1 5,9 2,1 
 1,3 1,3 -1,5 2,1 
 
This table shows also that this result highly depends on the value of the CPF. The 
optimal IC level increases with the CPF of the IM. Additional simulations indicate that 
in the monopoly case under review (the s parameter being equal to 1 and without any 
externality), optimal IC is close to the marginal infrastructure cost for values of CPF 
around 1,4 for the IM and 1,0 for the operator; and that in a large number of cases 
tested, values of CPF in the range [1,5; 1,8] rise the optimal IC close to the (observed) 
reference level of IC. 
The same results appear in the case of a duopoly (for example, a duopoly between rail 
and air transport for passengers), as shown in table 3. Here, the near coincidence 
between optimal IC and marginal cost is observed for slightly lower values of CPF than 
in the monopoly case; this result is in line with the expectation: when competition gets 
tougher, the optimal IC becomes higher than the marginal infrastructure cost. 
Table 3: Comparison of optimal IC and marginal infrastructure cost in the case of a duopoly. 
Link Costs of Public Funds Optimal Marginal 
 IM RO IC infra cost 
D 1 1 -22,1 3,4 
 1,3 1 2,0 3,4 
 1,3 1,3 -4,1 3,4 
 
Taking into account the external costs increases the IC if the mode is less environment 
friendly than its competitor, and decreases it in the reverse situation which is usually the 
case for rail vis-à-vis air or road transport. Table 4 shows examples of these effects. 
                                                 
3
 In the case of a profit maximiser monopoly, when CPF of the IM and of the operator are equal, optimal 
IC increase with these CPF and become equal to the marginal cost of infrastructure when CPF are 
infinite. 
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We see that, in the range of values considered in our simulations, external costs tend 
to have observable but lower impacts on prices and optimal charges, as compared to the 
impact of CPF (in this table, CPF of the IM is 1,5 while CPF of the Rail Operator is 1,0) 
Table 4: Effects of external costs. 
 External Costs Rail Price Optimal IC 
Link e1 e2   
B 0 0 32,9 0,4 
B 2,25 9,9 30,9 -2,0 
E 0 0 64,4 20,4 
E 4,5 19,8 59,1 14,0 
 
Another striking fact is the change in welfare induced by changes in the IC. It is clear 
from table 5 and figure 1 that the changes in welfare are small and that the effect of a 
sub-optimal IC bears mainly on the revenues of the IM and the operator’s revenues and 
consumer surplus. 
Table 5: Consequences of a sub-optimal IC (CPF of the IM=1,3; CPF of the RO=1,0). 
    Revenues 
Link Comment IC Welfare IM operator 1 
D  16,1 45,1 5,6 5,9 
D  9,0 46,3 2,9 7,6 
D 
In this simulation 
the IC is the 
marginal cost of 
infrastructure 
3,4 46,5 0,1 8,9 
D 
In this simulation 
the IC is the 
optimal one 
2,0 46,7 -0,9 9,7 
 
So as to give an idea of the relative orders of magnitude obtained in our simulations, a 
loss of IM revenue through a reduction of IC level often benefits to the rail operator for 
one third and to the consumers for two thirds. 
The relative share of the effect of external costs within the change in welfare depends 
highly, of course, on the unit level of externality gain or loss. This relative share 
depends also highly on the relative number of clients that rail takes from the competing 
mode within the total rail traffic increase obtained when the IC gets lower. 
For sensible estimates of the unit level, this relative share of external costs’ effects 
varies widely from a few per cent (the far more frequent case in our simulations) to the 
great majority of welfare gains. Figure 1 shows the relative orders of magnitude as 
taken from one of our simulations. 
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Figure 1: variations in profits of infrastructure manager, profits of rail operator, consumer surplus, 
externalities and welfare when the IC is set at its optimal level (link A, CPF(IM)=1,3 CPF(RO)=1). 
 
As a conclusion of this first set of simulations, it appears that, depending on the 
circumstances (level of CPF, externalities, market structure), marginal social cost 
pricing can be either a good approximation or lead to non negligible welfare losses; in 
any case it leads to important changes in the distribution of welfare. Circumstances 
under which non negligible welfare losses may occur are variable; if we dare to give 
some hints from our simulations, this situation seems to be more likely to occur when 
CPF(IM) is low and rail has a strong market power. 
 
5.2. Effects of differentiation of the IC 
 
Infrastructure Charges can be differentiated in many ways. Simulations have been 
designed to explore some of them. A first set of simulations relates to individual 
differentiation criteria: operator's marginal costs, elasticities and marginal infrastructure 
costs; then, the question of averaging the IC level over several links is treated: does it 
make sense, what is the loss in welfare, what are the impacts on the operators’ profits? 
Finally, the case of competing rail operators is treated. We will now address these 
points. 
 
5.2.1. How much should IC be different when operator’s costs are different? 
 
Table 6 below shows the impact of differences on the operators’ marginal costs: the 
effect of an increase of operator’s marginal cost is to decrease the optimal tariff. The 
decrease seems to be similar in situation of duopoly than in situation of monopoly, but it 
could well be lower in other cases than those simulated since, in a duopoly, the 
competitor exerts an effect which limits the market power of the operator. In any case it 
appears that the positive but rather low effect on welfare implies important effects 
because of the distributive effects between the agents: infrastructure manager, operators, 
and consumers. This point, illustrated further down for the issue of IC averaging (see 
figure 2), is a general conclusion of all the simulations. 
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Table 6: Effect of differences on operator’s marginal cost. 
Prices 
 
Market 
Structure 
Operators’ 
Costs P1 P2 
Optimal IC 
C Monopoly 16,2 50,3  4,3 
   19,5 52,9  4,0 
E Duopoly 24,0 64,4 90,3 20,4 
   28,8 67,9 90,8 19,9 
 
5.2.2. How much should IC be different when demand elasticities are different? 
 
The following table shows that the optimal tariff is rather sensitive to the demand 
characteristics. 
Table 7: Effect of differences in elasticities in the case of monopoly. 
 Elasticities Prices Optimal 
  e11 p1 IC 
B -1,0 46,4 -9,2 
B -1,5 36,9 -5,9 
Note: the values of p1 and of the Optimal IC differ from the values given in table 4 because in table 4 the 
s1 parameter is 0,4 while it is 1 in table 7. 
 
In the case of a duopoly with logit demand function, assessing the effect of elasticity 
is a bit difficult technically as elasticities depend on the value of the parameter «h» of 
the demand function that represents the weight given to the price: the higher h, the 
higher the elasticities, everything else being equal. The test has been to increase h by 
15%; the results are shown in the following table: 
Table 8: Effect of differences in elasticities in the case of duopoly. 
Link  h p1 p2 Optimal IC 
F 0,042 52,99 73,57 7,32 
F 0,047 50,70 72,80 7,71 
 
The optimal IC is sensitive to the elasticities: the higher the elasticities, the higher the 
IC. This point is understandable: when elasticities are high, the market power of the 
operators is lower and the IC can be increased without reducing too much the 
consumers’ surplus. 
From these results two conclusions can be drawn: 
 
- First, it is important to have a good knowledge of elasticities, since the optimal 
tariff is highly varying with them. Unfortunately these elasticities are known with 
a large uncertainty, and efforts should be made to improve our knowledge in this 
field.  
- Second, it may be wise to differentiate the infrastructure tariffs according to the 
characteristics of the demand. 
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5.2.3. Differentiation according to the infrastructure costs 
 
Table 9 shows the effect of differences in infrastructure costs. It relates to situations 
where the same link bears several traffics, for instance freight traffic and passenger 
traffic, or passenger trains with different number of carriages or different types of 
carriages (for instance double and simple deck), which damages to the track are 
different. Wrong prices signals come from an abusive assimilation of different ICs, but 
the impact seems to be rather minor when compared with the impact of other elements 
such as cost of public funds or elasticity level. 
Table 9: Effects of changes in infrastructure costs. 
s Parameters Prices 
 
Infrastructure 
Costs operator 1 s1 s2 p1 p2 
Optimal 
IC 
Traffic 
mode1 
Traffic 
mode 2 
A 2,06 0,29  40,25  10,18 0,18 0,29 
A 1,03 0,29  39,11  9,03 0,19 0,29 
D 3,44 0,42 0,18 42,44 61,18 9,14 0,30 0,30 
D 1,72 0,42 0,18 41,13 61,14 7,59 0,31 0,30 
 
It appears in our simulations that an increase in infrastructure costs leads to an 
increase in OIC of the same order of magnitude. 
 
5.2.4. Averaging of IC between links 
 
Table 10 shows that averaging the optimal ICs over two or three links does not induce 
a large loss in welfare if the differentiated ICs are not too far. But if they are far from 
each other, the loss may be important and the effect can be to exclude profitable 
services from the market. This point is a caveat for the temptation to use a unique IC 
over a too large set of links whenever the characteristics are different in terms of both 
costs and demand. 
Table 10: Effect of IC averaging (in this table, the first group of rows relates to fully differentiated tariffs; 
the second group of rows relates to a uniform tariff per km; the additional welfare lines show simply the 
sum of welfare values for the 3 market cases). 
 
s1 s2 p1 p2 Optimal 
IC 
Length of 
the link in 
km 
Q1 Q2 Welfare 
A 1,00 - 51,68 - -10,11 200 0,14 - 27,82 
E 1,00 1,00 87,41 128,80 13,45 900 0,36 0,35 -15,76 
F 1,00 1,00 60,27 101,83 8,33 700 0,31 0,33 -6,83 
         5,23 
          
A 1,00 - 62,92 - 2,56 200 0,11 - 27,49 
E 1,00 1,00 86,14 128,56 11,52 900 0,37 0,35 -15,78 
F 1,00 1,00 60,71 101,90 8,96 700 0,31 0,34 -6,84 
         4,88 
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Figure 2 shows that the positive (but often rather low) effect on welfare of diverse 
infrastructure pricing strategies may imply important effects because of the distributive 
effects between the agents: infrastructure manager, operators, and consumers. 
 
Figure 2: relative differences of diverse alternative IC pricing strategies as compared to actual (different) 
infrastructure charges on a set of 3 markets (A, B, C). Variation values are added over the 3 markets. 
 
The 4 infrastructure pricing strategies presented in figure 2 are: 
 
- uniform optimal IC: optimal IC level under the constraint that all markets A,B, C 
have to pay the same IC 
- differentiated optimal IC: the uniformity constraint is suppressed, A, B and C pay 
different ICs 
- average marginal cost: all markets A,B, C pay the same IC, equal to average 
marginal cost over the 3 markets 
- uniform IC within envelope of reference ICs (RICs): this is the optimal IC within 
the interval [Min(RIC(A),RIC(B),RIC(C); Max(RIC(A),RIC(B),RIC(C)]. 
 
Simulations made for sub-markets that were all over-charged as compared to optimal 
levels, as well as for sub-markets that were all under-charged, showed the same results: 
low impact of differentiation on welfare, but possibly high impact on revenue 
distribution. Still, the impact of IC differentiation on welfare may become more 
important when the envelope of actual (reference) ICs does intersect the envelope of 
optimal ICs. This can be the case when demand or supply parameters are broadly 
dispersed; for instance, when both freight and passenger markets are considered. 
 
5.2.5. Does it make sense to differentiate the IC of two competing rail operators? 
 
The situation here is a duopoly on rail: both operators run rail services, and they are 
competing in a Bertrand mode. Their market shares and quality characteristics are 
different. Is it good to differentiate their tariffs? The evidence obtained from our data set 
is that, generally, differentiation between rail operators induces a very small extra 
welfare, as shown in the following table 11, where the last line displays the values 
Variation pro-
f it Inf rastruc-
ture Manager
Variation 
prof it Rail 
Operator
Variation 
Consumer 
Surplus
Variation ex-
ternalities
Variation 
Welf are
-400,00
-300,00
-200,00
-100,00
0,00
100,00
200,00
300,00
400,00
Comparison diverse uniform IC pricing  vs differentiated optimal IC
Uniform optimal IC
Differentiated optimal IC
Average marginal cost
Uniform IC within enveloppe 
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obtained with uniform optimal IC and the line before displays the results for 
differentiated optimal ICs : 
Table 11: Effect of tariff differentiation in a situation of competing rail operators. 
CPF 
IM 
CPF 
operator 
s1 s2 p1 p2 Optimal IC 
operator 1 
Optimal IC 
operator 2 
Q1 Q2 W 
1,5 1,0 0,35 0,12 66,7 55,7 30,2 33,8 0,4 0,4 -10,8 
1,5 1,0 0,35 0,12 68,2 54,2 32,1 32,1 0,4 0,4 -10,9 
 
But in some cases when one of the operators does not bring much welfare (either 
because of its bad quality of service or of its cost inefficiency), a differentiated IC 
allows to exclude it from the market, while a uniform IC allows this inefficient operator 
to remain in the market, at the price of a loss of welfare. Still, even though being 
somewhat inefficient, an operator may play a strategic role for keeping an incentive for 
the main operator to behave reasonably. 
 
5.3. Impacts of changes in the market structure and in the operators’ behaviour 
 
Imperfect competition is often changing. New entrants can appear then disappear, and 
the market structure then comes from monopoly to duopoly and vice-versa. Do these 
changes have an important effect on IC? 
First, let us consider a possible misunderstanding of the market structure: while the 
true market structure is duopoly with air, the IM does not take this point into account 
and assumes that the market structure is a monopoly. It estimates the market structure 
(i.e. the parameter s1 and the demand function). In that case large mistakes result from 
ignoring the competition, as shown in the following table that explores the 
consequences of such mistakes. 
Table 12: Effect of changes in market structure: monopoly versus duopoly. 
s Parameters Prices at optimal IC level  Market 
Structure 
s1 s2 p1 IC 
Comment Welfare 
D Monopoly 1,0  50 -0,3 Optimal IC -11 
D Duopoly 0,4 0,2 45,5 12,8 Optimal IC -3,7 
D Duopoly 0,4 0,2 34,6 -0,3 
IC fixed at the level of 
Optimal IC if the 
market structure were 
monopoly 
-5,0 
 
Indeed, taking into account the regulating effect of the competitor increases optimal 
IC levels, therefore reducing the optimal charging policy’s negative impact on IM 
revenues. It is interesting to assess the loss of welfare incurred by charging as if the 
market structure were a monopoly whereas, actually, it is a duopoly. In the case of table 
12, this loss of welfare would be equal to 1,3, corresponding to a 5% increase in the 
marginal cost for rail. 
Another example of the effect of a change in the market structure is expressed through 
changes in the value of the parameter s. As shown in the table 13, the behaviour of the 
rail's competitor (the value of s2) does not impact too much the optimal solution, while 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 43 (2009): 113-136 
 127 
large changes from the initial value s1 lead to important differences between the 
calculated IC and the optimal one. 
Table 13 Impact of the values of the behaviour parameters s1 and s2 
s Parameters Prices Link 
s1 s2 p1 p2 
Optimal IC 
C 0,52 1,00 50,3 97,7 4,3 
 1,00 1,00 59,2 97,7 -12,6 
 0,00 1,00 39,0 97,7 23,0 
F 0,84 0,17 53,0 73,6 7,3 
 0,84 1,00 69,6 354,7 10,3 
 1,00 1,00 65,9 100,8 11,6 
 0,00 1,00 50,5 97,7 34,3 
 
In our simulations, we observed that the parameter s allowing for a competitor’s 
pricing behaviour is frequently strictly less than unity, and takes values often very low, 
for instance between 0 and 0,5. The point is not surprising as far as the historical rail 
operator is concerned; it had clear welfare goals not so long ago, and may still be 
impregnated with such objectives. It is more surprising for the air competitors, as they 
are clearly in the private sphere, and their aims should be purely profits. This result 
could indicate that the behaviours of the operators are much inspired by welfare 
concerns or, more realistically, that strategic considerations (may they come from 
demand considerations or competition concerns) do lead them to exert less market 
power than what would be expected at first sight. The price regulation exerted by the 
State, although acknowledged as mild, may also contribute to lower this parameter. But 
this situation may change in the future, and not acknowledging these changes would 
lead to large mistakes. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This text explores the consequences of IC differentiation in a situation of imperfect 
competition, in the framework of a partial equilibrium model. In such situations of 
imperfect competition, the short run marginal social cost doctrine should be adapted. It 
appears that the optimal IC depends highly on the market structure and on the cost of 
public funds, and that in the simulations performed it rejoins the marginal cost only for 
costs of public funds of roughly 0,5 (λ values of 1,5), a rather high value compared to 
the current estimates. 
Simulations of optimal tariffs have been made for various situations: 
 
- market situations: monopoly, duopoly with another operator running a substitute 
service on another mode (air transport), duopoly with another rail operator. 
- operator’s behaviours: profit maximizing, welfare maximizing or intermediate 
behaviour 
- various costs of public funds. 
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Various possible IC differentiation situations have been explored as well as the 
consequences of the reverse procedure: averaging over several services that differ only 
in one of these characteristics. The estimated impacts have been observed as regards 
optimal tariffs, prices of the operators, traffics and welfare. 
From this simulation exercise, several conclusions can be drawn: 
 
- Market structure has an important impact on the optimal IC; so the ICs of two 
services similar in everything except the market in which they are run should 
differ. Generally speaking, IC levels for monopoly should be lower than for a 
duopoly. In many cases marginal cost pricing leads to non negligible welfare 
losses, and in any case it provides very different welfare distribution than the 
optimal pricing 
- The possibility for IC differentiation between two sub-markets can stem from 
differences in costs or demand or market structure (or a combination of these 
features) of these services 
- In any case, IC differentiation brings small welfare changes when the two - or 
more- sub-market situations are close to each other; in such cases, the tiny 
improvement in welfare may lead to huge consequences on the distribution of 
welfare between the agents: the operators, the infrastructure manager and the 
consumers 
- As far as costs are concerned, differentiation between two operators whose 
operating costs are different seems to bring minor welfare gains, which could 
possibly be more important when these operators are monopolies than when they 
bear competition with another mode. In the case of two links having different 
infrastructure costs - or two operators whose damages to the track are different- 
differentiation may have observable welfare consequences and is to be 
recommended, especially when the operator is a monopoly; in the case of a 
duopoly, the market power of the operator is limited by the operator of the other 
mode and differentiation, though desirable, may be less important 
- In some cases, averaging the tariffs of several services may have important effects 
if these services have very different characteristics of costs and demand; in 
particular, it may happen that the average tariff excludes some profitable services, 
ending up in a large loss of welfare 
- In case of a duopoly on track – meaning that two rail operators compete on the 
same track - welfare does not seem to be highly sensitive to an averaging of tariffs 
- Last but not least, making non differentiated IC come closer to optimal IC levels 
could be much more worth than trying to differentiate finely around the initial IC 
levels, if those levels are far from the optimal ones. 
 
Besides data requirements, the research field of imperfect competition in rail markets 
seems to be quite important if we want to explore more these important issues and to 
have a better understanding of what the final indirect impacts of infrastructure charging 
are, once interactions between competitors and demand converge to equilibrium. Trying 
to open and explore this “black box” of interactions is highly desirable, since the very 
basic usual representations such as perfect competition assumptions are clearly far from 
being fulfilled. 
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 1: Modelling operators’ behaviour 
 
 
The purpose of this annex is to show that various competition situations and 
behaviour of the operators can be expressed by a formula akin to the Ramsey formula: 
 
ε
s
p
cp
−=
−
 
 
Where: 
p is the price of the operator 
c is its marginal cost (assumed to be constant) 
ε is the own price-elasticity of the operator 
s is a parameter taking values between 0 and 1. 
 
Profit maximiser monopoly 
 
In that case, the previous formula holds with the value 1 for the parameter s; it is the 
classical formula giving the price of a monopoly. 
 
Price-taker monopoly (or perfect competition) 
 
In that case, the operator sets its price equal to its marginal cost, and the parameter s is 
0. 
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Public monopoly subject to budget constraint 
 
Then the price is defined by the previous relation which boils down to the Ramsey 
formula, with λ
λ 1−
=s
 using our conventions for the CPF parameter. In that case, the 
parameter s depends on the tightness of the budget constraint: 0 if the budget constraint 
is not binding, 1 if the budget constraint is very high (so high that the operator has to 
behave like a monopoly to meet this constraint). 
 
Mixed behaviour monopoly 
 
Historical operators were very much like public firms aiming at welfare maximizing. 
Their behaviour is changing more or less quickly. It may happen that their behaviour is 
not yet profit maximising; another interpretation may be that the operator is subject to a 
more or less tight regulation. In that case, it is sensible to assume that their objective 
function is a combination of profit and welfare, this combination being characterized by 
a parameter s such that: 
 
OF(p) = s*q*(p - c) + (1 - s)*[SU(p)+q*(p - c)] 
 
Maximizing this objective function with respect to p leads to the same result as in the 
previous cases: 
 
ε
s
p
cp
−=
−
 
 
Mixed behaviour, operators acting in a Bertrand duopoly market 
 
If the two operators provide (partially) substitute goods, each of them maximizes its 
objective function with respect to its price, which leads to the following relations: 
 
)],([ 21 ppOFMax ipi  
 
for i=1,2 
 
where: 
 
[ ])(*),(*)1()(**),( 2121 iiiiiiiii cpqppSUscpqsppOF −+−+−=  
 
This leads to the twin relations: 
 
ii
i
i
ii s
p
cp
ε
−=
−
 
 
The numerical simulations used in the text are based on this type of Bertrand 
competition: the operators use the prices as an optimisation tool. 
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Appendix 2: Detail of the simulation process 
 
 
The simulation process has two phases: first, calibration of the parameters of the 
model; second, optimisation of the IC of the IM. This process is presented in the case of 
a rail operator in competition with an air operator, the market structure being a Cournot 
duopoly; the extension to other market structures is straightforward. 
 
First step: behaviour calibration 
 
The first phase starts from sensible values of current observable variables. They are, 
in the chosen case: 
The rail traffic: qm 
The infrastructure cost: bi and charge: ti 
The cost of the rail operator: cr (including the infrastructure charge pi) ; its price pr  
The cost, price and traffic of the air operator: cm, pm, and qm 
The four demand own and cross elasticities. 
 
If the demand function is linear, the parameters to be estimated are the 5 parameters a, 
b, c, kr, km such that: 
 
Qr=a*pr+c*pm+kr 
Qm=c*pr+b*pm+km 
 
The behaviour parameters of the operators: s1 and s2 
s1 is for instance such that the rail operator’s behaviour is to maximize: 
 
1* *( ) (1 1)* *s qr pr cr s pr dqr cr qr − + − − ∫  
 
The calibration phase aims at giving good estimates of the demand function's 
parameters and of the behavioural parameters (here: the seven parameters a, b, c, kr, km, 
s1, s2) that reproduce the four elasticities, the two prices, and the two traffics. 
 
This is obtained by minimizing the sum of the squares of the relative differences 
between, on the one hand, a set of the calculated values that conform perfectly to the 
model used and, on the other hand, the observed values of each parameter.  
 
The procedure is the following one: let X*i be the data observed and collected, and Yj 
the demand function and behavioural parameters. To each set of value of Yj 
corresponds a set of calculated values of Xi: Xi(Y1, Y2, …Yj). The optimal set of Yj 
minimizes the sum: 
 
Σi [(X*i-Xi(Y1,Y2, ..Yj))²/ X*i ²] 
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Second step: Optimisation 
 
Once the parameters of the demand function and of the operator’s behaviour are 
estimated, they are used in a maximisation process which aims at maximizing the total 
welfare. We assume that the infrastructure charge has to be determined by the IM in 
order to maximize welfare, with possibly a cost of public funds (or a budget constraint). 
 
The second step consists in finding the infrastructure charge that maximizes the 
welfare: 
 
SU+λ*PRim+λ’*PRr+λ’'*PRm-er*Qr-em*Qm 
 
Where: SU is the consumer’s surplus, λ, λ’ and λ’’ are costs of public funds (or dual 
variables of budget constraints), er and em are environmental costs. 
 
 
Appendix 3: Derivation of optimal infrastructure charges for linear demand - monopoly 
and duopoly 
 
We will present here the derivations that give the expressions for optimal 
infrastructure charges, in the simple case where the value for parameter s is 1 (pure 
profit maximisation). 
 
1. Monopoly 
 
The first case will be a profit maximizer monopoly. Let us derive the algebraic 
formula for the optimal IC, using the following symbols and assumptions: 
 
- The demand function of the down-stream market is : 
 Q= f(p) = α p + β    ,  00 >< βα and  
 where Q is the traffic and p is the price paid by the users to the rail operator (RO) 
- The operating cost of the RO is assumed to be constant and equal to : c’ 
- The operating cost of the infrastructure manager (IM) is assumed to be constant 
per unit of traffic and equal to: b 
- The IM sells the paths to the RO at a price t per unit of traffic 
- Then the cost per unit of traffic for the RO is constant and equal to: c=c’+ t 
- The RO generates an external cost of e per unit of traffic 
- The Cost of Public Funds (or shadow variables of possible budget constraints) are 
(λ-1) for the IM and (λ’-1) for the RO 
 
It is easy to show that the RO, aiming at maximising its profit: Q(p-c’-t)=Q(p-c), 
chooses the price p such as: 
 
( / 2) ( / 2 )
2
c
p c
α β
β α
α
−
= − =  
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ie 
 
'( )
2 2
t c
p t
α β
α
−
= +  (E0) 
 
1
;
2 2
p Q
t t
α∂ ∂
= =
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 (E1) 
 
'( )
2 2
t cQ t α α β+= +  (E2) 
 
( ) ( ( ) ( ' ))Q t p t c tα=− − +  (E3) 
 
The welfare is: 
 
W(p)=SU(p)+λPRim(p)+λ’PRro(p)-eQ(p) 
 
where PRim and PRro are the profits of the IM and the RO. 
The optimal IC is the value of t which maximises W. 
 
Noting that ∂SU/∂p=-Q, using (E1) and replacing the other terms by their expressions, 
it turns out that since: 
 
[ ] [ ]( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ' ( ( ' )) ( ) ( )W t SU p t t b Q t p c t Q t eQ tλ λ= + − + − + −  
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and using (E3): 
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But, if Qb is the traffic in the case of an infrastructure charge equal to the marginal 
infrastructure cost, (E2) gives : 
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Therefore : 
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since α<0, W is concave in t as long as : 
 
0
2
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and W gets its maximum for IC value t such as: 
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2. Duopoly 
 
Let us present also the case of a duopoly, representing competition between air and 
rail. The demand functions are: 
 
rmrr qppQ ++= γα  for rail traffic 
 
mmrm qppQ ++= βγ  for air traffic 
 
000 ><< γβα
 
 
The profit of the RO is (through profit maximisation): 
 
²
1)²()( rrrrrrr QcpcpQPR αα −=−−=−=   
 
with a similar relation for the competitor m, and the equivalent formulations: 
 
)()( mmmrrr cpQandcpQ −−=−−= βα   (E4) 
 
These expressions also give us: 
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We assume for simplicity that both operators are purely private: λ’=λ’’=1 
and that rail externalities are negligible when compared to air externalities: er≈0. 
 
Welfare maximisation then leads to: 
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and, using (E4) and (E5) so as to simplify the two following expressions: 
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Thus, we obtain for welfare maximisation: 
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Introducing the quantity values that would be obtained if the infrastructure charge was 
set equal to b (from now on, the subscript b will be used for the value of the variable 
that is obtained for IC =b): 
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where the partial derivatives are constant, in the linear model. 
 
We then obtain: 
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or: 
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In the end, using again (E5): 
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We can go further if we solve the two simple linear equations obtained by mixing 
(E5) with linear demand formulations, so as to obtain the exact expressions for prices, 
quantities, that are linear functions of cr: 
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Using the notation: ∆≡γ2-4αβ, the full set of prices and quantities obtained is the 
following: 
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A fully explicit expression for optimal IC is then: 
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